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11 Introduction
Online market platforms like eBay, Amazon, and Yahoo have a historically unique path
to success. These companies started without branch offices, interacting with their cus-
tomers exclusively online. Their success illustrates the importance electronic markets
have achieved in our everyday life. The increasing penetration rate of high speed Inter-
net access across the world combined with high costs for service staffing in first world
countries promises high returns on online services with little or no branch offices involved.
Online services base their success on trust in infrastructure, mechanisms, and counter
parties. The infrastructure is seen as reliable and trustworthy in many countries. But
counter parties, such as service providers and —if involved— third parties are difficult
to evaluate and more likely to defect. This holds especially true for electronic markets,
where counter parties often use pseudonyms rather than their real names and may orig-
inate in other countries with different jurisdictions. The companies mentioned above
try to foster trust via rating systems, reputation systems, and advertisement. However,
recent numbers published by official institutions (National White Collar Crime Center
2006) about fraud and manipulation point towards a growing need for rule enforcement,
monitoring, and prosecution tools for electronic market platforms.
People tend to manipulate markets in order to improve their stock to yield a higher
benefit or to reduce uncertainty during trades. To assure a common understanding of
the general terms such as fraud, prediction markets, and market engineering each term
will be briefly introduced in the following subsections. Finally, an example will illustrate
how manipulation can happen in an electronic sports prediction market and the difficulties
encountered in discovering it. The example will pose the research questions addressed in
the following chapters.
1.1 Market Design and Fraud
The term fraud is used in different contexts and with different meanings. The Concise
Oxford Dictionary, for example, defines fraud as
“criminal deception; the use of false representation to gain an unjust advan-
tage.”
Another definition is given by the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners :
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“the use of one’s occupation for personal enrichment through the deliberate
misuse or application of the employing organization’s resources or assets.”
(ACFE 2006)
In the example in the introduction, it is the violation of the general terms and conditions
to improve the ranking of a certain account in order to increase the probability of winning
the final lottery. This can be subsumed very well under the more general definition of
the Concise Oxford Dictionary.
Following Darwin, it is natural to take advantage of others. It can be explained by
our biological instincts. However, electronic markets theoretically provide a previously
unreached level of transparency and rule enforcement via protocols that it should be
possible to prevent manipulation by design. The questions become what fails on these
markets and what can be improved in order to prevent or at least limit fraud? Electronic
markets, such as STOCCER, Betfair, or the already mature eBay, are very popular.
However, bad press and personal fraud experience affect Internet companies significantly
since the cost for customers to switch to another platform are negligible.
“Markets don’t always grow like weeds... some of them are hothouse orchids.”
(Roth 2002)
This quotation illustrates that evolving markets do not always succeed. In fact, they might
wilt very fast. Market Engineering addresses this problem by providing a framework
to design, implement, test, and introduce markets. The underlying process has been
formalized and introduced by Neumann (2004). The process steps are shown in figure
1.1.
The diagram shows the different steps a Market Engineer takes to design a new market.
The term environmental analysis refers to the economic environment. In this step, ques-
tions like the following have to be answered: who are potential customers, what are their
preferences, constraints, and endowments? Answering these questions creates a basic
requirement list for designing the market.. The design phase includes both the concep-
tual design of the market as the design object and the embodiment design, wherein the
abstract concepts develop into blueprints for protocols such as trading protocols. This is
followed by the detail design and implementation phase. The detail design phase fills the
gap between a blueprint and a concrete system design. After the first implementation,
the incentive scheme is evaluated. This can be done via rough estimations, field studies,
simulations, or experiments.
To facilitate the work of the market engineer, several tools have been proposed. While
many tools set the focus on specific aspects such as simulations (e.g. marketsim (Porter
et al. 2006)), experiments (e.g. ztree (Fischbacher 2007)) or even application fields (like
zocalo on prediction markets (Hibbert 2005)), Meet2trade combines a complete set of
tools supporting different steps of the market engineering process (Neumann et al. 2005;
Weinhardt et al. 2006b). It has been successfully applied in various settings and contains
2
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Figure 1.1: Market Engineering Process (Neumann 2004)
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specific tools for market design (MML (Mäkiö and Weber 2005)), experiments (MES
(Kolitz and Weinhardt 2006)) and agent based simulations (AMASE (Czernohous et al.
2003)). STOCCER was built on top of meet2trade (Weinhardt et al. 2005, 2006a) and
the psm (Political Stock Market1).
In the age of the Internet, the time between an idea and its first publication is often
minimized since being the first one offering a service can have a significant impact on
your success (Andersen et al. 2003). This pressure to launch early naturally results in
less time spent on the evaluation of how people may take advantage of the system.
Time pressure and limited evaluation are two major factors influencing the shortcoming
of the market engineering process in the Internet economy. Even when system abuse is
evaluated, the electronic environment makes it hard to foresee every possible avenue of
abuse. A bank robber will try to get a million dollars in a single attempt, but in the
Internet it is easier to trick a million users to spend just a single dollar each (Cukier et al.
2007; August Bequai 2001). Things which are too much effort for a human being can be
carried out by fully automated machines with little or no special programming knowledge
at all.
Since errors in the incentive scheme and in system design can never be excluded, a market
quality analysis has to be carried out on a regular basis after its introduction. This is
the next phase in the market engineering process: operation. To facilitate the operation
of a market, a network analysis based approach will be presented and applied to detect
manipulation in sports prediction markets. The next subsection will introduce prediction
markets in general and sports prediction markets in particular.
1.2 Prediction Markets
Prediction markets is only one of the terms used in scientific publications to describe
this forecasting method. Other terms include information markets, decision markets,
idea futures, forecasting markets, electronic markets and virtual stock markets. A recent
literature overview comparing the different terms can be found in Tziralis and Tatsiopoulos
(2007). Prediction markets are usually arranged very similar to common stock markets.
This is also reflected in the names attributed to them. But unlike stock markets, whose
primary concerns are market capitalization as well as resource and risk allocation, the
primary goal of prediction markets is the aggregation of information(Luckner 2008).
Rhodes and Stumpf describe how market based forecasting methods have been used since
the Middle Ages, and more recently, in presidential wagering markets in the United States
(2004). With the broad availability of telecommunication and the Internet at the end of
the 20th century, the application of prediction markets became easier than ever before.
Nowadays, prediction markets are used in many fields including politics (Forsythe et al.
1Polticial Stock Market http://psm.em.uni-karlsruhe.de
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1992), sports (Luckner et al. 2007), medicine (Polgreen et al. 2007), and entertainment
(Pennock et al. 2000). Besides markets which are open to the public, prediction markets
have also been employed within companies like Siemens or Hewlett-Packard in order to
improve their decision making (Plott and Chen 2002; Ortner 1998).
The idea behind prediction markets is to translate the uncertain probability of future
events into a tradeable contract. If an appropriate payoff scheme is applied, traders will
reveal their true beliefs about the probability of the underlying event. According to the
efficient market hypothesis (Fama 1970), the market will aggregate the diverse beliefs
—reflected in the trading prices— into a single price (Hayek 1945). The aggregation
continues as long as traders observe the current price and then trade against it until
equilibrium is reached (McKelvey and Page 1990). The contracts have to accommodate
the distinct types of predictions, for example, ranking of alternatives or yes-no questions.
Wolfers and Zitzewitz distinguish three basic types of contracts (Wolfers 2004):
• winner-take-all, where a certain amount of money is paid only if the event occurs,
otherwise nothing,
• index, the contract price is linked with a real number such as percentage of votes
a candidate gains; and
• spread, a certain cutoff is defined such as whether a candidate gains more than a
certain percentage of the votes.
In practice, variations of these contract forms are often employed. For example, if pre-
dicting a specific rank is desired, portfolio trading can be used in order to balance the
different options. Portfolio trading is when a basket containing one of each contract is
bought for the baseline price and then bought back from the market operator for the
sum of the current market prices of all shares. This allows arbitrage traders to level the
prices against the baseline assuming there is enough liquidity in the market.
The incentive scheme plays a key role in the motivation of the traders. Various schemes
have been proposed and evaluated against each other. Some of the often used schemes are
the publication of rankings performance based pay-offs and fixed pay-offs. In real-money
markets the performance based pay-off is widely used. There is discussion regarding
whether real-money markets are more accurate than play-money markets. However,
recent findings indicate that they perform equally well (Servan-Schreiber et al. 2004).
Because of the German gambling law (LottStV 2003), STOCCER used play-money. Every
trader began with an initial endowment of 100,000 virtual currency units as well as 100
shares of each contract. In order to motivate traders, small prizes were raﬄed among the
most active traders of the week as well as larger prizes among the final top 100 traders
ranked by their portfolio.
The trading mechanism is the third key component of a prediction market — besides
the contracts and the incentive scheme. Typical trading mechanisms are the continuous
double auction (CDA), the call auction (CA), dynamic pari-mutuel markets (Pennock
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2004) and market scoring rules (Hanson 2007). In STOCCER, both CDA and CA have
been implemented, where the CDA had the higher trading activity as measured by the
transactions per day (Geyer-Schulz et al. 2007).
The FIFA World Cup 2006 was held in Germany from June 9th to July 9th 2006. Thirty-
two national teams qualified for the tournament. The tournament was organized in two
stages: a group stage and a knock-out stage. All in all, 64 matches were played: 48 in the
group stage and 16 in the knock-out stage. Overall, more than 1,700 traders registered
on the platform and initiated on average more than 1,600 trades per day with a total of
about 90,000 trades. The traders could trade on 19 different markets: 16 final rounds
matches, 2 for the top goal scorers and a so-called championship market for shares of
all 32 teams. The latter market was the one with the highest trading activity and will
therefore be used as the data set for the following.
The championship market started on May 15th 2006 and ran until the end of the FIFA
World Cup on July 9th 2006. The platform consisted of a trading system and a portal
site to publish rankings, FAQs, news, and host discussion forums.
1.3 State of the Art in Fraud Detection
Fraud detection is investigated in different domains within the scientific community as
well as industry. The solutions, metrics and results are of such a diverse nature, that
several literature surveys have been published in the last years. Due to their extensive
nature this section will discuss fraud detection in general and close with the critics and
comments of the literature reviews. For further reading, the review by Bolton and Hand
(2002) and of Phua et al. (2005) is especially recommended.
The literature regarding Fraud detection is highly related with statistics, data-mining, vi-
sualization and artificial intelligence. The methods are usually classified into supervised,
semi-supervised and unsupervised. Application areas range from insurance fraud, mobile
and telecommunication fraud, e-commerce fraud, on- and oﬄine credit card fraud, iden-
tity fraud, and financial fraud – in markets as well as in accounting. Related areas are law
enforcement, anti-terrorism systems, and intrusion detection systems. Several machine
learning techniques need a pre-classified training data set. The term labeled data refers
to such a data-set which usually is a real-world or generated data-set with an additional
column containing the classification labels.
Focusing on neural networks and computational immune systems Margaret Weatherford
(2002) published a short report about ongoing projects in fraud detection. According
to her report, HNC Software applies back-propagation based neural networks with three
layers of neurons. These are trained in supervised mode to detect credit card fraud in the
Falcon Fraud Manager. A European research group is reported to use neural networks in
mobile telecommunication fraud with an unsupervised learning approach, such that only
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non-fraudulent data is necessary. Finally, she presents a computational immune system
used to detect fraud at Consignia, the former UK’s Post Office Group.
Bolton and Hand (2002) published an overview covering several application areas and
techniques. They distinguish between fraud prevention and fraud detection, the latter
being continuously applied to find the cases where the first has failed. According to them,
the interchange of ideas in the field of fraud detection is limited since fraudsters could
use this information as well to circumvent the newly developed systems. Censored and
unpublished data-sets restrict the evolution of the discipline as well. The large data sets
of the typical application areas require the dection system to have a very high efficiency.
Bolton and Hand see the uncertainty of the classifications as a fundamental point:
“[...] we can seldom be certain, by statistical analysis alone, that a fraud has
been perpetrated”.
This means the only purposes of the fraud detection system is to distinguish a probability
of the case via a suspicion score and then to alert the user. In the real world, fraud
detection is a delicate topic since it is about trust. Neither news about fraud in certain
companies, nor noting that you yourself are suspected to be fraudulent, will foster the
necessary trust in the customer relationship.
After addressing fraud in general, Bolton and Hand discuss different tools for fraud de-
tection and present selected publications from the following application areas: money
laundering, network intrusion, credit card, telecommunications, medical, and scientific
fraud. They conclude with a description of related areas such as insurance fraud, plagia-
rism and management fraud. Besides the previously mentioned essential importance of
the detection speed, they consider the uncertainty about the false negatives to be key
for the evaluation of the methods.
Kou et al. (2004) published a survey about fraud detection techniques focusing on credit
card, telecommunications and computer intrusion. The survey is structured alongside
these application areas and discusses within each of them the different techniques that
have been applied so far and by whom. Besides the different publications about each
technique, they describe open research issues they see in each of the application areas.
Finally, they close with some criticisms. In credit card fraud detection, only few ap-
proaches are published in any detail. Among these, neural networks are very popular,
but no data sets are available to implement or reproduce them. In the field of intrusion
detection, data sets are available, but it is hard to reproduce or simulate realistic attack
scenarios. Telecommunication fraud detection systems suffer from their inability to detect
newly evolving fraud, which is not already present in the training data set and therefore
requires system maintenance or an upgrade. It is especially important for the thresholds
and parameters to be accurately defined.
An extensive review of the literature regarding the use of data mining techniques is pre-
sented by Phua et al. (2005). The mentioned criticism by Bolton and Hand regarding
7
8 1 Introduction
unavailable or unpublished data sets has a complete section dedicated to data and mea-
surements. Phua et al. found 40 different sizes of data sets described in the literature,
ranging from less than 500, up to 100 million, with a number of different attributes. The
vast majority have less than 50 attributes with only 6 data sets containing more. None of
the data sets are publicly available except for one relatively small automobile insurance
data set.
Similar to the wide variety of data sets is the multitude of employed performance mea-
sures. The survey encountered as measures: explicit cost of fraud, misclassification
cost, false positives, false negatives, real positives, entropy, conditional entropy, relative
conditional entropy, information gain, detection time, Area under the Receiver Operat-
ing Curve (AUC), cross entropy (CXE), Brier score (mean squared error of prediction),
Hellinger score, t-statistics, online vs. batch, number of different frauds detected and
some problem specific criteria. Phua et al. regret that some recent studies still aim to
only maximize accuracy (true positives vs. false positives) arguing that
“in fraud detection, misclassification costs (false positive and false negative
error costs) are unequal, uncertain, can differ from example to example, and
can change over time”.
They further state that
“a false negative error is usually more costly than a false positive error”.
In cases regarding markets this does not necessarily hold. Investigators from stock ex-
changes have stated in personal interviews with the author of this work that if a system
comes up with several thousand cases/events/rule violations and most of them are false
positives they stop believing in the system and therefore stop using it. Most of the in-
vestigating departments do not have the resources to manually verify all reported cases.
Consequentially, if an automatic fraud detection tool shall support the investigators, it’s
accuracy is a core criterion. Depending on the application area, time to alarm may be of
high importance as well. For example, online credit card fraud can cause high damage
within minutes while insurance fraud detection may only require running a batch system
overnight. In prediction markets, real-time detection is desirable but not indispensable.
Phua et al. (2005) not only review, but also criticize the current data-mining methods
and techniques. According to them, research is often data oriented, while real-world
applications are more resource and management dependent. Furthermore, the industry
developed its own solutions independently, yet there has been no empirical evaluations
of these commercial systems since the one by Abbott et al. (1998). Only 7 studies of
the 51 claim to be implemented as actual fraud detection systems. Furthermore, very
few are using temporal information and none are using spatial information. Researchers
focus more on complex, non-linear supervised algorithms, but in the real world, due to
missing labels and time restrictions, only semi-supervised and unsupervised approaches
can be employed. Phua et al. (2005) predict that in the long run, faster and less complex
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algorithms will be winning. They close with the recommendation that data-mining should
consider new approaches such as outlier detection (Hodge and Austin 2004), skewed
classes (Weiss 2004), sampling (Domingos et al. 2002) or graph mining (Washio and
Motoda 2003). These are applied in related application areas like law enforcement and
intrusion detection.
After this brief overview of fraud detection in general, the next section will introduce
fraud detection on prediction markets in particular.
1.4 Related Work on Fraud in Prediction Markets
While polls rely on the quality and independence of the underlying sample, markets are
more complex and therefore the possibility of manipulation may raise concerns. The
impact of manipulation on the performance of prediction markets is without a doubt an
open question. Wolfers and Zitzewitz published a paper on five open questions about
prediction markets; one of them is “How can markets limit manipulation?” (Wolfers and
Zitzewitz 2006). Furthermore, they distinguish between the intent to manipulate the
outcome which is to be predicted and the manipulation of the prediction market itself.
This distinction is also made by Ottaviani and Sørensen(2007). They refer to previous
work in the financial literature of Allen and Gale (1992) and Vila (1989) for further
classifications of manipulation. In their paper, they investigate agents’ incentives to
manipulate in corporate prediction markets using a theoretical model. They consider
the posibility that agents may not be able to influence the price on the market but can
influence the outcome –i.e. the project end or cost– by choosing a different effort level.
Some more research on manipulation has been conducted in the field of political stock
markets (PSM). Hansen et al. (2004) discuss the effect of manipulation under the
preconditions of indecisive voters and mass media coverage. They conclude that PSMs
are vulnerable to manipulation and find that small contracts are especially effective at
being manipulated. As a solution, they propose the reduction of market imperfections
and the filtering of the prognosis (reduction of media coverage).
Bohm and Sonnegård (1999) tested a PSM in the context of a referendum, namely the
Swedish referendum about joining the European Union. In this context, they evaluated
the prediction quality of a PSM compared to polls and studied whether polls induce
market activity. Furthermore, they introduced manipulation by adding a side competition.
This competition collected a participation fee of 10 Swedish Krona from all participants
payable to the account with the highest trading gains. This should not influence market
accuracy as long as no coalitions are built. A coalition where n participants share the
final benefit but ruin n−1 accounts in favor of one single account may distort prediction
accuracy since their goal is now to transfer money from one account to another and not
to strike the most likely market price. They conclude that unless the regular market is
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strong and has considerable economic power it is possible for any group to distort the
prices at least for a certain period of time.
Most of the research on political stock markets consider outcome manipulation. In the
field of market manipulation, Camerer (1998) reports some interesting observations. He
observed that temporarily introduced manipulative bids in racetrack betting markets had
a certain but statistically insignificant impact on market prices.
Hanson and Oprea (2004) take a contrary position. By modeling a market with a modifi-
cation of the simplified Kyle (1985; 1989) model and adding a participant with a different
price preference to the market, they find that the mean target price has no effect on prices
and the price accuracy even increases. Their model has T participants of which one is
a manipulator and N are informed traders (subset of T ) who can obtain disclosed in-
formation about the bias of the manipulator and the real asset price v. In a follow up
experiment, Oprea et al. (2006) investigated the influence of manipulation on price ag-
gregation and on observers in a lab experiment. Therein manipulators did not succeed
in raising the prices and failed in lowering them. Even though aggregation did not work
properly, there was no statistically significant influence of manipulation on information
aggregation. Dimitrov and Sami indicate in their recent publication (2008) that non-
myopic strategies in prediction markets may actually be profitable and can temporarily
distort prices.
This discussion of recent work on manipulation in prediction markets already indicates the
early stage of the field. Hanson (2006) states that empirical results on price manipulation
are mixed and the evidence is weak for actual manipulation in political stock markets.
Moreover, a large part of the earlier work focuses on outcome manipulation where traders
who care about the outcome try to influence prices. This is negligible in our field of
sports prediction markets since participants of our market can most likely not influence
the outcome of the predicted event such as FIFA World Cup 2006.
After a general introduction to the field, a detailed example is presented on how partici-
pants commited fraud on the sports prediction market platform STOCCER to illustrate
the problems of revelation and raise the questions the following chapters will answer.
1.5 Fraud Examples in Sports Prediction Markets
On the sports prediction market platform STOCCER2, people can trade their expectations
in form of stocks about the results of various soccer events. The platform consists of a
trading system, information portal, and a user forum.
By German law, it is forbidden to pay the participants according to the profits they achieve
on the platform since the stock exchange is a zero sum game. This implies that people
2http://www.stoccer.com. The STOCCER project was funded by the German Federal Ministry for
Education and Research under grant number 01HQ0522.
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can loose as well which means it would be gambling for them. Gambling is a state-owned
monopoly. In order to motivate people to trade on the platform during the FIFA World
Cup 2006, prizes were raﬄed among the 100 most successful accounts. Participation was
free.
A promising strategy in such an incentive scheme is to create an account for each team
and play the make-or-break strategy. This means a participant sells all the shares of his
account except those of team x and then uses the benefits from his selling to buy even
further shares of team x, all under the belief that this will be the winning team. To
reduce the risk of backing the wrong horse, the participant creates a separate account
for each team. To prevent this behavior, the general terms and conditions excluded the
possibility by permitting only one account per physical person. Violation was threatened
with exclusion of the lottery. But in order to do so, it needed to be revealed in the first
place.
During the FIFA World Cup 2006, some accounts moved into the top 100 ranking shortly
after being created. Participants who had been on the platform for a while, started
complaining in the online forums and questioning the market operator by email, asking
how this was possible. Some even investigated on their own and located price drops
or peaks in certain markets, publishing their suspicion in the online forum. The market
operator started investigating —following the hints— and found evidence of collusion.
For illustration purposes, one case is presented here in more detail. The screenshots are
taken from the prototype, presented in Section 4. However, in 2006, the operator had
only an SQL-query interface which made manual investigations very time consuming.
The transaction listing from the account Soccer securities in Figure 1.2 shows a three
day period during the world cup. The pop-up menu in the lower part of the screenshot
lists all matches in which Tunisia was playing. They lost the last match on June 23rd and
dropped out of the competition. The final value of the Tunesia share was € 0 according
to the pay-off rules of that market. Apparently Soccer securities was trying a make-or-
break strategy on Tunisia. He was buying during the days before the last match all shares
he could get by placing a large buy order at € 2.31. This presumption is supported by the
structure of his portfolio (see Table 1.1). The table shows in the rows the different shares
traded on the market and in the colums the number of shares (Amount) the account
was holding. The column Gain/Loss is the profit of all sell transactions so far minus the
costs of all buy transactions so far. The last column Final Value is the value of the shares
when the market closed and the final pay-offs per team were known.
Even after Tunisia dropped out on the 23rd he continued buying shares indicated by the
blue marked transactions. But then, between 11:30 am and 11:34 am, he changed his
mind and sold all his Tunisia shares within less than half an hour to three accounts only
for € 2.69, making more than € 280,000.00 profit and pushing himself from the last
ranks right into the top 100 of the almost 2,000 participants.
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The system automatically highlights disadvantagous transactions in blue, advantagous
in green.
Figure 1.2: Transactions of the account Soccer securities, 21-24 of June, 2006
12
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Table 1.1: Portfolio balance for Soccer securities before and after the fortunate transac-
tions
Portfolio at 11:31:00 Portfolio 12:01:00
Share Amount Gain/Loss Amount Gain/Loss Final Value
Italy 91 1150 91 1150 4550
Mexico 483 -2512 483 -2512 2415
Netherlands 91 1145 91 1145 455
Tunisia 109586 -157006 0 137779 0
Japan 22541 -12047 22541 -12047 0
Paraguay 3591 -358 3591 -358 0
Iran 3165 -1372 3165 -1372 0
Korea Republic 191 0 191 0 0
Saudi Arabia 191 0 191 0 0
Poland 91 200 91 200 0
Côte d Ivoire 91 1 91 1 0
Czech Republic 45 1142 45 1142 0
Serbia and Montenegro 0 1174 0 1174 0
Spain 0 2346 0 2346 0
Sweden 0 1126 0 1126 0
Switzerland 0 1457 0 1457 0
Togo 0 3857 0 3857 0
Trinidad and Tobago 0 166 0 166 0
Ukraine 0 971 0 971 0
Angola 0 4557 0 4557 0
USA 0 210 0 210 0
Argentina 0 4307 0 4307 0
Australia 0 887 0 887 0
Brazil 0 5711 0 5711 0
Costa Rica 0 105 0 105 0
Croatia 0 870 0 870 0
Ecuador 0 1222 0 1222 0
England 0 2514 0 2514 0
France 0 -14684 0 -14684 0
Germany 0 3858 0 3858 0
Ghana 0 60753 0 60753 0
Portugal 0 2109 0 2109 0
SUM -86141 208644
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If the change of luck is not suspicious enough, a glance at the counter parties provides
more insight. Figure 1.3 on the facing page shows the three accounts who bought the
worthless Tunisia shares from Soccer securities. Among these three accounts, the account
morros is particularly interesting. He has a longer trading history and apparently also
played a make-or-break strategy on two outsiders: Tunisia and Mexico. Note, that after
a sequence of Mexico acquisitions between € 5.40 and € 5.67, he is selling them for
€ 5.36 to Soccer securities. Both the acquisition the disposition took place on June 21
right after the end of the game where Mexico won against Portugal and thereby qualified
for the next round. The shares of all teams of the second round paid a minimum of €
5.0. For Tunisia, morros exhibits less ambition but still buys large amounts here and
there from Soccer securities. Therefore, Soccer securities can be seen as the major buy
and sell partner of morros in terms of turnover.
Even more obvious are the cases of the accounts mojitos and cocacola, where Soccer
securities is the only trading partner and the two accounts were created on the same
day just two hours earlier. The whole pattern of both accounts is very similar and it
is conjecturable that they are the same persons. Since the only account that benefited
from their actions was Soccer securities, the market operators excluded Soccer securities,
cocacola and mojitos, but failed to notice the relation to morros.
The operator considered these fraudsters harmful since their trading behavior, at least
temporarily, influenced the market prices and thus also the prediction accuracy of the
market. Furthermore, complaints which were published in the discussion forum about
fraudsters in the market, such as “Is it possible to exclude cheaters from the market?
They screw up the market” or “My first experience in STOCCER is that some traders are
cheating”, exemplify the traders’ annoyance. In the worst case, well-informed and rather
motivated traders may stop participating in the market. Consequently, it is desirable to
prevent fraud in prediction markets.
Manipulation in prediction markets is not only limited to STOCCER. Betfair, one of the
largest commercial online betting platforms for sport events had to void a market for a
Polish 4th tier tennis match involving No. 4-ranked Nikolay Davydenko of Russia and
No. 87-ranked Martin Vassallo Arguello of Argentina (Culpepper 2007). Such a match
usually does not attract too much attention. But even before the match began, the
odds went away from the logical favorite toward the underdog. The total was £ 3.59
million, ten times higher than usual. Though the favorite won the first set, he lost the
second set and finally dropped off in the third set with a foot injury. Betfair and ATP
started investigations. Betfair started offering to share their data with sports governing
bodies in order to reveal corruption. But many of them —including the International
Olympic Committee— refused the offer (Drape 2008). The Betfair case illustrates what
can happen if a group of people collude to increase their profit. When the sportsmen are
involved, it is even worse since this damages the sport’s reputation, like recent cases in
European Soccer Matches illustrate.
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(a) morros
Figure 1.3: Transactions of the collusion partners of Soccer securities
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Manipulations exist on political stock markets as well. Rhode and Strumpf documented in
their publications (2004; 2007) several cases on different markets throughout the last 80
years. The manipulations they address are more concerned with price manipulation and
its consequences. However, none of the cases succeeded in the long run. On historical
Wall Street Betting Markets manipulators have changed the prices during several days,
but they have only succeeded for several minutes on recent Tradesports3 markets.
In general, fraud in electronic markets increased during the last few years and has become
a serious problem for electronic market platforms such as eBay or Amazon. The Internet
Crime Complaint Center received 207,492 complaint submissions in 2006 (National White
Collar Crime Center 2006). Of those, 86,279 complaints were referred for further investi-
gation with a total dollar loss of $198.44 million and a median dollar loss of $724.00 per
complaint. Almost half of them (44.9%) have been Internet auction fraud. In 2003, a
report from the SIRCA (2003) states a total loss due to identity fraud of $1 billion dollars
just in Australia. Recent estimations in money laundering see it as the third biggest
business in the world (Robinson 1998). These figures illustrate the economic dimensions
and the growing need to address the underlying problems of market manipulation and
fraud.
All these different types of manipulation and fraud have one thing in common: a group of
persons or a one person with multiple identities join forces to reap benefits either inside
the market or in a super game (e.g. in case of STOCCER the final lottery, in political
stock markets the elections, etc.). Several identities collude to manipulate the market or
game. Thus the main questions addressed in the following chapters are:
1. Can the social structure between market participants be revealed by ana-
lysing only transaction data?
2. How can the social structure be used to detect collusion?
The first question is clearly limited to markets where participants are trading with each
other without a central intermediary such as a market or book maker. If an intermediary is
present, the group of manipulators has to either include the intermediary or work around
the other individuals decisions.
1.6 Summary
The recent rise of fraud and manipulation in electronic markets in general and in prediction
markets in particular is a key problem for trust in current market platforms. Two real
world examples have been presented to illustrate different aspects of manipulation. The
majority of the scientific approaches to detect fraud use complex, supervised methods like
neural networks and depends on labeled data sets. Disagreement on a common metric,
3Tradesports http://www.tradesports.com/
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unpublished data sets, and the problem of the closely following fraudsters hinders further
development of the field.
Since the trustworthiness of an electronic market, be it a commercial or a prediction mar-
ket, is the basis for the customers to use the platform; bad reputation and manipulation
is a serious threat to the operators. Most of the operators do not have the staff or the
capacity for complete transaction monitoring. So the questions to be answered in the
following chapters are:
1. Can the social structure between market participants be revealed by analysing only
transaction data?
2. How can the social structure be used to detect collusion?
The chapters are organized as follows: The second chapter will present two different
detection heuristics. The third chapter will propose a visualization which can be used to
monitor a market. Chapter four describes a prototype implementation which is followed
by an evaluation in chapter five. Chapter six closes with a summary and outlook.
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Trading patterns play a key role in fraud detection. Market designers can use them as
a feedback to their design parameters, and traders could use them to develop counter-
strategies.
Pattern recognition in fraud detection is a straight forward approach, in order to generate
warnings to authorities if previously investigated crime patterns appear again. Though
the term pattern recognition has a rather narrow meaning in computer science, there are
a variety of data-mining algorithms for this purpose. For example, event-based systems
raise events on certain predefined conditions or patterns and rule-based systems have hard
coded rules for each pattern. Only a few approaches try new, uncommon techniques.
Some examples are the work of Hill, who looks for statistically uncommon occurrences
of first digits (Hill 1995) in accounting, game theoretical modelling of fraud strategies
and development of counter strategies (Dalvi et al. 2004) and logical rule improvement
by Kim et al. (2003). The problem of patterns is that they are very short-lived. Once
the fraudsters become aware of a search pattern which matches their strategy, they alter
their patterns in order to stay below the thresholds or deviate from the pattern and thus
create a new one. Therefore operators have to continuously fine-tune the thresholds and
update the pattern database. Consequently, a flexible pattern that automatically adapts
to the current situation without any fixed thresholds and a system the automatically
learns new patterns promises the highest success against fraudsters.
This flexibility is provided by artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms. AI research has applied
adaptive algorithms like neural networks, genetic algorithms and case based reasoning to
fraud detection. The problem of many of these AI approaches is that they act as a black
box. The reason why a case had been classified as fraud because of a neural network
is hard to comprehend. Without the reason for the classification, the investigator has
to analyze the case in depth without knowing what to look for. Comments in a pattern
database can at least link to previously judged cases and a rule based system can mark
the element, which violates the rule. Thus, core characteristics of a good fraud detec-
tion system are comprehensibility and flexibility. Another problem of machine learning
algorithms is that they need an accurately classified training data set. In several fields of
fraud detection like money-laundering or telecommunications, the exact classification is
often impossible. Accounts may turn out to be fraudsters several month or years later, as
shown in Bolton and Hand (2002). Furthermore, trained algorithms can only recognize
existing fraud patterns and are less flexible for new evolving patterns.
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A very important question in the design of a fraud detection system is which performance
measure to apply. For example, one could minimize false positives or false negatives. The
SAS Institute stated in 1996, that the objective of fraud detection is to maximize correct
predictions and to maintain incorrect predictions at an acceptable level (SAS Institute,
1996). Therefore, false positives and false negatives have to be minimized at the same
time. Bolton and Hand (2002) provide a numeric example, showing that even with an
accuracy rate of 99% for the classification of a fraud case, 99% accuracy for a legitimate
case, and an actual fraud rate of 0.1 percent, on average only 9 of out of 100 flagged
cases will actually be fraud1. Considering the costs for an in depth analysis for all hundred
cases, the system would still generate a significant overhead. Many other measures have
been suggested for the different algorithms and domains (c.f. previous chapter). In the
insurance industry, the comparison against manual evaluation is done quite often (von
Altrock 1997; Brockett et al. 2002; Stefano and Gisella 2001; Belhadji et al. 2000). As the
discussion in the previous chapter about fraud in prediction markets indicates, a certain
amount of noise trading is even desirable for a market. Thus a hundred percent clean
market is neither achievable nor desirable. But a very high degree of noise may harm the
information aggregation and thereby the quality of the market and threaten legitimate
users.
The best solution would detect the fraudsters by their intentions rather than by their
transactions. Intentions, the very inside of our thoughts, cannot be revealed with the
information stored in today’s transaction systems. Though neuro-science is advancing
lately, the intentions behind a transaction is still left to the interpretation of the human
investigator. Phua et al. (2005) point out that new research topics in the field of anti-
terrorism and law enforcement such as link analysis and graph mining should be taken
into consideration for fraud detection as well. Bolton and Hand recommend Peer Group
analysis to monitor inter-account behavior over time and suggest Break Point Analysis to
monitor intra-account behavior over time. Also, using further information like the social
context of a trader and the context of the transaction may help to improve classification
quality. A social network analysis related approach has recently been presented in law
enforcement (Wang et al. 2006).
In this chapter, two graph based pattern detection algorithms are going to be presented.
The patterns originate from fraud detection but may be of interest for other applications
as well. Analyzing social graphs using specific metrics like betweenness, centrality and
others has already been suggested earlier. A good overview can be found in Wasserman
and Faust (1994).
1100 cases get flagged, if the algorithm evaluates a 10,010 records while recognizing 99% of the legimate
users as legimate. With a fraud rate of 0.1 percent, 10,010 records would contain 10 real fraud cases.
Though the fraud algorithm will recognize most of the fraud records properly, it still leaves the user
90-91 records to revise.
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2.1 Related Work
After the very broad introduction into fraud detection in the previous chapter only pub-
lications closely related to the algorithms of this thesis will be addressed in this chapter.
Cortes et al. (2001) introduced graph based fraud detection in telecommunication; where
fraudsters make calls for free using other customer’s accounts. They extended the exist-
ing ideas of analyzing graph patterns to identify interesting nodes (e.g. Wasserman and
Faust 1994; Kleinberg 1998) from static graphs to dynamic graphs, introducing a new
data structure called communities of interest (COI). This dynamic graph data structure,
which they later refined (Cortes et al. 2003), allowed them to slightly improve the man-
ual classification in a telecommunications data set. The idea is that fraudsters tend to
learn from other fraudsters. This implies a slightly higher probability for other fraudsters
in their social community. They observed that the shortest path from a fraudster to
any other fraudster is usually shorter than from a normal node to any fraudster. The
disadvantage of this approach is that it needs some previously classified fraud cases to
indicate further accounts for investigation. An investigator – knowing this detail – may
even automatically revise the social neighborhood of each classified fraudster. Neverthe-
less, the work indicates that a dynamic transaction graph contains structures which may
reveal fraudsters by their patterns.
The next logical step would be the analysis of patterns in transaction graphs to distinguish
between normal and fraudulent nodes. This leads to the evolving area of graph mining.
From the field of bio-informatics and chemistry, several graph mining algorithms are
available (Inokuchi et al. 2003). However, general sub-graph isomorphism is a NP-
complete problem (Garey and Johnson 1979) and Washio and Motada (2003) point out
in a recent survey that there are still many open problems in this young but promising data
mining field. Due to the early stage of the field, only a few graph mining implementations
are available. Since molecular structures are large in number but rather small in size, the
run-time of the mining algorithm is still acceptable for bio/chemistry applications. But
market graphs grow easily beyond common molecular dimensions such as in the case of
traders of Apple Inc. shares on public stock exchanges. Therefore, unspecific, frequent,
sub-graph mining is still too slow for markets.
A less pattern-, but more graph-oriented, approach in fraud detection is link analysis.
Lee et al. (1999) define link analysis as follows:
[it] “determines relations between fields in the database records. Correlations
of system features in audit data, for example, the correlation between com-
mand and argument in the shell command history data of a user, can serve
as the basis for constructing normal usage profiles.”
Goldberg et al. (1995; 1998) have already proposed using link analysis to build profiles
for the revelation of money laundering. The links were made searchable through a query
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interface and displayed for further manual investigation using the NetMap tool (Davidson
1993). Though they argue that the power of the system is the “man in the loop”2, they
also have to admit that manual data analysis is not manageable any more.
Closely related to link analysis is record linkage, also known as the merge-purge-problem
(Hernandez and Stolfo 1995), object isomerism (Chen et al. 1996) or instance identifi-
cation (Wang and Madnick 1989). It refers to the mapping of identities in different data
sources. An example could be that “Eick, 2009”, “S. Eick” and “Stephen G. Eick” all refer
to the same person in a citation data set. Mapping this ambiguous reference correctly
is a common problem in information integration and of manifold nature. Records may
have different keys, missing data, inaccurate information such as only estimates of the
age of a criminal and data entry errors like misspellings or typing mistakes. The goal
is to find duplicates within a database or corresponding records between different data
sources. Identical duplicates can be found easily by sorting the database and looking
for a sequence of identical records. But when relaxing the assumption from identical to
only similar records, each record has to be evaluated against every other record in the
worst case using n∗(n−1)2 comparisons. The solution to the explosion of comparisons is
to first search and select suitable records for comparison followed by matching pairs with
a distance measure. Several heuristics have been proposed to tackle the problem (e.g.
Monge 2000; Elfeky et al. 2002). But none of them is suitable, if a person deliberately
hides his identity or even uses a fictitious one.
This type of fraud is called identity fraud and has recently gained more attention (Office
2002; SIRCA 2003). The Home Office Identity Fraud Steering Committee, a group of
governmental and associated organizations in the UK, defines identity fraud as follows:
“Identity fraud occurs when a false identity or someone else’s identity details
are used to support unlawful activity, or when someone avoids obligation/li-
ability by falsely claiming that he/she was the victim of identity fraud”.
They define a false identity as:
“(a) a fictitious (i.e. invented) identity; or (b) an existing (i.e. genuine)
identity that has been altered to create a fictitious identity”.
Since identity fraud often leads to criminal investigations, law enforcement is especially
looking for algorithmic support. An interesting approach has recently been presented by
Wang et al. (2006). They use social contextual information to match criminal identities.
Since social contextual information is usually not stored in law enforcement databases,
these features have to be extracted from personal records and crime incident reports.
The obtained information is used to span the social network. They tested the four
features: structural similarity, relational-, group- and personal distance, to train a C4.5
2This expression refers to the integration of human beings in the process of recognizing fraud. The
information is gathered by the software and presented to the human investigator who analyzes and
finally classifies the presented case.
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decision tree algorithm and achieved a significant improvement of the prediction quality
about which accounts belong to the same identity. C4.5 is a standard machine learning
algorithm introduced 20 years earlier by Quinlan (1993). A related approach, again using
a C4.5 decision tree algorithm to classify fraudsters on eBay, has been proposed by Chau
et al. (2006). The classifier is based on features extracted from the account’s transaction
history and just provides a preliminary classification. In a second step, the social network
structure is built from the bidding and transaction relationships and used to refine the
classifications with a hidden markov model using a belief propagation algorithm.
On prediction markets Schröder used graph based analysis using eigensystem analysis
techniques to detect particular trading behaviors (2009). He identified specific eigenvector
compositions for particular trading patterns related to the ones described in this thesis.
However, no information about precision and recall of this method is available. Also the
eigensystem analysis is very computing intensive already for mid-size graphes (O(|V |2|E|)
without any optimization).
Maranzato et al. have made tests to evaluate and verify the ratings given by social
networks embedded in Latin American eBay competitor TodaOferta.com (2010). They
used various kinds of activities (account creation, bidding, offering goods, accessing
listings, etc.) to evaluate trustworthiness of ratings. After identifiying 17 indicators
where activities happened from the same machine or IP address, they run a logistic
regression to rank and weight the different indicators. The goal is to develop a tool to
verify members ratings to foster trust into the right accounts and the marktet platform.
In a previous publication, Maranzato et al. build the graph of who rated whom in oder to
look for transitive rating relations and by this networks of similar rating accounts (2009).
2.2 Design of Detection Algorithms
Inspired by the work of Cortes et al. (2001) with respect to the shorter path lengths
between two or more fraudsters than between legitimate accounts and fraudsters; a
similar test was applied to the FIFA prediction market data set. Cortes et al. observed in
telecommunication networks fraudsters finding ways to abuse the system to make calls
on behalf of other or non existing customers. Being happy about their success they
often shared their techniques with family or friends. Thus in the call graph a community
of fraudsters appeared usually together. This behavior manifests itself in shorter paths
between fraudsters than from normal users to fraudsters.
In STOCCER the manually discovered fraudsters were used for the labelling. While Cortes
et al. saw the reason for the phenomenon in information dissemination of the current
fraud techniques, in markets it is more the endowment of a ruined account flowing to
the winning main account of the fraudster. Since each share can be seen as a separate
market and the observed fraud techniques did not span different shares, a graph for
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(a) normal accounts to fraudsters (b) between fraudsters
Figure 2.1: Histograms of the shortest paths in the graph of Tunisia
each share was created. The observed techniques will be discussed in detail together
with the detection algorithms below. On a high level the emloyed techniques involved at
least two accounts, where one account traded shares for unreasonable prices with other
accounts and all belonged to the same user. The minimum number of involved accounts
was obviously two. The shortest path to the nearest fraudster was measured for each
node using a breadth-first search. Two sets were defined: distance fraudster to fraudster
and distance legitimate to fraudster. Since the underlying distribution is unknown but
probably similar and the two sets are independent, the Mann-Whitney U test has been
used to test the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2.2.1. H0: The length of the shortest path between fraudsters is greater or
equal than the shortest path between legitimate accounts and fraudsters.
Hypothesis 2.2.2. H1: (Alternative) The length of the shortest path between fraudsters
is shorter than the shortest path between legitimate accounts and fraudsters.
The p-values of the tests are listed in Table 2.1. The hypothesis obviously has to be denied
for several shares at a highly significant level e.g. Australia, Ghana, Japan Korea, Mexico,
Poland, Saudi Arabia and USA (α < 0.05). But remembering the case presented in the
introduction (Chapter 1 on page 1), there had been hard evidence of fraud in the Tunisia
market. However, the Tunisia market graph seems to have other than the expected
characteristics. With a p-value of 0.347 the hypothesis cannot be rejected for Tunisia.
Another surprise are the high p-values for the market shares of Angola, Argentina, Togo,
Spain and Netherlands, where several cases of fraud had been found. There are several
possible explanations for this: Either the finding of Cortes et al. does not hold for every
market, or the fraudsters did only legitimate trades in these markets, or not all fraudsters
in the selected network have been discovered yet. The latter explanation can be supported
by the histograms of the observed shortest path distribution. Continuing the example
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Table 2.1: Results of the Mann-Whitney U test on H0 for each FIFA tournament share
Market p-value
Angola 0.751
Argentina 0.775
Australia 0.049
Brazil 0.707
Costa Rica 0.900
Ivory Coast 0.388
Croatia 0.374
Czech Republic 0.723
Ecuador 0.529
England 0.155
France 0.148
Germany 0.180
Ghana 0.004
Iran 0.051
Italy 0.748
Japan 0.014
Korea 0.001
Saudi Arabia 0.024
Mexico 0.017
Netherlands 0.996
Paraguay 0.264
Poland 0.023
Portugal 0.105
Serbia & Montenegro 0.296
Spain 1.000
Sweden 0.249
Switzerland 0.993
Togo 0.798
Trinidad and Tobago 0.061
Tunesia 0.347
Ukraine 0.906
USA 0.026
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of Tunisia, the corresponding histograms are shown in Figure 2.1. The vast majority of
traders did not get directly in touch with a fraudster and have a shortest path length
of two and above (c.f. Figure 2.1 (a)). On the other side, nine fraudsters seem to be
separated from the other fraudsters at least by one or even two legitimate accounts (c.f.
Figure 2.1 (b)). Since it is impossible to collude with only a single account, either these
nine accounts had been labelled fraudulent due to activities in another share but for some
reason “behaved” in this market or their partners have not yet been discovered. When
analyzing the nine fraud cases, it turns out that all of them acted as legitimate accounts
within the Tunisia market. Eight of the nine accounts only sold their initial endowment
and then left the market. The ninth account showed only a little more activity by buying
almost 3000 stocks during one week before the first match of Tunisia had started. But
the strategies applied by the five convicted accounts appeared more often within the
market - this time involving accounts labelled as legitimate so far. When changing the
label of each newly discovered account the shortest path distribution shifted, bringing
fraudsters closer together.
This is another example of how manual fraud detection with a small team on large data
sets is an error prone and time consuming process: error prone because not all fraudsters
had been found and time consuming because fraudsters have been discovered months
after the markets had been closed. Therefore it is highly desirable to automate the
process and minimize the necessary human involvement. Cortes et al. observed that
fraudsters call friends and after they revealed to them how they bypassed the rules, these
-so far regular accounts- then turned into fraudsters as well. On STOCCER, however,
there is no such conversion. Multiple accounts have been created by the same person.
Some of them were created to be able to play different strategies at the same time,
while others were used to dump unwanted or worthless shares. In the transaction graph
these accounts are naturally close together. The transaction graph contains important
information about fraudsters and their relationships. So the open question is:
Problem 2.1. How can the market graph be used to detect fraud on prediction markets
like STOCCER faster and with higher accuracy than human investigators?
The general idea is to mine this graph for unusual sub-graph patterns, especially patterns
known from previous fraud cases. Each of these patterns is addressed by a particular
heuristic optionally followed by a more detailed analysis in case of activation by the
heuristic. The heuristics are used to enable the detection to happen in real-time or near
real-time. The market graph is continuously updated with every contract concluded.
The heuristics are started on each update. If the heuristic activates, it runs a detailed
analysis. If the analysis detects an attempt at fraud, the case will be reported to the
market operator. Each case consists of a score, the inflicted parties, the share, number
of shares, transactions and volume.
Naturally, each indicator should capture a maximum variety of fraud cases and at the
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same time be as accurate as possible in its distinction between fraud and legitimate.
In the following, two algorithms are going to be presented to detect two out of three
observed patterns. The third pattern needs a different graph construction and will be
covered briefly at the end of the chapter.
2.3 Ping-Pong Trading
2.3.1 Motivation
A common goal of market manipulators is to purposely push the prices once they have
bought a sufficient amount of shares. One particular strategy is called pump ’n dump
on stock exchanges. Via repeated selling and buying back the price of the stock rises. A
high investment is necessary to buy existing orders in the order book. The hope is that
the market starts to believe in previously undisclosed information / insider knowledge and
jumps on the train. When enough people start buying, the fraudsters switch from buyer
to seller and sell their stocks. Thereby they make profits from selling the stocks at the
now increased stock price.
On STOCCER a similar pattern was observed but with a different goal. One account sold
shares for a low price to buy them immediately back for a higher price within the spread.
Consequently, the first account ruined himself step by step in favor of the second account.
According to the resulting pattern the strategy was entitled ping-pong or circular trading.
Depending on the spread size and the current price of the share, this loop had to be
repeated more or less often in order to transfer the initial endowment of one account
to another. If the stock price is relatively high compared to the initial endowment, only
few stocks can be bought and the process has to be repeated more often. In case of
cheap or worthless shares, large quantities can be easily accumulated and only few trades
are necessary. An example transaction sequence for such large scale transfers is given
in Table 2.2 on the following page. Two accounts transfer ca. € 114.000 in less than
20 minutes with a ping-pong sequence of buy (b) and sell (s) transactions. Besides the
alternating buy (b) - sell (s) sequence, the short time span between the two orders, listed
in the last column, is very typical. The short time difference is necessary to prevent other
traders from taking the orders. Though perfectly clean and almost synthetic, this case
was found in the real world data set from STOCCER. Other instances are more difficult
to spot since independent traders, who may have observed the activity in the order book,
pushed orders in between and disturbed the pattern.
2.3.2 An Indicator for Ping-Pong Trading
As described above, the detection is split into two parts: a graph based heuristic and an
in-depth analysis. The directed graph is built by representing accounts as nodes. Each
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Table 2.2: Typical ping-pong transaction sequence for a cheap share
s/b share price amount volume time-stamp order.t diff.
s Paraguay € 0.01 50518 € 505.18 2006-06-16 09:43:28 00:01:12
b Paraguay € 1.00 50518 € 50,518.00 2006-06-16 09:46:18 00:01:38
s Paraguay € 0.01 50518 € 505.18 2006-06-16 09:50:30 00:08:14
b Paraguay € 1.00 50518 € 50,518.00 2006-06-16 09:53:37 00:01:26
s Paraguay € 0.01 50000 € 500.00 2006-06-16 09:55:56 00:13:40
b Paraguay € 0.29 50100 € 14,529.00 2006-06-16 10:01:12 00:03:12
buy-sum 115,565.00
sell-sum 1,510.36
profit -114,054.64
edge from a arbitrary node a to node b represents all transactions so far concluded where
account a has sold to account b. For a real-time system, the heuristic is called for each
updated or newly created edge. For an ex-post analysis, it is just called once.
Ping-Pong Trading Heuristic
This indicator detects cycles in the graphs. In the basic implementation, it only detects
cycles of length two which involve just two nodes. The reason this simplification was
desired is the real-time aspect of the heuristic. Besides, the effort for the fraudster to
implement a strategy with more than two accounts is much higher and thus less likely.
To improve the speed of the heuristic, a separate graph for every traded stock is created.
This assures that whenever a cycle is detected, the heuristic does not have to test whether
stocks of the same share have been traded. This particular fraud technique does not work
across various shares as after the first sell, all shares would be gone and the user would
not have enough resources to perform a second cycle. Large isolated deals in favor of
another account will be topic of the next presented indicator below.
Another advantage of separate graphs per stock is that a case will only be reported once
to the user for every stock-seller-buyer combination — even if the ping-pong strategy has
been used several times. While running the market and updating the graph, two possible
cases can occur:
1. A new edge from node a to node b is inserted into the graph.
2. An existing edge of the graph from node a to node b is updated.
In both cases, the heuristic checks whether there exists an edge from b to a which closes
the cycle. If this is the case, and the last modification time-stamp difference between
the two edges is lower than a certain limit (max∆t), a detailed check of the transaction
history is invoked. The introduction of the time limit is required to revise existing edges
as well. This prevents the heuristic from detecting cycles based on trasactions which are
two long ago and of rather speculative nature where the market developed into another
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direction than assumed by the trader. Switching from buying stock back to selling stocks
is natural in this case and not desired to be detected by the heuristic. This is covered by
case 2.
In-depth analysis
One could imagine that quite a number of possible tests are necessary to classify a case
as ping-pong trading. For example, looking at the number of sell and buy transactions,
the number of stocks exchanged between two traders, the time difference between buy
and sell transactions, price differences and so on. To keep the test as simple as possible,
the transaction history is filtered for the currently traded stock and gets ordered by the
execution time. Stepping through the history, the average price for each block of sell
transactions and for each block of buy transactions is calculated. Whenever the trading
direction switches from sell to buy or vice verse, two checks are performed:
1. Is the time span between the last buy/sell and the current sell/buy transaction
lower than max∆t?
2. Is the average sell price lower than the average buy price? In other words, is the
price on edge ab lower than on the edge ba?
If both conditions are fulfilled, a score l is incremented. The score correlates to the
probability that the underlying account pair are fraudsters. The intuition of this in depth
analysis is to count unprofitable changes of trading direction which have a high probability
of not being caused by changing long term investment plans. The latter is addressed by
the first condition stating that the transactions have to be concluded within a short period
of time. The second condition also assures that only one case per cycle is reported. The
current implementation puts the emphasis on the one who is ruining himself by looking
for unprofitable transaction sequences. Both accounts are reported per case. A case is
only reported when the incremented score is higher than a previously selected level L.
How often someone may change their mind or conduct a transaction due to an input
error and tries immediately to correct it, depends on the underlying market and trading
interface.
Analysis of complexity
The indicator, comprising of the heuristic and in-depth analysis, is heavily depending on
the number of nodes compared to the number of transactions. The heuristic will only
fire in case a circle is closed. The probability of a new inserted edge cloosing a loop
increases with the density of the graph G = (V,E). The density is the proportion of
edges relative to the total number possible |E|/(|V | ∗ (|V | − 1)). For the online sports
prediction markets like STOCCER with open registration the major part of the graph is
very sparse and there is only a small core cluster of frequent traders. Furthermore, sports
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Table 2.3: Number of reported cases varying max∆t and setting L = 0
max∆t # reported cases
∞ 246
240min 134
120min 127
105min 127
90min 127
75min 125
60min 119
45min 117
30min 111
15min 93
10min 80
5min 74
1min 41
prediction markets are operated only for a limited time, such as till the end of the league,
championship or cup. This means that the density may vary but is likely to increase
towards the end. Across the 32 different shares traded on STOCCER the average final
graph density was 0.00933.
The in-depth analysis is more complex but can be further optimized for online processing
via only going one buy/sell block back in history as the older ones have been checked
in previous alerts of the heuristic. In case the previous transaction was in the same
direction we have already performed a similar check and we can abandon. In case our
database storage returns the transaction in their natural order which is sorted by time,
the complexity can be seen as constant (O(1)) since the number of transactions to check
is very limited.
Summarizing the above, the complexity of this indicator is O( |E||V |2 ) for an online version.
In the oﬄine ex-post analysis we add an important constant which is the average number
of transactions per edge. In sparse markets like stoccer this number is often small because
of the many one day visitors who only have few trades and lower the average.
2.3.3 Applying the Indicator
The optimal fine-tuning of the indicator requires a sensitivity analysis. The indicator has
two parameters: the maximum time between a change in the trading direction (max∆t)
and the minimum repetition threshold (L) above which a case is reported. Table 2.3 lists
the number of reported cases in the STOCCER data set when max∆t is varied while L is
kept fixed at 0. If no time restrictions are set at all, 246 cases are reported. This means
in 246 occasions someone had made an unprofitable sell-buy- or buy-sell-combination
with the same trading partner.
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Table 2.4: Number of reported cases varying L while setting max∆t =∞
L # reported cases
0 246
1 97
2 56
3 42
4 26
Since STOCCER was about predicting the outcome of soccer matches, the question arises
how fast people adapted to unexpected outcomes of the matches. If people would trade
their opinion before the match and return after watching the match, a significant change
in the number of reported cases is expected at around 105 minutes (2 * 45 minutes plus
15 minutes break) or at least 45 minutes in case they are trading during the break. This
is not the case. The number of cases reported stays high and only drops significantly if
max∆t≤ 10 minutes. This indicates that most of the participants traded while following
the match. From a prediction market perspective, this makes sense as newer information
is getting available during the match (goals, fouls, substitutions, etc.). It is surprising
that the high number of 41 cases remain even after the maximum time-span has been
decreased to one minute. A further reduction of the time-span below one minute has
not been made since on a web-based trading interface like STOCCER the time for the
update of the order book plus the time of filling out the order form and committing it
can sum up to more than half a minute. This depends on the overall load of the servers
and bandwidth. One explanation could be that the user prepared the two transactions in
two different browser windows to submit the orders as quickly as possible.
In a second step, the influence of the minimum repetition threshold L was tested, while
max∆t was set to infinity. In STOCCER, between 500 and 900 accounts traded a share.
That one account traded twice with the same trading partner is unlikely. As expected,
L turned out to be an effective filter (see Table 2.4). Only 56 cases had more than 2
unprofitable cycles and 26 had more than 4. Remember, a cycle means that an account
sold cheaper to a second account than the price for which it bought the shares back from
that same account. Thus, a L-value of 4 means that the same two accounts (i.e. a, b)
had 4 of these unprofitable cycles always in favor of the same account (w.l.o.g. a). The
highest observed repetition has been observed for Tunisia with L = 26, indicating that
two accounts shifted money from one to the other in 26 cycles . For L = 27 no case are
reported anymore.
2.3.4 Choosing Optimal Parameters
Each market is different. The analysis above indicates that depending on the number of
traders, the trading frequency, and the underlying, the parameters L and max∆t have to
be adjusted. A general recommendation for the two parameter settings cannot be given
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Table 2.5: Example transaction sequence of the account willi for a selling cheap
to b/s share price amount volume time-stamp t. diff.
Azzura b France 10.48 300 3,144.00 11.06.2006 01:01 01:01:59
Hainz b France 10.55 200 2,110.00 11.06.2006 01:01 01:13:28
Baschi b France 10.9 6626 72,223.40 11.06.2006 01:01 00:01:25
waba554 b France 10.13 374 3,788.62 11.06.2006 01:01 00:36:38
Azzura b France 10.33 300 3,099.00 11.06.2006 01:01 01:02:11
Baschi s France 8.6 7800 67,080.00 11.06.2006 01:08 00:01:17
buy-sum 84,365.02
sell-sum 67,080.00
profit -17,285.02
and as the small example of the expected trading time of 105 minutes indicates, a sound
knowledge of the market is necessary to separate the wheat from the chaff. At the end of
the chapter a combined approach of the two indicators is presented where no restrictions
have to be used at all.
2.4 Prominent Edges
2.4.1 Motivation
Ping-pong trading leaves quite obvious traces in the transaction history. Besides the
repeated money-pumping addressed by the indicator above, a second strategy was fre-
quently observed as well. The second strategy tries to cover the involved accounts by
reducing the number of necessary transactions to a minimum. The idea is to get rid of
worthless stocks for a good price or to buy expensive stocks far below the average market
price. Consequently the counter party is ruining itself. An example of selling worthless
shares has been presented in the introduction in the previous chapter. Table 2.5 illustrates
a case of selling cheap with a transaction listing from the STOCCER data set. The last
column t.diff indicates for how long the matching orders from the account mentioned
in the first column have been in the order book. The participant willi is buying a high
number of France-stocks with a single large order, indicated by the same time-stamp of
the transactions, then selling them afterwards to Baschi far below the price he paid just
a few minutes ago. Baschi is gaining 7800 shares of France for 17,285 less than the
current market price. This happened several days before the first match where France
played for the first time. It is very unlikely that new information had been revealed at
that very moment, especially so late at night.
The pattern of this strategy in the graph is an edge with a significantly higher volume than
other edges of the same node, since the supporting account tries to give the maximum
profit to the selected account. In the case of transferring stocks below market prices, the
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Figure 2.2: Prominent-Edge graph pattern
expensive stock has to be bought first by the account that is selling the stocks afterwards.
This results in a star pattern like the one depicted in Figure 2.2.
2.4.2 The Prominent-Edge-Indicator
The challenge is to identify trading volumes deviant from the regular volume traded by
the account. The difficulty is that every trader has a different trading strategy and in
some cases, also different financial resources. Moreover, different trading volumes may
be induced by the platform if it provides different initial endowments on each market.
Therefore, the threshold to classify an edge as abnormal has to be adapted for each market
or even each node. To overcome this problem, we employ a concentration measurement.
Concentration measurements can be categorized into relative (e.g. Gini Coefficient (Gini
1936)) and absolute measurements (e.g. Herfindahl). While relative measurements only
compare each edge with the others using a selected attribute, absolute concentration
measurements focus more on the number of edges.
This distinction is especially relevant for a leaf: a node with just one single edge. A
relative measurement assigns a value of zero to the edge, while evaluating the leaf node,
because there is no other edge available for comparison. An absolute measurement
assigns a value of 1.0 to the node, because the complete volume is concentrated on only
one edge.
Online platforms often have a high number of one-time users. These are users who just
want to explore a new service or platform and loose interest shortly after their first login.
This also holds for STOCCER. Many users only traded during one day and then left the
market without returning ever again. Figure 2.3 depicts on the x axis the number of days
of activity. From the 444 one-day-users 70 had only one single transaction turning them
into leaves. If an absolute concentration measurement is applied, it would make these
70 one-time users highly suspicious, hence they receive the highest possible score of 1.0.
One could think of special strategies or treatments of these leaf accounts, such as testing
them with a special heuristic. Instead, a relative concentration index is used since it
outperforms the absolute concentration measurements. The latter ones are less sensitive
to relative size differences and more to the absolute number of edges. A fraudster could
use this omission for his profit by creating many accounts all of which are used only for
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Figure 2.3: Histogram of the distribution of the number active days per accounts in the
STOCCER data set
Figure 2.4: Gini relative concentration measurements on the volume in the STOCCER
data set
a single transaction in which he buys/sells to his primary account. However, the pattern
of an account with an unusually high number of leafs, again makes this very obvious in
the graph and easy to detect (e.g. via a breadth first search).
The result when calculating the Gini Coefficient based on the traded volume per edge
without any parameterization is displayed in Figure 2.4. Along the x-axis the accounts are
sorted by their coefficient value. The red dots indicate that the corresponding account
had been found during market operation and tagged as fraudster. It is obvious that
besides some outliers the majority of fraud cases have a coefficient value higher than
0.75. For a coefficient greater than 0.75 there are 145 cases reported; for a coefficient
greater than 0.8 there are only 52 cases. Of those, 13 out of the 52 cases were previously
classified as fraud. While revising the remaining 39 accounts, 11 of them could be easily
classified as fraud. But still more than half (54%) are false positives.
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These false positive accounts had issued an order which was matched days or even weeks
later. This is another consequence of one-time users, who place orders which may stay a
long time in the order books. Somebody may have put a sell order for a low price long
before the first match. If the team later unexpectedly wins and the prices rise within
minutes, the order may appear uninformed and gets cleared. This can create very strong
edges between unrelated accounts. Such occurrences can be seen more as a speculative
strategy and should not be addressed. These edges of unrelated trades have to be filtered
before applying the Gini coefficient. Therefore we construct an undirected graph using
only transactions where the matching orders arrived within a certain time span, e.g.
time-stamp of order A - time-stamp of order B ≤ 1 hour.
The full indicator can be described as follows:
1. Filter all transactions/edges where the timestamps of the corresponding buy and
sell order differ not more than pe.max∆t.
2. Convert directed edges into undirected edges. In case of an edge e1(a, b) and a
second edge e2(b, a) remove both and introduce an new undirected edge e3 where
all attributes are the sum of the attributes of e1 and e2.
3. Calculate for the filtered edge-set the Gini coefficient:
G(v) =
∑
ei∈edges(v)
2i− n− 1
n
∗ ei.attr
with v being the node currently evaluated, and attr the selected attribute the
concentration is based on. Depending on the market and the distribution of prices
attr may be the number of transactions, the number of shares or the volume
(
∑
price ∗ quantity) traded over the edge.
If G(v) exceeds a threshold θ, the case is reported to the market authorities. The
conversion of the graph into an undirected graph helps to distinguish cases where a node
traded on several edges with similar volumes, but on one edge received a high volume in
return. In the directed case, this would not call the attention of the authorities though
certainly being worth a look.
The runtime complexity of this indicator depends on the implementation being either
focused on realtime or ex-post analysis. While for a real-time analysis the graph update
only happens in case the current transaction matches the filter criteria, the ex-post
analysis will have to build the full graph for all transactions once in the beginning. The
complexity of the Gini coefficient is per evaluated node equal to the degree of the node.
The upper boundary is naturally O(|V |) for a node with an edge to every other node in
the graph. In STOCCER the maximum observed outdegree was 200 for the Iran market
with 614 nodes. This is an extreme exception as the majority of nodes had less than
20 edges (see Figure 2.5). Given the logarithmic degree distribution in such markets the
complexity is between o(log |V |) and O(|V |). For an expost analysis the whole graph will
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Figure 2.5: Histogram of node degrees
be traversed, which adds the total number of nodes as a multiplier for the upper bound
O(|V |2) and expected complexity o(|V | log |V |).
2.4.3 Applying the Indicator
Table 2.6 shows the sensitivity of the parameter pe.max∆t. Obviously the number of
reported cases can be reduced significantly. The unexpected increase in reported accounts
while reducing the time span towards 12 hours is related to the graph construction: Some
accounts had several strong edges. But when we reduce the time span, some transactions
are removed from the transaction history and at a certain span only one strong edge
remains in the transaction history of the account. Now this account will be reported
until the time span drops below the value of the last strong edge.
The unexpected increase underlines that indicators probably fit best if they are calibrated
node-wise and not just according to the market. Certainly an optimal calibration cannot
be achieved manually, since this would be an immense effort requiring a complete manual
investigation of the whole data set.
Since many of the false positives resulted from different sell and buy transactions in
different shares, some modifications have been implemented and tested. The following
modifications have been implemented:
1. a directed graph,
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Table 2.6: Number of reported accounts varying pe.max∆t and keeping θ = 0.75
pe.max∆t # accounts
24h 145
22h 139
20h 138
18h 138
16h 138
15h 140
14h 147
13h 141
12h 142
10h 137
08h 131
04h 119
03h 122
02h 108
01h 87
45m 83
30m 72
15m 59
10m 49
05m 44
01m 16
a) considering the entire graph
b) considering only incoming edges
c) considering only outgoing edges
2. setting up different graphs for each share.
As expected the directed graph implementations returned fewer cases than the undirected
version. Unfortunately, there was no notable change in the false-positive rate (more or
less 50%). The implementation using a different graph for each share got the best result
with only 32.5 % false positives (pe.max∆t = 1h, θ = 0.80). The logic behind this effect
can be explained by the lower variance of the prices. If an account sells his complete
initial endowment to the market, he makes less profit for cheap shares and a higher profit
for the more expensive ones. If only transactions of the same share are considered, the
concentration is related to the amount of stocks. If an account usually trades only less
than 500 shares and suddenly 5000 with a single partner, the indicator produces the
desired warning. The resulting case list is provided in Table 2.7. The table contains
the case list with the previously described settings. The accounts are colored according
their manual classification into fraudsters (red) and legitimate (black) accounts. The
table is ordered according to the edge volume instead of the Gini-value (column score).
The column labelled tr. lists the number of transactions and q. refers to the number of
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Table 2.7: Cases reported by the Prominent Edge Indicator per share (pe.max∆t =
1h, θ = 0.80)
Note: Fraudsters are marked in red color.
account 1 account 2 Gini Indicator for score volume∇ tr. q.
FEZ RibAldA [Côte d Ivoire] 0.8294 540.0 1 200
FEZ RibAldA [Czech Republic] 0.8060 1900.0 1 200
gunnar.kaestle Maddin [Serbia & Montenegro] 0.8039 3348.0 3 1200
Soccer securities Studienrat [Togo] 0.8074 9719.35 3 8673
bleckfriday Bernie78 [Czech Republic] 0.8650 10,000.00 1 1000
brainjohn hannes2802x [Costa Rica] 0.8030 12,979.00 2 12595
KöbiKuhn Andrea [Costa Rica] 0.8275 13,500.00 1 7500
FEZ sb3000 [Germany] 0.9087 15,815.15 2 815
HelloWorld eug555kg [Poland] 0.8337 21,930.00 1 12900
winner Hopp Schwiiz [Trinidad &Tobago] 0.8150 23,270.00 1 13000
Doppelpack KSC4ever [Angola] 0.8564 23,350.00 1 23350
brainjohn bleckfriday [Iran] 0.8041 23,583.00 1 23583
JPKocher dagho [Ghana] 0.8080 26,590.50 1 5598
welwelsken merlin [Togo] 0.8191 27,531.00 4 18600
rizzopower king [Paraguay] 0.8506 35,340.74 3 93002
bleckfriday Liceu [Iran] 0.8817 37,568.21 6 23981
KSC4ever blablu [Côte d Ivoire] 0.8159 39,996.00 1 9999
www.tischt. . . Attila [Angola] 0.8418 45,843.43 4 48758
RibAldA pabeki [Paraguay] 0.8199 46,136.40 2 11504
drogadito morros [Tunisia] 0.8831 47,723.01 4 23909
www.tischt. . . Attila [Korea Republic] 0.8333 48,018.81 1 19131
fpschebe falke [Ghana] 0.8595 54,320.00 2 21728
RibAldA Mikl [Trinidad & Tobago] 0.8836 66,570.00 1 4438
Maddin Pia [Angola] 0.8461 81,155.84 5 37532
fruit king [Paraguay] 0.8624 114,000.00 2 120000
slindoe kyrie [Tunisia] 0.8042 213,014.94 17 97639
kyrie slindoe [Korea Republic] 0.8134 326,750.62 28 73082
Maddin Lutscher [Ghana] 0.8476 585,409.00 25 118050
stocks transferred between the counter parties. Obviously, the higher the edge volume
is, the higher the probability of fraud. This strategy is very convenient for a fraudster.
The fraudster has to create fewer fake identities or cooperate with fewer partners and
has to transfer less often but in higher amounts to improve the chances of the primary
account. On the downside, this increases the probability of false positives for cases with
a low volume.
This finding has been reproduced on further data sets. Table 2.8 lists the results of the
Prominent Edge Indicator applied to four data sets. The parameters were kept fixed with
only the FIFA WM 2006 market being evaluated twice. Once with the default setting
applied to all data sets and a second time with the example settings above to make it
more comprehensible in combination with Table 2.7. The volume median (x˜) for Table
2.7 is 31,435.87 and the 0.25 quartile (x0.25) equals 15,236.36. In all tested data sets, the
38
2.5 Combined Approach 39
Table 2.8: Reduction of fraudsters vs. false positives (FP) by cutting of the low volume
cases at 0.25 quartile or median
pe.max∆t = 0.75, θ = 24h all cases cut x0.25 cut x˜
data set #fraud #FP #fraud #FP #fraud #FP
FIFA WM 2006 61 108 60 77 56 45
1. Bundesliga 06/07 3 4 3 1 3 0
1. Bundesliga 05/06 8 10 8 7 8 2
Herbstmeister 3 6 3 6 3 5
pe.max∆t = 0.80, θ = 1h
FIFA WM 2006 27 13 23 10 18 3
number of detected fraudsters stays fixed or is only slightly lower. However, the number
of false positives can be significantly decreased.
2.5 Combined Approach
Although the reduction in reported accounts by parameterization is very successful for
both indicators, it obligates the market supervisor to carefully evaluate and set the pa-
rameters. Without any parameter restrictions (L = 0 and max∆t = ∞) the Ping-Pong
Indicator marks 246 account pairs as suspicious. These suspicious cases can be fraud or
simply the result of a change in the trading strategy or an input error. It is desirable that
a pre-selection of the parameters – similar to the median cut-off in the Prominent Edge
Indicator – could be applied, which filters the highly suspicious cases. A ruinous buy-sell
combination is suspicious, especially when it is one of the biggest transactions in terms
of volume for at least one of the accounts.
This suggests combining the two indicators. In a first step, both indicators are run
independently. Secondly, all edges reported by only one indicator are removed from
the result set. Even with very open parameter settings, amazing results were obtained.
The Prominent Edge Indicator time span was set to 12h, taking only accounts with a
coefficient greater than 0,75 into consideration. The Ping-Pong Indicator was set to
L = 0, max∆t = ∞ , reporting 246 cases. After removing all cases with a unique
account combination – meaning that a specific account combination was reported only
by one indicator and only once –, 52 accounts remained in the list. Of these, 19 of them
had been found already during market operation. A hand revision of the 33 remaining
accounts confirmed the suspicion in 28 cases, but was indeceicive with regard to the
last five. It was unclear if the traders made this transaction sequence by accident or on
purpose. They were reported because of having an unprofitable buy-sell combination in
two different shares to the same counter party.
Nevertheless, it is a valuable option to avoid the evaluation of parameter settings and
still have an effective profiteering, reducing the false positive rates below 10% (compared
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to 50% of the pure prominent edge).
2.6 Detection of Robots/Scripts
Besides the two strategies addressed in the previous chapters, the terms and conditions
prohibited specifically the usage of robots or scripts by the participants. The goal was
to have a manual trading market. Some cases however provide evidence of script usage.
For example, one user was trading at a very high frequency during several hours. The
average inter-arrival time of his orders was lower than 10 seconds. His orders covered all
32 markets and -particularly suspicious- in alphabetical order, one order per market and
all orders of the same lot size. The lot size changed after each alphabetical iteration.
Similar patterns have been observed with other accounts. Though the user interface
would allow to sort the shares in an arbitrary order, the manual trading of the same
volumina in all shares does not make much sense as portfolio trading was offert via the
trading interface as well.
In order to detect these cases automatically, a time series analysis of the transactions is
proposed. A graph based solution is to create a bipartite graph of accounts and shares.
When an account trades the same set of shares within the same amount of time, a star
like pattern arises. If the pattern repeats, the operator gets an alert.
However, every fraudster reading this section will modify his robot in such way that it will
not be detected by the above suggested methods. A more general approach to exclude
scripts from trading is the usage of CAPTCHAs (Ahn et al. 2004a,b). The user has to
solve a hard artificial intelligence problem when logging into the system. Since the human
abilities in various areas are still unmatched by the machines, one of these cases can be
used to exclude scripts from logging into the system.
2.7 Further Possible Extensions
2.7.1 IP-based Approaches
So far, only transaction data have been used for the indicators and their validation.
Another source of information is the IP-address submitting the order. This information
may put further weight into the scale. Maranzato et al. used workstation identifiers
and ips in combination with certain correlated market events (Listing + Buyer) two
defraud reputation systems for an electronic market in Latin America (2009; 2010).
Many fraudsters may ignore the fact that the network connection is giving another trace.
However, in IPv4 networks this may not be a unique identifier due to gateways, proxies,
and VPNs. Careful fraudsters will always use two different IP-Address to commit fraud.
Therefore this information has been ignored in the present state of the indicators.
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Table 2.9: Example creation pattern of a collusion group
id account name surname email address cc
1603 stoccer bbbbbbbbbbb blöd schweizwollerau@***.net ffffffffff 4455 zuu 17
1594 wollerau ***1 ****1 abcde1@***.ch hhhhh 33 8800
Zürich
188
1597 123wollerau bbbbbbb bbbbbbbbbb 123wollerau@***.ch ggggggg 8800 z 17
1595 wollerau123 bb cccc wollerau123@***.ch hhhhhhhhhhh 8800
Zürich
28
1601 123tim hhhhhhhhhhh hhhhhhhh wollerauschweiz@***.ch hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh
8880 zuri
17
1 characters replaced by * for anonymity
2.7.2 De-duplication on User Registration Data
Generally, one would expect fraudsters to try their best to create independent identities.
Maranzato et al. found that even just the domain of the registration email might be
a good signal in case of existing suspicion (2009). Surprisingly, on STOCCER many
cases have been found with very similar registration data. Even if the data itself was not
identical, at least the way it was altered was similar. Table 2.9 lists five accounts. The
selected country was stored as an integer in the database under the abbreviation cc for
country code. Obviously, the data used to register these account are highly similar. But
especially the way they differ supports the hypothesis that they originate from the same
person.
Unfortunately, it is still an open question to find this kind of pattern algorithmically.
So far, only the human pattern recognition abilities can help to identify and use these
patterns to strengthen the evidence against a suspicious group of accounts. Therefore,
the implemented prototype (see chapter 4 on page 71) offers an incremental search over
all fields of the registration data. This allows the user to efficiently check suspicious
patterns.
2.7.3 Neighborhood Search
As described in the section 2.4.2, a relative concentration measurement like the Gini
coefficient ignores leafs, because there are no other edges with which to relate. But
fraudsters do exist within the group of leafs as Figure 2.4 indicates. For these special
cases, the pre-filtering via the volume has been tested as well. The results are promising,
with 19 of 82 edges stay in the list when cutting away all edges with a volume below
x0.75. Within the remaining set of edges, eight fraud accounts have been found. Six out
of eight could be confirmed via similar registration data. The last two accounts have
been found guilty because of convincing transaction patterns.
Regarding the false negatives this is still poor evidence, but all of them are partners
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with already detected fraudsters. Therefore, a neighborhood search feature has been
integrated into the prototype, allowing it to filter the indicator result list for cases where
at least one of the two accounts already is flagged as a fraudster (see 4.2.1 on page 79).
2.8 Summary
In this chapter two graph based approaches to detect collusion in prediction markets have
been presented. The goal was to find simple measurements that are fast to employ and
easy to control by the market authorities. The influence of the different parameters on the
precision has been evaluated. To avoid the calibration of parameters, a combination of
both indicators has been proposed. Thereby a precision of above 90% could be achieved
on a real world data set.
Naturally, using graphs implies higher memory consumption. On the other side, a high
run-time performance can be achieved. The Circular Trading Indicator needs less than
seven minutes for a complete replay of all 32 graphs with a total of 17,432 nodes and
47,588 edges; the Prominent Edge Indicator even less than 30 seconds.
A side effect of the investigation was the finding that people trade upon each goal instead
of betting on the outcome of the game in advance. The high number of ruinous trades
within less than half an hour indicates that orders were issued alongside the goals of the
matches. Consequently, some of the traders bet on the wrong horse and tried to cut
their losses. This also implies that the most active traders watched the matches with
their computers near by.
Cortes et al.’s findings (2001) about fraudsters being closer to other fraudsters than to
normal users have been extended from telecommunications to markets. Besides the first
test in the beginning of this chapter, a second test with an extended fraud account set has
been conducted. This set included the accounts which were manually excluded during the
market run-time, plus the newly discovered accounts via the combination of the Circular
Trading and the Prominent Edge Indicator (see Section 2.5). Again the shortest path
from each account to the next fraudulent one has been measured and the hypothesis H0
(the length of the shortest path between fraudsters is greater or equal than the shortest
path between legitimate accounts and fraudsters) tested using the Mann Whitney U
Test. From the subset of fraudsters detected by the algorithms, only accounts detected
in the corresponding share market were used. In other words, if an account had been
found because of fraud in the Angola and Swiss market, the account was added to the
manual detected set only for Angola and Switzerland, but not for other markets.
The result is depicted in the second data column in Table 2.10. In the manual classified
set, only eight of the 32 markets had a p-value < 0.05 (see Section 2.2). After applying
the indicators the hypothesis H0 cannot be rejected for 21 markets. The p-value for the
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Table 2.10: Results of the Mann-Whitney U test on H0 for each FIFA tournament share
Market p-value1 p-value2
Angola 0.751 <‌<0.000
Argentina 0.775 0.026
Australia 0.049 0.001
Brazil 0.707 0.053
Costa Rica 0.900 0.074
Ivory Coast 0.388 0.003
Croatia 0.374 0.048
Czech Republic 0.723 0.265
Ecuador 0.529 0.018
England 0.155 0.136
France 0.148 <‌<0.000
Germany 0.180 0.004
Ghana 0.004 <‌<0.000
Iran 0.051 0.029
Italy 0.748 0.083
Japan 0.014 0.005
Korea 0.001 <‌<0.000
Saudi Arabia 0.024 <‌<0.000
Mexico 0.017 <‌<0.000
Netherlands 0.996 0.055
Paraguay 0.264 0.005
Poland 0.023 <‌<0.000
Portugal 0.105 0.100
Serbia & Montenegro 0.296 <‌<0.000
Spain 1.000 0.079
Sweden 0.249 0.129
Switzerland 0.993 0.992
Togo 0.798 0.001
Trinidad and Tobago 0.061 <‌<0.000
Tunesia 0.347 0.003
Ukraine 0.906 0.199
USA 0.026 0.001
1 p-value for the set of manually excluded fraudsters (c.f. Table 2.1)
2 p-value for the set of manually + algorithmically excluded fraudsters
43
44 2 Trading Pattern Detection
remaining 11 markets improved significantly with five being <= 0.10. Only for the Czech
Republic, England, Sweden, Switzerland the hypothesis could not be rejected.
(a) normal accounts to fraudsters (b) between fraudsters
Figure 2.6: Histograms of the shortest paths in the graph of England
Since in the second test the manual set was still used for all markets, the shortest path
callculations might not be optimal since the underlying activity for some of the edges
had been legal. When looking at the histograms for these five markets, the distributions
look very similar for the shortest path from normal to fraudsters and from fraudsters
to fraudsters (see as an example Figure 2.6 for the England market). Only 7.5% of
the honest traders in the English market had a shortest path longer than two to the
next fraudster (Figure 2.6 (b)). This indicates that many fraudsters played a central
role as major traders on these markets. When visualizing the England market graph
and marking all detected fraudsters in red, this suspicion is confirmed (see Figure 2.7).
Many fraudsters are in the center of the graph, being the major trading partners for
other fraudsters and honest traders. As a result, the shortest path for honest traders is
rather short and the Mann Whitney U Test cannot see them beeing significantly different
compared to fraudsters.
The question, whether this observation defeates the applicabillity of Cortes et al.’s find-
ings, has to be answered with ’no’. Having fraudsters operate as major market players is
a result of not monitoring market acitvity for possible fraud. This happened only since
STOCCER was primarily a scientific experiement about prediction markets. The need for
rule enforcement and market monitoring was only discovered during the experiment. But
without proper tools there were still plenty of users who managed to abuse the system
while staying under the radar. Some of the fraudsters are neighbors of the manually
excluded fraudsters. Hence, the results of the mixed test show a definite improvement.
This shows that Cortes et al.’s findings also hold true on the STOCCER platform and
that the suggested indicators help to reveal fraudsters in an automated way.
Moreover, there is the possibility of still undiscovered false negatives, leaving room for
the development of further indicators (e.g. robot detection) and the improvement of
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Figure 2.7: Marketgraph for England of the last four trading weeks
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existing ones as explained in 2.7. An completely independent evaluation of the algorithm
results will be presented in Chapter 5.
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3 Market Visualization Design
Markets are driven by price and liquidity. Therefore, common visual presentations of
markets focus on price and volumes. Some modern visualization technologies such as
treemaps (Turo and Jungmeister 1992) and information landscapes (Gershon and Eick
1997) have been applied to markets without becoming widely established. All these visu-
alizations address the trader and his needs, but are insufficient for market operators and
supervisors, since they do not provide deeper insight into the trade activity. For example,
the question of how reliable the aggregated information is cannot be answered with con-
ventional displays if the prices are set by as few as two or as many as a thousand traders.
Providing a suitable tool for market monitoring will not only help market supervisors but
also help market engineers analyze and understand the influence of their design.
The crux of the problem is not that there are no advances in technology or new ideas and
concepts, but often they are not applied in practice. Even in 2007, scientists encounter
financial staff still working with spreadsheet, paper and pencil (Chang et al. 2007). Al-
ready in 1996, Matthew Chalmers found that although new products for data analysis
were available and traders knew that the new technology could ease their work,
“their scepticism was kept strong by a stream of over-complex and ill-fitting
technology” (Chalmers 1996).
Hence, a new approach has to be designed according to the needs of the user and provide
flexible interactions.
Using price and volume information for market monitoring is not enough, because they
are too aggregated. They cannot be related to the activity of a single participant. Since
fraud is usually caused by a single participant or a group of participants, the social context
of a participant is relevant when analyzing a transaction. The common visualization of
social networks is a graph (e.g. Moody et al. 2005; Heer and Boyd 2005). This can be
easily adapted to capture the social characteristcs of the market where participants are
represented as nodes and relationships such as has sold to are transformed to edges.
The problem of common graph visualizations is that after reaching a certain size the
graph becomes too large to monitor due to the visual complexity caused by too many
elements and the tendency towards visual clutter caused by many crossing edges. The
critical size depends on the graph density, size and the applied layout algorithm. Because
of the computational complexity, real-time layouting with standard algorithms like the
spring embedder is not possible above certain dimensions.
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The full transaction and order history that are available on electronic market places
contain information about the intentions of the participants. Mining the information
that is disclosed to the public is a promising approach to effectively combat fraudulent
activities. Since the fraud patterns change whenever fraudsters get aware of a detection
mechanism, these patterns have to be reviewed and adapted by humans on a regular
basis. The question is how to present the high amount of available data in a meaningful
way to the reviewer.
Problem. How can the dynamics of a market be visualized over time while still allowing
real time monitoring and not overloading established solutions with semantic complexity?
To avoid ambiguity, in the following, the term user shall mean the user of the visualization,
whereas participant refers to the market participant – also known as trader.
The previously mentioned clutter hinders the user’s ability to keep track of the active
traders, their relationships and the prices and volumes involved. Clutter is mainly com-
prised of the edges. The contribution of the nodes is negligible. Therefore, several
algorithms have been proposed to minimize edge clutter (Purchase et al. 1996; Sugiyama
2002). A typical approach is pre-clustering the data set to make the node placement
more intelligent (Archambault et al. 2007). However, a market is a dynamic process and
evolves over time. Former neighbors may never trade again. So in order to cluster the
current market state in a meaningful way, the trading history has to be considered with
decreasing weights for older transactions.
It is difficult to incorporate aggregated information about the market, like price index
and overall traded volumes, into the graph. Examples of such complex visualizations can
be found in the semiosys software1 or MatLab2. In the following, a combination of a
graph and the standard chart displays are proposed to overcome the visual clutter and
complexity problem.
3.1 Related Work
Using visualization for market monitoring can be done for two reasons: First, to find
opportunities and investment strategies, and second, to reveal fraud and risk. Informa-
tion visualization in finance has been researched for more than a decade. Most of the
publications are dedicated to showing opportunities and depicting the current market
situation and development. Fraud detection is only a niche topic. Fraud detection on
prediction markets has not been covered yet. Therefore, this section will briefly cover
some general publications about market and financial visualizations and then present
some closely-related approaches in more detail to compile a requirement list.
1S-Explorer http://www.semiophore.net/v3/en/explorer.html
2MatLab - Biograph http://www.mathworks.com/applications/compbio/demos.html?file=
/products/demos/shipping/bioinfo/biographdemo.html#19
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Various visualizations have been proposed to monitor or compare single stocks against
each other. Kiviluoto and Bergius (1997) discuss the use of 2D vs. 3D self organizing
maps on financial data. Heatmaps are available and have been used in many trading
tools. Treemaps and Information Landscapes have already been mentioned above. Stock
Diamonds have been proposed by Blume and Weinhardt (2008) as indicators for recent
price development of a single stock.
The application of graph visualization to markets is relatively new. Rostoker (2006)
recently published a manuscript on his website regarding interactive presentation of pre-
computed stock clusters as a market graph, where the clusters of stocks are represented
as nodes and similarities as edges. The graph represents similar price development in
different stock groups such as the banking sector, automotive industries, and so on.
In recent research, statistical charts are much better represented. Shmueli and Jank apply
box plots and scatter / profile plots to analyze online auctions on eBay (Shmueli and
Jank 2005). Besides these more statistical driven approaches, they present scatterplot
and list view driven AuctionExplorer in Shmueli et al. (2006). A more statistical approach
to fraud detection is presented by Shah et al. (2003). They try to classify transactions
and develop rule-sets to distinguish bidding strategies.
Little work has been published so far in the field of market visualization for fraud detection.
In the following, a requirement list has been compiled from related works. Some of the
articles cover only similar or related topics, such as credit card fraud or visualization of
business processes, since the field of market visualization for fraud detection has only
recently started.
Ming C. Hao et al. (2006) present an interactive approach for mining business data for
fraud. They pre-process the data to determine the driving impact relationship, via corre-
lation and similarity analysis, followed by clustering and classification. The visualization
depicts three attributes: source, intermediate and destination. These have been found
to be correlated as a cause and effect chain when placed on a circle from left to right.
The source attribute is shown on the left half, the intermediate on the vertical diameter
and the destination on the right half of the circle. The attributes are grouped in clusters
with the lines of the chain connecting the clusters. The main idea is to derive the angle
of a node from its importance and thus to place important nodes to the lower area of the
diagram. Further emphasis is on the possibility to drill down, filter and mark outliers.
Senator et al. (1995) present the FinCEN AI System (FAIS), that is used at the U.S.
Department of the Treasury to mine the data gathered following the Bank Security Act
(2000) for money laundering and other types of fraud by using a combination of cluster-
ing, link analysis, and visualization. The main application consists of a query interface,
which is more comfortable for the user than plain SQL queries. After identifying a clus-
ter or group of interest, the case data set can be exported to the NetMap3 application
3NetMap Homepage http://www.altaanalytics.com/
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to be analyzed visually (Goldberg 1998). Besides presenting the application, the au-
thors identify open challenges: better automatic layouts for the visualization of network
analysis, identification of “key” nodes, detection of similar sub graphs, (near) real-time
interaction, incorporating data from other sources, and finally “temporal link analysis”,
i.e. introducing simultaneous unlinked activities as new links.
A more stock exchange related approach is presented by Senator (2000). The National As-
sociation Of Securities Dealers (NASD) Regulation’s Advanced Detection System (ADS)
works with a rule engine derived from patterns achieved by mining data from different
sources. The mining can be done automatically or by experts. The visualization in ADS
is related more to the preconditions and consequences of the rules than visualizing rela-
tionships of cases like FAIS does. In a follow-up case study, Senator et al. (2002) describe
some of the requirements the system has to meet. Many of the requirements are related
to the work of NASD like
“policy approval and management acceptance of the business use of discov-
ered knowledge”.
However, some of the requirements can be seen as more general, like integrated and
continuous real-time detection, periodic evaluation and updating of the patterns to keep
pace with the fraudsters, and equal treatment of all market participants. Since ADS has
no visual analytics part, the requirements are more detection related, but they are still
relevant criteria for a market monitoring application.
Finally, looking at business process visualization, Bobrik et al. (2005) compiled a very
general list of requirements. They sort the requirements into different groups, namely
data integration, user-specific visualization, automatic layout, further requirements, and
non-functional requirements. Since some of the requirements have already been men-
tioned, only new elements concerning the visualization will be listed here: central spot
of information, adequate visualization for different user groups with different motiva-
tions, highly flexible, generic view concept, different visualization forms, and adaptable
graphical parameters.
Closely related to the approach presented in this chapter –though focusing on the min-
ing approach instead of the visualization– is an article recently published by Chau and
Faloutsos (2006). They identify potential fraudsters on eBay by analyzing their ratings,
transaction history, and their partners. The approach consists of a crawler for the eBay
transaction data, a trained C4.5 decision tree, classifying the aggregated transactions into
fraudulent and honest, and a Markov Random Field Model using the network features
to distinguishing between three states: fraudster, accomplice, and honest by applying a
Belief Propagation Algorithm. The results of this process are visualized as a graph to
give the user an overview of the situation. The layout is a standard spring embedder
which is transformed manually into a hierarchical layout. The visualization is a report for
the end-user, who has queried the trustworthiness of a certain account. Note that the
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Application
query interface ‡ 2 2 2
incorporate data from other sources† 2
“temporal links”‡
integrated and continuous detection† 2
periodic evaluations and update of the pattern†¶ 2 2
equal treatment of all market participants† 2 2 2
Visualization
weighted node positions
drill down$ 2
filtering$ 2
(near) real-time interaction$ 2
automatic layouts$ 2
identification of “key” nodes$¶ 2 2
similar sub graphs$¶ 2 2
marking outliers¶ 2
central spot of information¶ 2
adequate visualization for different user groups†
highly flexible, generic view concepts$ 2
different visualization forms$ 2
adaptable graphical parameters$ 2
† Senator et al. $Chang et al.
‡ Goldberg et al. ¶Chau and Faloutsos
Table 3.1: Requirement list for a market visualization for fraud detection
approach is based on a set of known fraudsters to train the decision tree in advance.
3.2 Graph Visualization and its Difficulties
3.2.1 Requirements for Visualizations
A list of requirements for a visual market monitoring application has been compiled from
the related works. Most of the related work does not directly address financial markets.
Some focus on very special aspects; therefore, only the most relevant or most similar
approaches have been extracted (see Table 3.1).
These approaches and their limitations are evaluated according to their current published
state in the referenced articles.
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As the review of related work has shown, most visualizations of markets deal with infor-
mation aggregation on attributes like price, trading volume, order book, and spread.
However, there is also a social component in the market: the institutionalized exchange
of goods. Markets may suffer from collusion or other forms of fraud based on agreements
between (sub-) groups of market participants. In order to focus on the social interaction,
this work proposes a graph based visualization focusing on the active parties in the market.
The questions addressed are:
1. Who is currently active in the market?
2. With whom are they currently trading?
3. Who are their past trading partners?
4. Who is a high volume trader?
5. Who is continuously active and who has only a temporary involvement?
In the following, the visualization will be presented with references back to these initial
questions.
3.2.2 Transforming a Market into a Graph
To make the mapping as intuitive as possible, a straight forward solution was taken to
construct a graph, which
• maps traders to nodes
• maps sell transactions into directed edges from the seller towards the buyer
• marks the trading volume by the thickness of the edge
• uses an intelligent filtering to focus on the most important events.
This mapping is formally presented in the following definitions.
Definition 3.1. (Vertices)
Every market participant v is mapped to exactly one node (vertex) by a bijective function.
The set V of all vertices is defined as follows
V = {v|v is a user trading on the platform}
Definition 3.2. (Share Set)
Further, let S denote the set of all shares traded on the platform.
S = {s|s is a share of a tradable product or contract}
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Definition 3.3. (Transaction Set)
Let Ts,t be the set of tuples
Ts,t = {(u, v, s, n, p, t)|u, v ∈ V, s ∈ S, n, t ∈ N, m ∈ R}
representing transactions where u sold n stocks of share s at price m to v at the time
t. The time t can be seen as discrete (e.g. milliseconds) and is modeled by a positive
integer.
Transactions represent the links (edges) in our graph. Hence, the edge set can now be
defined in the following way:
Definition 3.4. (Edge Set)
Let Esbe defined as an aggregation of Ts,twith
Es = {(u, v, s)| (u, v, s, n,m, t) ∈ Ts,t, n, t ∈ N, m ∈ R}
The time t, the amount n, and the price m are aggregated and are therefore not reflected
in the edge tuple. They are stored in the attribute set of an edge. The graph can now
be defined as
Gs = {V,Es}
Note: According to these definitions, Es may contain transactions regarding different
shares. Therefore, Gs is a graph representing all activity on the market platform. The
user of the application may filter for any desired combination of shares to narrow the
investigation.
3.2.3 Modification of the Force Directed Layout
Since there is no inherent physical representation of the trading process on a stock
exchange, the general approach is to use the spring embedder layout. The advantage
of this approach is that all nodes are treated equally and no hierarchy is superimposed.
Early concepts of this layout date back to VLSI design which Eades adapted in 1984 to
the field of graph layout (Eades 1984). A good introduction can be found in Brandes
(2001). Following Brandes, the algorithm is based on two force functions and an update
loop:
Definition 3.5. (Force functions):
Let px denote the vector pointing to the position of node x on the drawing space. Then
the force functions can be defined as follows:
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Algorithm 3.1 Basic spring embedder algorithm taken from Brandes (2001)
input: connected undirected graph G(V,E),
an initial placement vector p
output: placement vector p with low internal stress
for t← 1 to iterations do
# calculate forces on nodes
for v ∈ V do
Fv(t)←
∑
u:(u,v)/∈E frep(pu, pv) +
∑
u:(u,v)∈E fspring(pu, pv)
# update node positions
for v ∈ V do
pv ← pv + δ ∗ Fv(t)
frep(pu, pv) =
cg
‖pv − pu‖2
∗ −−→pupv (3.1)
fspring(pu, pv) = Cσ ∗ log ‖pu − pv‖
l
∗ −−→pvpu (3.2)
The function (3.1) represents repelling forces between unrelated nodes, whereas the
function (3.2) represents spring forces between nodes with a common edge. The repelling
function (3.1) returns the vector of the direction in which node u pushes node v away
(−−→pupv), weighted by a gravitational constant cg related to the current distance squared.
The spring forces (3.2) between two nodes with a common edge depend on the current
distance divided by the desired spring length l. The logarithm of this term guarantees
that the contracting force is positive if the current length is greater than l, negative if
lower than l, and zero if the length equals l. Finally, the force is weighted by a spring
coefficient cσ and drags node u towards node v by the vector −−→pvpu.
These two force functions are combined in an update-algorithm which iteratively calcu-
lates all influencing forces on each node (see Algorithm 3.1). The input is a connected
undirected graph and a vector with an initial placement of all nodes (i.e. randomly
chosen). The first inner for-loop calculates the forces on all nodes. The second inner
for-loop updates the node positions. These two steps cannot be done in a single loop.
Otherwise nodes that are processed later in the for-loop would already take updated
node positions into account.
Since the first inner for-loop iterates over all nodes in which the force-functions again
iterate over all nodes, the run-time complexity is of O(n2) for each iteration. Several
solutions have been proposed to speed up the algorithm. Fruchtermann and Reingold
(1991) propose squared force functions to speed up the initial positioning of the nodes .
Barnes and Hut (1986) present a hierarchical approach applying a divide and conquer pre-
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Figure 3.1: Example clutter when visualizing a market with ca. 1500 nodes using the
standard spring embedder
calculation and thus reduce the overall run-time complexity from O(n3) to O(n2 log n)
with an acceptable error degree. Their approach is implemented in the prefuse4 framework
on which the presented prototype is based.
The algorithm presented above is defined for an undirected graph. Although the previously
defined edge set of a market contains directed edges (a has sold to b), the layout algorithm
works fine. The force function iterates over all nodes and thus takes all edges into
consideration.
Applying this algorithm to market data will sooner or later lead to visual clutter due to the
arbitrary relations between market participants. Figure 3.1 depicts a market with 1,543
traders and 34,748 transactions. Trades happening on the current day as well as new
traders joining the market on the current day are highlighted in red color. But because
of the visual clutter and compactness it is hard to grasp what is currently going on.
To improve the visualization, the algorithm needs to be modified. Since market graphs
vary in their density and evolution, the spring embedder has to adapt to the current
market situation. The goal is to highlight the current developments in the context of the
previous trading situation. In addition, the visualization should allow the user to follow
the market activity without the need to scroll, zoom, or pan. Innovative visualizations
from the field of network monitoring, which fulfill these requirements, are proposed by
Livnat et al. (2005a,b). They describe a circular visualization, in which the current events
4prefuse visualization toolkit http://prefuse.org
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Figure 3.2: Market graph mash-up; the gray triangle indicates the history-area of the
central nodes. Inactive one-time traders get pushed out by new one-time
traders within the gray area
appear in the center, while past events move slowly outward, creating circles like annual
rings of trees. The circles are divided into sections related to a certain event type which
determines the drifting direction of each occurring event.
Creating a similar metaphor for markets might help the market operator to understand the
duration of social relationships between participants. Figure 3.2 shows a map overview
of a possible visualization. The graph is embedded in the center of the visualization. The
edges are shown as gray lines. The dots symbolize formerly active accounts. They are
shown without edges since they did not trade within the time slice of the visualization.
Active nodes are dragged towards the center of the visualization driving inactive nodes to
the outer area. Thus, the most outer belt contains the accounts that have been inactive
for the longest time. An activity history is inherent in the structure and is indicated by
the gray triangle and the time line. Note, since the repelling forces diminish with the
distance of the nodes, all nodes without edges relax to a default distance between each
other.
To structure a spring embedder visualization as described above, the animation and
update functions have to be fine tuned to the typical relationships occurring in markets.
This modification will be described in detail in the following subsections. For a better
understanding where the modifications apply, a brief introduction of the underlying model
will be given first.
Figure 3.3 shows a sequence diagram of the application. The market platform operates
directly on the database. The visualization prototype constructs a model of the market
from the database. Some filters are applied, which leads to a second reduced model. This
information is provided to the layouter, who assigns coordinates to each visual object and
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Figure 3.3: Sequence diagram of the different steps in the prefuse visualization chain
finally the renderer decides the appearance of each object according to its class and
attributes.
3.2.4 Filtering the Edge Set
The first challenge is the growing number of edges and nodes over time. A moderately
sparse graph with more than 50 participants and 200 transactions already contains too
much information to be analyzed in real-time. This is a problem of information overload.
To reduce the amount of information presented, a sliding window can be applied to the
transaction set reducing the number of edges drawn simultaneously. Only transactions
concluded in the last n time periods (e.g. seconds) are displayed as edges of the graph.
Edges based on older transactions are removed from the visualization. In order to be able
to filter the graph in the desired way, a timestamp attribute is introduced into the edge
data structure (see Appendix A). However, nodes - once they are created - remain in the
layout throughout the visualization. Though removing the nodes from the visualization
would further speed up the layout process, they still indicate previous business relations
with neighboring nodes.
For example, imagine a case where one node is surrounded by fraudsters and all edges
are already filtered. A market operator would pay more attention to this account than
if all the surrounding nodes are already removed. Therefore, it was decided not to filter
the nodes in the visualization.
Definition 3.6. (Filtered Edge Set)
Let Es,∆t be defined as
Es,∆t = {(u, v, s, t)| (u, v, s, n,m, t) ∈ Ts,t, n, t ∈ N, p ∈ R ∧ tnow − t ≤ ∆t}
The edges of the set are based on transactions in the share list s concluded shortly before
or right on the current time step tnow. So the resulting graph Gs,∆t = {V,Es,∆t} allows
the user to filter by time and share.
Filtering the edge set by time is just one possibility. It answers the first and second of the
initial questions: who is currently active in the market and with whom they are trading?
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Figure 3.4: When introducing mass ∼ trading volume (depicted by the node size), the
new spring force -dragging the nodes towards each other- moves the smaller
node faster, and thus closer to the high volume trader
Further filtering options result from the other attributes stored in the transaction set.
One could filter for price, volume, share, or user. The prototype presented in chapter 4
only supports filtering by time and share.
3.2.5 Introducing Mass
Since filtering only reduces the complexity, the representation so far only provides who
traded with whom and when. Interesting aspects such as who is a heavy and/or active
trader are hardly recognizable from the animation. The layout algorithm forces the nodes
to jump together whenever a visual edge is inserted in between them and drift away after
the edge disappears. To keep the attention of the user on a central spot and maintain
his mental map, a semantic has to be introduced into the node movement behavior.
To distinguish heavy traders from low volume traders, a mass (also interpretable as a
drag coefficient) related to the overall trading volume of the node is introduced. An
example is given in Figure 3.4. Instead of equal spring forces, the high volume trader,
who is depicted with the bigger circle, will move slower and therefore less towards the
low volume trader than the low volume trader will move towards the high volume trader.
The overall trading volume of each market participant is the sum of all his buy and sell
transactions:
vol(v ∈ V ) =
∑
e:(u,v,s,n,m,t)∈Ts
ne ∗me︸ ︷︷ ︸
buy volume
+
∑
e:(v,u,s,n,m,t)∈Ts
ne ∗me︸ ︷︷ ︸
sell volume
(3.3)
Empirically, a exponential distribution of the volume could be observed in data sets
of the stock exchange as well as in prediction markets (see Figure 3.5). A non-linear
statistical regression underlines this relationship (see Table 3.2). Therefore, a logarithmic
transformation of the total trading volume is used as a drag coefficient. The update loop
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c expλx- Regression R2 c λ
Bundesliga 1 06/07 0.894 2090909 -0.81
Bundesliga 2 06/07 0.810 2558904 -0,123
Bundesliga 05/06 0.931 837754,7 -0.43
STOCCER WM 0.774 2429544 -0.006
Canada 0.869 51156810 -0.94
Table 3.2: Exponential regression analysis, underlining the hypothesis of exponential dis-
tributed trading volumes on financial market places by high R2 values
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Figure 3.5: Total trading volume per participant in different markets
of algorithm 3.1 has to be modified in the following way:
pv ← pv + Fv(t)
δ(v)
to incorporate the drag coefficient function δ(v), which is defined as
δ(v) = cδ ∗ log10(vol(v))
where cδ is a constant for calibration.
Less active traders, who have a low total trading volume, now slowly disperse from the
center of the visualization. When they transact they are ‘snapped’ closer to the center
of the visualization depending on the prior trading volume of their partners. The more
active a trader is, the slower he will move. For example, a heavy trader will stay almost
stationary in the middle of the visualization, this being a good orientation for the observer
of the visualization. This helps the user answer the fourth initial question of who is a
high volume trader.
New nodes entering the market are placed close to the center of the visualization; the
exact location is determined by its edges and trading partners. Because of the repelling
forces older nodes are pushed to the outskirts. This causes the graph to grow in concentric
circles, where the inner circles represent the most recent active traders (see Fig. 3.2).
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One time traders move out of the center faster than traders coming back every now and
then. So the visualization is continuously updated corresponding to the trading activity.
3.2.6 Adjusting the Repelling Forces
The third initial question regards the trading history of a node. Therefore, the next
modification is related to the problem caused by repelling forces leading to a uniform
distribution of the edgeless nodes in the outer part of the visualization. These belts of
inactive traders provide little information because their placement is only influenced by
the repelling forces, which are equal towards all other market participants.
Since the visualization should answer who was formerly trading with whom, the placement
should be an intuitive representation of this relation. The full answer to this question is a
|V |-dimensional vector, which requires a |V |-dimensional space; however, the visualization
is only in a 2-dimensional space. In order to properly depict a market with more than
two participants, the requirement have to be relaxed. Instead of answering this question
for all nodes, the visualization only shows the relation between visual neighbors. If two
nodes have the default distance, they have never traded with each other. If they are
closer together, it is because they have traded together before.
To reach a meaningful clustering, the repelling force (3.1) has to be modified. The idea
is to reduce the repelling force between two nodes in case of former trading activity.
At first sight, this looks like having to traverse all other nodes in each repelling force
calculation again. So, the second objective is to keep the necessary extra computation
as low as possible. This can be achieved via a hash look-up in the full, unfiltered edge
set (Es). The function is defined as follows:
ρcluster(pu, pv) =
{
1 if (u, v, . . . ) ∈ Es
 if (u, v, . . . ) /∈ Es
(3.4)
with  ∈ (0, 1). Empirically, good results have been achieved setting  = 18 . The cluster
function ρcluster is now introduced to reduce the repelling forces:
Fv(t)←
∑
u:(u,v)/∈Es,∆t
ρcluster(pu, pv) ∗ frep(pu, pv) +
∑
u:(u,v)∈Es,∆t
fspring(pu, pv)
Note that ρcluster depends on the full edge set, while operating on the filtered edge set.
Thus the visualization knows about the edges, although they are not painted anymore.
3.2.7 Adjusting the Edge Width
The next modification improves the rendering. For the market operator, it is highly desir-
able to distinguish high and low volume trading relationships. A very intuitive reflection
60
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Figure 3.6: Transaction volume histogram
of the trading volume can be represented by drawing the edge width according to the
volume (price * quantity) traded over this edge.
The transaction volume distribution analysis is depicted in Figure 3.6 for data sets of five
sports prediction markets and one financial stock market. The histogram classes show
the number of shares traded in each transaction. For example the first class represents
the number of transactions where 0 to 10 shares have been traded. Note that both the
histogram classes and the y-axis have a logarithmic scale. Common within all prediction
markets is a peak in the 100-1000 shares class. Only the financial stock exchange data
set has a peak in the 1000-10000 class. The order volumes reach up to a million and
more in the financial market.
To be able to distinguish the different empirically observed classes in the visualization, the
edge width function uses the logarithm base 10 of the volume. The flexibility requirement
implies that the visualization has to adapt to each market automatically. So in low volume
markets, the full spectrum of edge widths should still be applied. Furthermore, an edge
width above a certain limit is perceived to be rather unaesthetic. To solve these two
aspects, the volume is normalized with the maximum volume traded over an edge so far.
Since the normalized scale range of the standard spring embedder algorithm is [0, 1], the
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result has to be scaled again to [1, 7]. These numbers are not arbitrary but related to
the seven empirically observed classes and the observation that pixels are still esthetically
acceptable. If a number larger than seven is selected, the nodes are only a little larger
than the edges and thus hard to distinguish.
width(e ∈ Es) = 1 + 7 ∗ log10(1 + e.volume)log10(1 + max i.volume)
(3.5)
The edge width function (3.5) adds 1 to the volume to prevent negative logarithm values
and thus a negative width. Since the fraction only scales to the range of [0, 6.1) and an
edge width of 0 is not desired, the overall value is incremented by one. The resulting
function is depicted in Figure 3.7. The x-axis represents the maximum volume observed
in the market so far, while the z-axis is the current edge e. The y-axis is the value of
the function width(e). It can be seen that the function is linear so far in the case of
the observed maximum of 1.000.000 on the x-axis. When going towards 1 on the x-axis,
the function becomes more logarithmical because the current calculated value of e is
simultaneously the current observed maximum and therefore stretches the linear starting
scale.
This behavior may not always be desired. If the maximum volume of the last evaluated
edge is significantly higher than all volumes observed before, the visualization will be
misleading. All other edges, which were evaluated with the old maximum, have been
drawn too thick in comparison to the last edge. This can be handled in two ways:
1. determining the maximum in advance, for example, on creation or when updating
the graph
2. ignoring it, since the visualization in this case is continuously updated like a video,
typically 25 fps, meaning the error will only be visible for 40ms.
In the prototype presented in the next chapter, the second option has been chosen. The
reason for this choice is that, in the model-view-controller concept, the model and its
knowledge is separated from the view classes. In the prefuse toolkit, the edge-renderer
class does not have access to the full graph and its information but only to the edge it
is currently rendering.
An example screenshot of the visualization can be seen in Figure 3.8. The central players
are easy to recognize and their trading relationships are clearly visible. The graph is not
necessarily connected. For example, node 125 is selling to 83 in the current time slot
∆t but neither of them is trading with anyone else. In the middle of the lower part, the
two nodes 90 and 107 are closer together than the default distance. This indicates that
they had been trading with each other previously. Another example of this are nodes 74
and 43 on the right. The inactive nodes form belts around the center of the graph. The
most inner unconnected belt is the group of traders who just stopped trading.
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Figure 3.7: Edge width function (y) with varying transaction and maximum volumina
Figure 3.8: Example for volume related edges
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3.2.8 Combining Visualizations for the Application
The graph itself is a very intuitive visualization of the social relationship among market
participants. But besides these patterns, investigators need an overview of the current
development of the market. This is necessary to relate the observed market events with
social entities and patterns. Market events are such things as price jumps or uncommonly
high or low trading volumes of a certain share.
To keep the visualization as simple as possible, these financial aspects regarding the whole
market are not incorporated into the graph visualization. However, the typical charts, like
bar charts for trading volume and scatterplots for the price development, are presented at
the side of the graph visualization (see Figure 4.14 on page 84). The scatterplot for the
prices displays the price index by default. If a peak is observed, the user can drill down
to the scatterplot of a single share via the drop down list of the combobox. The volumes
are presented as stacked bar charts. Each share is represented in a different color. On
the upper right, a map view of the current graph is displayed.
3.3 Evaluation
There is no standard procedure to evaluate a visualization as it may serve different needs.
Three main aspects of visualization evaluation will be presented in the following:
1. complexity of the underlying algorithms
2. human-computer-interface perspective
3. user requirement fulfilment
In the following sub sections, the above aspects will be explained and applied to the
proposed visualization.
3.3.1 Algorithmic Complexity
The standard way to measure algorithmical complexity is by giving upper or lower asymp-
totic bounds in the big-o notation. The o notation was introduced by the mathematician
Paul Bachman (1894). Public attention to this notation was drawn by the German Ed-
mund Landau (1909), which is why the notation is also known as Landau symbols. Nowa-
days, the usage is widespread in standard computer science literature (e.g. Knuth (1997);
Sipser (1997)). In graph theory, where the graph is typically denoted in G = {V,E}, the
problem dimension is separated into the number of nodes |V | and the number of edges
|E|.
The upper boundary of a standard spring layout as presented in Alg. 3.1 on page 54 is
in O(|V |3). One approach to reduce the runtime complexity is pre-clustering the nodes
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Algorithm 3.2 Final version of the spring embedder including all modifications
input: connected undirected graph G(Vs, Es,∆t),
placement vector p
Es-hashtable for the cluster function ρcluster
output: placement vector p with low internal stress
for t← 1 to iterations do
for v ∈ V do
Fv(t)←∑
u:(u,v)/∈Es,∆t ρcluster(pu, pv) ∗ frep(pu, pv) +
∑
u:(u,v)∈Es,∆t fspring(pu, pv)
for v ∈ V do
pv ← pv + δ(v) ∗ Fv(t)
and grouping them in a quad-tree (Barnes and Hut 1986). After a certain distance, the
virtual nodes representing a cluster of nodes are only used for calculation. This reduces
the runtime complexity to O(|V |2 log |V |) . Due to the notational complexity, only the
default spring embedder with the previously described modifications (see Alg. 3.2) will
now be considered. Whether the assumptions also hold true for the Barnes-Hut approach
will be discussed for each modification.
The filtering reduces the number of times fspring has to be calculated in the first for-loop.
But instead of calculating the spring force to the neighbor, now frep has to be evaluated
for this node. Since the difference in complexity between fspring and frep is negligible,
the filtering is neutral in terms of runtime complexity.
The second modification in the first for-loop is the introduction of ρcluster. The cluster
function consists of a look-up whether an edge exists between u and v. This look-up can
be done with a hashtable in O(1) and therefore can be considered neutral in terms of
runtime complexity.
Barnes-Hut reduce the number of nodes which frep is summing up by introducing virtual
nodes. Since these virtual nodes are not reflected in the hashtable of Esfor the cluster
function, ρcluster will return the default distance coefficient 1 (c.f. equation 3.4). To
estimate the error introduced into the clustering, the virtual node creation and selection
has to be explained in more detail. The quad-tree is constructed via partitioning the
space into rectangles and splitting them repeatedly until there is only one node left per
rectangle (see Figure 3.9). In the depicted example, it can be seen that only nodes
for non-empty rectangles are added to the tree. The virtual nodes are initialized in the
barycenter of the child nodes. The decision whether to use the virtual node or traverse
the tree to the child nodes can be expressed by the following condition:
size of rectangle
distance of barycenter to current node
< β
This term can be read as “if the rectangle is far enough, we can safely use the virtual
node”. For our cluster function ρcluster, this is irrelevant since the only goal is to reflect
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Figure 3.9: Quad-tree transformation in the Barnes-Hut reduction (Dehmel 1996)
the relationships in the nearest neighborhood. As the condition only selects virtual nodes
for larger distances, there is no error introduced by this modification.
In the second for-loop, inertia is introduced via the function δ(v). This is only a linear
transformation of a node attribute. Since the node attributes are calculated upon creation
or update of the graph and the function δ(v) is only a linear transformation, δ(v) is
element of O(1). Clearly, this also holds in case of the hierarchical approach.
The last modification concerns the edge width. This is only a rendering aspect; and
furthermore, only a linear transformation of the volume attribute (width(e ∈ Es) ∈
O(1)). Thus, it is not relevant for the layout algorithm at all.
Summarizing the influence of the modifications on the runtime complexity, it has been
shown that there is no significant change in the complexity. The modifications can be
applied to the basic algorithm as well as the hierarchical approach without significant
performance loss. However, the memory complexity grows from |V | + |Es| to |V | +
|Es| + |Es,∆t| due to the look-up table for ρcluster and the filtered edge set for the
visualization. Though the size of Es,∆t depends on ∆t, it can be safely stated that
Es,∆t ⊆ Es usually with |Es,∆t|  |Es|.
3.3.2 User Requirement Fulfilment
There are several ways of measuring requirement fulfilment. In the context of ergonomics,
it can be done by using a participating observation, requirement analysis, checklists, and
the like. In the field of ergonomics, many descriptions have been applied to describe more
or less the same concept, referred to here as human-computer-interface (HCI). Software
ergonomics, human-computer-interaction, GUI design, and usability engineering are often
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Figure 3.10: The clipping or visual area is markedby the black rectangle as compared to
the size of the graph
discussed, though they describe different concepts. Software ergonomics / HCI principles
are summarized in the ISO norm 9241, parts 10-17 and 110 and multimedia systems are
summarized in DIN EN ISO 14915. Most of these concepts refer to software systems. HCI
principles and the requirement list that were gathered in the beginning of this chapter
will be discussed in detail after the presentation of the prototype (c.f. Section 4) in
chapter 5 on page 97. In this chapter, the visualization is evaluated according to the goal
of presenting a compact visualization for monitoring purposes.
The spring force visualization is not necessarily deterministic. This holds especially true
when the user can interact with the visualization. A good visualization should point
the user towards the interesting aspects of the underlying data. Especially in the case
of monitoring a continuous task, the visualization has to adapt to the market situation
and should be readable without zooming or scrolling. Hence, setting the zoom level far
enough out of the visualization would solve the problem. If the user has to zoom and
scroll continuously, it distracts or even hinders him from judging the situation and taking
appropriate action.
The question is how to evaluate a visualization while being mindful of these requirements?
There is no theoretical approach to predict the space consumption a spring embedder
layout will need. There is only a worst case upper boundary. In the worst case, the
nodes will form a long chain, each node connecting with exactly two neighbors, except
the first and the last node. This chain would relax into a long diagonal with the length
of (|V | − 1) ∗ l ∗ cσ. But besides this worst case scenario, no further predictions about
the space consumption can be made. Thus, only empirical evidence can be given. A
straight-forward approach to gathering such empirical data is to count the edges drawn
inside the visual clipping area and then count the number of edges drawn outside. Each
edge drawn outside of the visual clipping area would require the user to scroll or zoom
to see this transaction. This metric will be defined as the percentage of edges drawn
outside the clipping area. Let G be a set of graphs, then:
metric(G) =
#edges drawn outside
#edges drawn inside+ #edges drawn outside
,
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An open question is which data set to use for such a metric. Since there is no default
market and the only explicit requirement for the visualization is the flexibility to adapt to
different markets, it is hard to test its robustness. There are two possibilities: Generate
different graphs to simulate different markets or take the graphs of existing market data
sets.
For the first approach, it would be necessary to cover all possible extreme settings to
challenge the visualization. But it would still be rather doubtful whether the employed
settings sufficiently reflect reality. Theoretically, there can be three reasons for edges to
be drawn outside the clipping area:
1. Unconnected Graph:
There is a long period with no trading activity in a share and the nodes correspond-
ing to the current spread limit offers are floating outside of the clipping area. If
another inactive trader returns to the market and trades against the spread, bying
or selling less than or equal to the number of shares offered by the other inactive
trader, the edge will be drawn in between them. This edge will be invisible to the
user only if the position vectors of both nodes are pointing to the same side of the
visualization. Else the edge will cross the clipping area. This case will happen in
only 1/4th of these cases.
2. Connected Graph:
If many members start trading within ∆t, it is possible that the filtered graph can
grow beyond the clipping area.
3. Graphs, related to the worst case scenario:
Any graph that contains a longer chain as described above in the worst case scenario
-whether connected or unconnected to the rest of the graph- could display only the
clipped part, if the chain connects nodes inside and outside the clipping area. This
can only happen if a sells to b, who buys or sells only to c, who buys of sells only
to d and so on, where -without loss of generality- c and d are outside the clipping
area. Though it is not impossible, it seldom occurred in the observed markets
(for exact figures see below). This probably relates to the fact that 80% of the
trading is done by 20% of the market participants. Less active participants typically
trade against the active traders. To form such a chain the inactive traders have to
coordinate a process sequence of buying exactly the same size offered by the other
player.
The number of edges drawn not only depends on the graph but also on the filter setting
∆t. The sliding window setting was altered between one hour and one day. The market
ran over 56 days. As the time period grows longer, more edges will be displayed. This
makes the layout more complex. The update increment was set to the same value as the
sliding window. This means that all edges from the previous update are filtered out for
the next update and only the new edges are displayed. This is more challenging for the
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layout algorithm since improved node placement, in order to reduce edge crossings in the
previous step, may be contrary to the optimal placement for the current update. Since
force directed layouts continuously improve the node placement in each cycle and can be
run to infinity, the relax time was set to six seconds. Thus the layout algorithm had six
seconds after each update to improve crossings and node placement of the graph before
the time was incremented by ∆t and the next update started. After each run the initial
node setting was randomly altered.
Overall the visualization ran for ten hours on a 1600x1200 resolution (no zoom, font
size at 10pt). On average, only 2.1 % of the edges were drawn completely outside the
clipping area with a standard deviation of 1.6. The maximum was 4.9 % in a run with
∆t = 1 day. In a market with 1500 transactions on average per day, stepping day-by-day
through the data set still results in to many relations to get a clear picture. If these less
realistic outliers are excluded, the average decreases to 1.4 %. Thus 98.6 % of all activity
can be monitored without any scrolling, zooming or panning.
3.4 Summary
In this chapter, a visualization for the social aspects of market activities has been pre-
sented. The visualization is a modification of an existing spring layout algorithm. It allows
the user to focus only on the important nodes and activities. The runtime analysis shows
that the modifications do not significantly increase the complexity (still in O(n2 log n))
and the empirical test indicates that the visualization accommodates common market ac-
tivity very well within the dimensions of a common monitor. The interactive capabilities
-important for the investigation- are presented and discussed in the next chapter.
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4 Software Prototype
The prototype was implemented with the goals of portability, flexibility and intuitive user
interface design. The primary user groups addressed are market operators and investi-
gators. Applications in the field of fraud detection span from simple query interfaces to
sophisticated link analysis tools. A general distinction can be made between scientific
prototypes and reports about real systems. As Bolton and Hand (2002) state in their
review, there are no detailed published methods of real systems or any publicly available
data sets used to train and evaluate real fraud detection systems. This shall prevent
fraudsters from learning too much about the current state of the art. The same holds
true for software available for fraud detection. Most products give only a very superficial
description of its capabilities and technology.
The FinCEN AI System (FAIS) and the advanced detection system (ADS) from the
NASD have already been presented in the previous chapter about the visualization de-
sign. Though they are well established in the industry, some scientific publications can
still be found about them. Further examples of commercial fraud detection software
can be categorized into different application areas such as finance, telecommunications
and networks intrusion, credit card, and money laundering. A detailed overview of these
examples is given in Appendix E on page 141. In the field of financial markets, prominent
examples are DeltaMaster (Bissantz & Company GmbH 2008), Coral8 (2008), SMARTS
(Smarts Group International Pty Ltd 2008), Apama (Progress Software Limited 2008),
and mlds (Innovations GmbH 2008). However, only a little information is publicly avail-
able about most of these tools. SMARTS and Apama are event based systems which
allow the user to define rules that will be activated on certain events. A more visual
approach is made possible by mlds which integrates VisualRules. This tool allows the
user to define and manipulate the rule set in a graphical rule editor. The underlying
decision tree of the rule is graphically depicted and can be reordered and parametrized.
Coral8 and DeltaMaster are data-mining tools that allow the user to apply certain tests
or algorithms. Less specific are pure data mining and rule engine applications like WEKA
(Witten and Frank 2005) and GritBot (RuleQuest Research Pty Ltd 2008). Although the
pure data mining applications are powerful and flexible, they require a sound knowledge
about data mining. The last empirical evaluation of commercial fraud detection systems
was done by Abbott et al. (1998).
A very comparable system, though not based on a graph visualization, but also using a
multi-display approach has been recently published at the IEEE Visual Analytics Science
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and Technology Symposium 2007 by Chang et al. (2007). They describe a system
developed in collaboration with Bank of America for transaction analysis. It combines a
keyword network view, a heatmap, a search-by-example tool, and a newly developed view
called Strings and Beads. The goal was to facilitate the search for suspicious accounts
and transactions especially in the context of terrorism. Thus, interactive filtering over
time, keywords, and accounts are of crucial importance for the investigators and are
specifically addressed by the interface.
Since portability is a desired feature in the heterogeneous university environment, the
prototype underlying this work has been developed in Java and ANSI SQL 2.0 (ISO 9241
1996; Cannan and Otten 1993). The application has been tested on Windows and Linux
in combination with local and remote database servers (PostgreSQL 8.0, 8.1, and 8.2).
The chapter is ordered as follows: Section 4.1 presents the use cases of the application
and how these are addressed in the prototype, Section 4.2 goes into detail about how
the detection algorithms are integrated into the prototype, Section 4.3 explains the user
interactions with the visualization, and Section 4.4 presents further investigation tools
and helpers. The chapter concludes with a short implementation and design overview.
4.1 Use Cases
The requirements of the prototype can be derived by a use case analysis. Figure 4.1
depicts the central use cases of the prototype. The analysis tasks can be split up into
diverse use cases. Each use case will be described in detail in the following section.
4.1.1 Monitoring
The market operator needs continuous feedback about the current development of the
platform: e.g., user statistics, price development, transaction volumes, and the interaction
of the different market participants. Looking at the minimal market model (Rolli et al.
2004), the enumerated entities reflect the basic entities of markets. Besides tabular lists,
graphical elements like bar- and pie-charts are useful to give an oberview. Views should
update in realtime. This following definition captures all these aspects on an abstract
level:
Definition. Monitoring: Continuous surveillance/observation of a process..
Monitoring is supported in the prototype by the graph visualization described in Chapter 3.
The integration of the graph visualization into the prototype and further involved views
are explained in more detail in Section 4.2.3 on page 83.
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InvestigatorOperator
monitor market activity
analyze price developement
analyze volume developement
automatic fraud detection
analyze account
Figure 4.1: Use case diagram
4.1.2 Automatic Fraud Detection
Since the purpose of the prototype is to support the user with semi-automatic fraud
detection, the visualization and the designated detection algorithms should incorporate
necessary functionality for both aspects.
The visualizations have to allow marking, cross linking and drilling down functionalities.
Marking is necessary to follow certain accounts or to mark a special market situation.
When deciding whether a situation is relevant or not, it often depends on the context.
This can be done via cross linking. The context should be available to the user within
only a few clicks. An example of context is looking up a participant’s portfolio, when
investigating a suspicious transaction, to understand the motivation they had to sell or
buy in that specific moment. Drilling down allows the user to disaggregate from the
highest level of aggregation down to the most detailed view of information (e.g. offers,
transactions, users).
Making the parameters of the detection algorithms available allows the user to interac-
tively adjust the sensitivity of the detection algorithm to the current market situation.
At the same time, the number of parameters has to be minimized in order to reduce the
complexity for the user.
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Figure 4.2: Price & index panel
4.1.3 Analyzing Price Development
The most common visualization for prices is a line plot. Prices are displayed in consecutive
order and connected by lines. It is important for the user to have an easy-to-use zoom and
panning functionality, a filter for single shares or combinations, and an index to observe
the whole market at a glance.
The screenshot in Figure 4.2 shows the “Index/Price Panel” depicting a market index over
a period of eight weeks. The context menu offers cross-links to the order history. This
can be used to analyze the last arriving offers before the selected time stamp. The user
can zoom in, pan, and, via the combobox above, filter for certain shares (Figure 4.3).
Figure 4.3: Filtering for a certain share
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Figure 4.4: Volume panel
4.1.4 Analyzing Volume Development
Besides the price development, the overall traded volume is relevant. A stacked bar chart
diagram is used to compare volumes between two different days. Each color symbolizes
a different share. When moving the mouse cursor over a specific bar, the correspond-
ing team and trading volume is displayed in a tooltip (see Figure 4.4). Similar to the
Index/Price Panel, the user can zoom and pan in the visualization.
4.1.5 Share Inspector
The Index/Price Panel and the Volume Panel allow the user to drill down to a single
share. On a share level, the user might want to better understand the order flow or
transaction history at a specific point in time. Therefore, the Share Inspector can be
used to drill down to a single transaction, order, or even an orderbook situation.
Figure 4.5 shows the Share Inspector. The dialog comprises three areas. On top is the
toolbar where controls for share and time stamp selection are located. The time stamp
can be set by entering the numbers directly, by using the pop up menu, or by using the
buttons to directly change the time increment forward or back.
The second part, below the toolbar, is a tabbed view with three tabs for the different table-
views (order book, orders and transactions). Each table-view has a default order criteria,
which is time for orders and transactions and price followed by time for orderbooks. The
user can change the ordering – indicated by the small triangles besides the column labels
– by simply double clicking on the new primary order criterion. A single click on any
other column label adds this label as a sub-criterion to the ordering. A second click on
any criteria reverses the ordering for this criteria. Ordering is helpful to efficiently find
outliers or a specific entry.
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Figure 4.5: Share inspector
The third part, in the lower half of the dialog, contains general information. The Chart-
tab plots the price and volume for a period of 24 hours centered around the current time
stamp displayed in the toolbar. Besides the price and volume information, special events
from the prediction market are displayed as markers in the chart. In the example in figure
4.5, Brazil played from 6 until 8 pm and eventually won. This is indicated by a gray
vertical line and the text “won 5.0 €” in the chart. In the prediction market context, 5.0
€ means that from then on the final value was at least five virtual currency units units
(VCU). During the match, the market participants had some doubts about the outcome
of the game which can be seen by the prices fluctuating between 0 and 5 VCU. The
second tab contains the prediction market events and their outcomes as a table.
If the user opens the pop-up menu in the chart, the corresponding time stamp from the
x-axis is used to reload the data tables. At the same time he can select whether the tab
view above should switch to the order book, orders, or transactions listing. Any time
stamp within the tables can be used to center the view around that time stamp via the
pop up menu. All timestamps provide the pop-up menu with the option to jump to the
selected time stamp. A similar function is provided for every username appearing in any
of the views. If the user opens the pop-up menu or double-clicks on a username, the
Account Inspector is opened automatically. This view is described in more detail in the
following section.
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Figure 4.6: Account inspector
4.1.6 Account Inspector
According to the paradigm that markets are formed by social entities, accounts play a key
role. Some entities have to be investigated in more detail if they have been reported by an
algorithm or gotten the attention of a market operator. All relevant account information
is provided by the Account Inspector. This dialog offers views for every activity an account
may have conducted (see Figure 4.6).
The dialog is comprisesd of five parts. A tool bar at the top allows the user to enter
a specific username or id, step backward and forward in the history, or directly select
a previously investigated account via the combobox. User registration details (account
name, id, current portfolio value, creation time stamp, forename, surname and email)
are displayed next to the combobox. The personal information is anonymized in the
screenshot. The red color of the portfolio value indicates that the account lost money.
The center part of the Account Inspector is split into three columns. In the second
column, all transactions of the account are listed. Besides the information about id
and name of buyer and seller, amount, price, volume, and time stamp, the investigator
can see whether the currently investigated account actively matched against an existing
order in the order book – indicated by the column active – and the delay between the
two matching orders. For instance, in the first line, a user’s buy order for Czech Republic
was actively matched by STOCCER_Guru with a sell order of over 70 shares for 700.00
on May, 17th at 13:17:54. The buyer had put in his order 54 minutes and 23 seconds
before. This will be the main column the investigator is focusing on.
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Figure 4.7: Pop-up menu
This listing is framed by lists of all buying and selling partners. Each view can be shown
as either a table or as a pie chart diagram. In Figure 4.6, the accounts who bought shares
from the account currently being investigated are shown in the table format on the left
side; while on the right, all accounts who sold shares to the currently investigated account
are displayed as a pie chart. The order criteria for both sides (sell and buy) is the volume,
which is calculated as price multiplied by the number of shares. An account is ranked
highest if it bought the highest volume from the current account. Double clicking on any
of the listed accounts in the selling-, buying- or transaction partner panels switches the
selected account into the currently investigated account. If the user wants to go back to
the previous account, he can use the browser navigation elements of the toolbar.
The bottom of the Account Inspector is split into two columns. In the first column,
portfolio information is depicted. By default, the current portfolio situation is shown
in descending order of the current market value. For each share in the property of the
account, the number of shares bought so far (amount), the number of shares which are
not covered by open sell orders (amount available), the value at current market prices,
and the value multiplied by the final payoff for each share is listed. If the final payoff is
unknown, this column is zero. Trades are listed in the right table portfolio. For detailed
information about portfolio trading refer to Section 1.2 on page 4.
If the user investigates a transaction, the price or quantity can be judged better in the
context of the price development of the share and the portfolio the user had at that
point in time. The pop-up menu (see Figure 4.7) in the share column of the transaction
table allows the user to access the Share Inspector, to open a portfolio view, and list all
scheduled events (in the STOCCER context soccer matches) for this share. In the lower
half of the menu, all matches of Czech Republic are displayed. The team played three
matches, but they were all after May 18th and are therefore displayed in italics. Past
matches are displayed in bold. This way the user exactly knows which information is
most important about this share. Since the screenshot was taken after the soccer world
championships had finished, the results of all matches were known and printed next to
each match. Since Czech Republic lost two of its three matches, they did not enter the
second half of the championships and the value of this share dropped to zero.
A separate dialog can be opened to see the portfolio of the trader at the moment of the
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Figure 4.8: Portfolio dialog
transaction (see Figure 4.8). The table is organized similarly to the final portfolio view
in the Account Inspector. An additional column benefits indicates whether the account
holder had gains or losses from this share. The benefit is the sum of all selling minus
the sum of all buying transactions. Portfolio trades are not considered because, on the
one hand, most people do not trade whole portfolios, on the other hand, this simplified
formula allows the investigator to distinguish where the user had considerable gains or
losses and which shares he traded actively. Though exact figures may differ with portfolio
trades included, the proportion is similar in most cases.
4.2 Combining Algorithms and Visualization
4.2.1 Active Search Support
The integration of the fraud detection algorithms from Chapter 2 is realized via two
mechanisms. If the user wants to actively search for accounts, he can start and configure
the algorithms via the menu from the main application window. Figure 4.9 shows a
screenshot of the algorithm selection dialog. Several algorithms can be selected and
configured individually. To configure an algorithm, the user selects the Properties button
beside the selected algorithm. An example of the properties dialog for the Gini-algorithm
is given in Figure 4.10 (a). If the user is new to the market, he may select the preview
button to see the scoring distribution of the examined accounts using his current settings
(c.f. Figure 4.10 (b)). After the algorithms have been started, they are sequentially
executed in the background, so the user can continue working with the application, e.g.
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Figure 4.9: Algorithm selection
(a) properties (b) distribution preview
Figure 4.10: Configuration of the algorithm properties
investigating further accounts or transactions. The algorithm results will pop up in a
results window after the last algorithm has finished. Additionally, the user is informed by
an acoustic signal that his search has finished.
Cases are listed one per row. Each case consists of the two partner accounts, the indicator
which reported the case, the probability ranking assigned by the indicator, the involved
volume (price * number of shares), the number of transactions, and the number of shares.
A toolbar above the search results table (see Figure 4.11) provides controls to filter the
list of reported cases in several advanced ways:
• The text field provides an incremental search for the entered character sequence.
This feature can be used to see how often, with which partners, and which indicators
an account has been reported. In fact, some people labeled the usernames of their
different accounts very similarly; thus the whole group appeared when investigating
the first suspicious account.
• The second button (“add selection to CaseManager ”) is used by the investigator
to confirm one or more cases. These cases are inserted into the central case
database which is called CaseManager. Each account referenced by a case in the
CaseManager will be highlighted in the graph visualization. Thus, the monitoring
staff is alerted whenever the concluding node is a red one instead of a blue one.
All cases are listed in the context menu of the node, in order to allow fast user
access to this information.
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Figure 4.11: Indicator result table
• After running the application for a while, the user may have already run the search or
may have tagged suspicious accounts manually. If the user now wants to find further
evidence for his suspicion, he might be interested in finding further indications of
fraud for this set of accounts. This is supported by the related button. When
pushed, the application removes all cases from the list where neither of the two
accounts already appears in at least one case of the CaseManager.
• On the other hand, the unrelated button removes all cases where at least one of
the two accounts already appears in at least one case of the CaseManager. This
supports the user when he is only interested in new cases he has not confirmed so
far.
• If the user is sure that a case is irrelevant, he may delete the case from the list
using the del button. A future enhancement would be to use this information as
training or calibration information for the algorithms.
• The >=2 button allows the user to only filter for cases where the account com-
bination is reported at least twice. The filter allows inverted couples as well. This
means that “a,b” is treated the same as “b,a”. This option is especially useful if
several algorithms were executed sequentially. If the user wants to check which
couples were reported from more than one algorithm, this option assists him in
finding them.
The CaseManager can be opened directly via the menu bar of the application window.
The appearance of the CaseManager is very similar to the indicator results dialog. The
main difference is that the CaseManager allows the user to import and export the central
case database to a file. The database file is a comma separated value list that can be
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Figure 4.12: Transaction highlighting
opened in Excel and many other applications. This feature allows the preservation of the
investigation results throughout several sessions with the prototype.
4.2.2 Indirect Active Search Support
Besides the active search, the algorithms can also evaluate transactions in the background
and support the user by highlighting suspicious transactions within the table views. Dif-
ferent colors can be used to distinguish different reasons for suspicion. Figure 4.12 shows
an example screenshot. In the screenshot, two of the four signal colors are depicted in
the Ukraine transactions: the sell transaction to Scala on the 29th is colored white (the
default color) since it is not considered suspicious but rather of natural interest for the
seller to sell over price. The remaining buy transactions are colored yellow to inform
the user that this participant bought the share above the current assured market price.
Again, this is common habit on financial and prediction markets, usually in the hope of
rising prices. In this case, it is not an unrealistic expectation since Ukraine had won 3:0
against Switzerland on the 26th. The last two transactions are colored in red because
the participant is selling Ukraine shares below the definite market value (see the context
menu information on the right). If he kept them till the end of the market he would have
gained a difference of:
1950 ∗ 10.00− (1500 ∗ 9.37 + 450 ∗ 9.36) = 1233.00
However, this does not necessarily have to be fraud. It may have been a mistake, ig-
norance, or an attempt to gain liquidity for another planned investment into a different
share. The user’s task is to evaluate these possibilities. He may check the price devel-
opment of Ukraine after May 30th with the Share Inspector to see whether it was just
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N Y
default color buy transaction?
N Y
sold under value? bought above value?
N Y
blue yellow
N Y
green red
Figure 4.13: Transaction coloring decision tree
ignorance, to look for similar registration data between the involved accounts, to look
into whether they helped each other, and to see if the transaction was completed to use
the liquidity for another investment. The colors are selected according to the priority of
the case. If someone is selling a share above its common value, the transaction is marked
green to point out the benefits. A transaction is marked in blue if the buyer got the share
below the common (minimum) value. The decision tree to determine the color for a
transaction is shown in Figure 4.13. Similar mechanisms exist for the graph visualization
from the Chapter 3.
4.2.3 Monitoring Support
The main application window combines both the graph display and traditional charts.
In Figure 4.14, the graph display can be seen in the main window. On the right are
three smaller displays: the upper one represents a map view of the graph, the middle
one represents a trading volume bar chart, and the bottom one represents the price and
index chart. The toolbar on top contains the controls to set and change the time stamp
and stepping, the share filter and the sliding window. The share filter allows for filtering
the visualizations in all displays for transactions only resulting from a selected non-empty
subset of shares. This enables the user to relate the activity observed in the market
displays (volume and price) to the activity of the graph.
Besides the share filtering, the most important complexity reduction stems from the
sliding window. The settings for the sliding window can be configured using the controls
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Figure 4.14: Screenshot of the market replay
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Figure 4.15: Sliding window
on the toolbar. On the left, the user can start, pause, and stop stepping through the
data set. The step size is determined by the Resolution combobox. Selecting either
the step forward or backward buttons allows the user to progress one step at a time,
while pressing the play button moves on to the next step automatically after a certain
delay. The delay can be configured via the speed slider on the right. The sliding window
length, which controls the resolution of the step on the time axis, can be configured via
the sliding window text field. Figure 4.15 helps to explain the difference between the
stepping and sliding window. The time axis is divided into equal units (e.g. hours in the
sample). This means that the visualization is depicting the graph at 2 am, 4 am, and so
on. The sliding window sets the duration of the trading period the graph edges reflect.
In Figure 4.15, the sliding window is set to three units, which in the sample equals three
hours. This creates an overlap of one hour, which is half of the length of the stepping.
Though it seems redundant at first sight, since we repeat information already presented to
the user, it helps the user to maintain his mental map in a quickly changing visualization.
Since some edges of the former situation are repeated, several nodes stay in the same
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Figure 4.16: Layout parameter dialog
or similar location. This reduces the effort the user’s short time memory has to spend
following the activity in the market. The transition states of the visualization are animated
by the prefuse toolkit. Thus the user gets a smooth animation from the layout of the
previous step to the current step.
Though it is usually not necessary, the user may adjust the layout parameters of the
graph visualization according to his preferences. Figure 4.16 shows a screenshot of the
dialog. Most of the parameters concern force functions of the basic algorithm. The first
block configures the gravitation constant cg of the repelling force function (see Section
3.1) and two other parameters of the Barnes-Hut-extension. The second block configures
the drag force which influences how fast nodes move over the background. Finally, the
last block adjusts the spring coefficient cδ and spring length l of the spring forces (see
Section 3.2). Manipulating the parameters is reflected in the visualization in real time.
This allows the user to efficiently adjust the visualization.
4.3 User Interaction
Interaction is a key feature in visual analytics and also an important requirement for our
visualization. The graph view offers a high number of interaction possibilities. The mouse
scroll wheel controls the zoom level of the display. By left clicking on the background
(or an edge) and dragging in any direction, the user can pan (move the visualization) to
see other areas or center the clipping area on a new position. By left clicking on a node
and dragging, the user can drag the node to a new position. This can be used to assist
the layouter or give the visualization a special ordering. After dropping the node on a
new position, the layout algorithm will start optimizing the layout from the new starting
positions. To keep such a manual layout, the user can freeze all nodes in their current
positions. The pop-up menu (see Figure 4.17 (a)) contains two options to freeze and
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(a) Background pop-up menu (b) Node pop-up menu
Figure 4.17: Pop-up menus of the graph display
unfreeze the layout.
If a node has to be observed in more detail, the user can pin it on the background by
selecting the fix node option from the pop up menu (see Figure 4.17 (b)) of the node.
If desired, several nodes can be fixed at the same time. This way the user can arrange
nodes at more prominent spots. If the user is interested in all former trading partners, he
can deactivate the sliding window time filter for this node from the pop-up menu. This
will display filtered and unfiltered edges of the selected node on the screen, arranging
all trading partners around the selected node. Nodes can be tagged to keep track of a
suspicious account. After tagging a node, its color changes to red and the text of the
tag is displayed in the pop up menu.
Through a context menu available on edges, nodes, bar charts and scatter plots, the user
can drill down to the account and transactions represented by the selected element. Since
a very common use case is to investigate around an interesting edge or node, a double
click on a node will open the Account Inspector and load the account. If an edge is under
investigation (e.g. by right clicking on it), the Account Inspector will load the source
node and highlight all transactions to the destination node. This will automatically scroll
to the visible part of the table enabling the user to drill down in a quick and efficient way.
4.4 Further Dialogs
4.4.1 Market Selection
The first dialog that appears when the prototype is started is the market selection dialog
(see Figure 4.19). In this dialog, the user can not only select the market he wants to
monitor or investigate, but he can also get some information about the market. Be-
sides the market name, the first day the market opened and the last day it will close is
shown. Lastly, the dialog lists the current number of orders and the number of concluded
transactions.
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Figure 4.18: Displaying all edges for node 949
Figure 4.19: Market selection dialog
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Figure 4.20: Market description panel
If a market has never been investigated before, the so-called fulltransactions should be
pre-calculated. The underlying platform market database is usually normalized to the
third normal form. Further information about database normalization can be found
in Lang and Lockemann (1995). The reason for the third normal form is the high
write performance and reduction of duplicate values. On the other hand, a normalized
scheme causes poor reading performance and is far too slow for real time analysis or
visualization. To circumvent this, the precalc option joins several tables about users and
transactions together into a single new table. This significantly increases the ex post
analysis performance. The pre-calculation time depends on the database system, server
performance, and the number of entries. The precalc function takes about 40 seconds
on a Dell Precision M70 laptop using a postgreSQL 8.0 database with about 2000 users,
132,000 transactions, and 246,000 orders. This still seems an acceptable amount of time
to start the system.
4.4.2 Market Description
All market participants get certain information about the market. For example, the
trading or redemption rules are explained. This information can be very valuable for the
investigator to understand certain behavioral differences on different markets (e.g. price
jumps according to the different redemption rules). With the prototype the user can open
an information panel which shows this information text. Figure 4.20 depicts a screenshot
of this dialog.
4.4.3 Account Registration Data
Whenever a new account is created on the platform, the account holder has to enter
some information about himself. This is not necessary for trading, but the general terms
and conditions state that the user is only allowed to have one single account (c.f. Chapter
C). The platform only checks the uniqueness of the username and email address. The
most important information (username, forename, surname, email addressee, id, and
registration time stamp) is displayed in the account inspector. If the prototype user
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Figure 4.21: Account registration data dialog
wanted to check whether someone registered with similar data, he can open the user
registration data dialog (Figure 4.21).
In the upper right corner, an integrated search text field can perform an incremental
search upon various fields. As shown in Figure 4.21, the search is case insensitive. If
the user, for example, types the letters “hegg” all rows are displayed that either have
the character sequence in the username, forename, last name, email or address. The
above example is taken from the STOCCER data set. The user HEGGES registered on
June 06th, 2006 with what is probably his real name and address (anonymized in the
screenshot). On June 07th, he created two secondary accounts who were manually found
and blocked. On the same day at 10 pm, the user created another secondary account
krebs which had not been found and blocked during the run time of the market. The
search list in the prototype reveals the relationship. Note, the user has to type only the
four letters “hegg” to verify his suspicion. The user is encouraged to investigate since the
username krebs is also reported by the algorithms from Chapter 2.
4.4.4 Account Ranking
One of the incentives for the participants in STOCCER is a high score listing on the web
page. The ranking is determined by the value of their portfolio. The higher the current
portfolio value according to the current market prices, the higher the username appears
in the ranking. The ranking is calculated once a day and the result is stored in a database
table.
Besides the current portfolio value, the change in the value from the day before is stored
in the database. The dialog is similar to the account registration data dialog (see Figure
4.22). Since the screenshot has been taken some weeks after the market had already
closed, the change column contains only zeros. The filter text field allows the user to
filter for certain account name patterns. Upon entering a character, an incremental case
insensitive search is performed.
The account ranking is important to the investigator because it allows him to gather
information about how successful a certain account was. Depending on the account
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Figure 4.22: Account ranking dialog
situation, some transactions may even be explained by the expected rise in the ranking.
Remember that in STOCCER only the first 100 accounts took part in the final lottery.
4.5 Implementation Design
In this section, an overview of the implementation will be given without presenting the
source code or classes. Instead, the focus will be on the general aspects of the imple-
mentation.
The prototype is implemented in Java using the language features of Java 1.5, such as
the newly introduced generics, which allow shorter and more elegant implementation of
the data handling. Most data is stored in the market platform database. STOCCER used
a PostgreSQL 8.0 database. JDBC is used on the lowest application layer to connect to
the market platform. The database is accessed by the implementations of the general
market data access facade. The advantage of the facade is that it allows the possibility to
adapt the prototype easily to other market platforms. The user has only to implement the
facade’s interface for the other market platform database scheme. So far, adapters for the
PSM database scheme and for the meet2trade database schema have been implemented.
To reduce the complexity of the UI-classes, the model view controller concept was used
for all the graphical components. The prototype uses three open source frameworks
to facilitate the necessary extensions of already known and existing components. The
prefuse1 framework (Heer and Boyd 2005) is used for the main graph display as well
1prefuse http://prefuse.org
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as the map overview. It provides a Barnes-Hut graph layout implementation. Therefore
only the modifications described in chapter 3 had to be implemented.
For the table views, the glazed lists open source library2 from public objects has been
used. The library extends the swing default table views and is based on the model-view-
controller concept. The glazed lists framework was extended in several aspects. The
background analysis of the items was introduced for coloring. Furthermore, the mouse
and keyboard interaction, formater for time and currencies, and the integration of the
JFreeChart library had to be introduced.
Finally, the char library JFreeChart3 is used to provide stacked bar charts, pie charts, and
scatter plots. All these components are integrated into a swing user interface to assure
the portability of the prototype. Debugging is facilitated by extensive logging using the
apache log4j library.
4.6 Selected Application Examples
In the following, two examples illustrate how the prototype can be used to detect fraud
or explain market effects.
4.6.1 Observing Uncommon Trading Volumes
When there is no alert or open case to investigate, the user may just want to observe the
current trading activity. Besides the graph of the active traders, the price and volume
diagrams allow further insights. If, for example, the trading volume of a certain share rises
significantly, the question occurs whether there is new information about the respective
share or whether an uninformed trader is investing more than usual.
An example screenshot of such a situation is given in Figure 4.23 on the next page.
In the volume display in the lower right, a share is suddenly traded in uncommonly high
volumes. Different colors are used to distinguish between different shares. It gets obvious
that the significant part of the high volume is based on trades of one single share.
After the user becomes aware of this unusual event, he probably wants to know which
share it was and which accounts have been involved. The first question can be answered
quickly by moving the mouse cursor over the stacked bar of interest. The tooltip indicates
the name of the corresponding share. The latter question can be answered by looking at
the graph display. In the center of the display, the two accounts X and Y have traded
significantly more than other active nodes in the same moment. If the user left clicks
on the edge, the Account Inspector will pop up and highlight all transactions between
the two neighbors. In the anonymized screenshot in Figure 4.24, the highlighted area is
2glazed lists http://publicobject.com/glazedlists/
3JFree Chart http://jfree.org
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Figure 4.23: Observing uncommon trading volumes
Figure 4.24: Drilling down onto the relevant transactions
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Figure 4.25: Observing price peaks
already reduced to show just the buy transactions. This way the pattern becomes obvious.
The pattern is probably related to a feature of the trading screen of STOCCER. The user
could click on a position in the orderbook and the order input mask was automatically
filled with the corresponding data. So the person probably placed a sell order with the
first account inside the spread. Then another session was opened for the second account
allowing the open sell order to be bought and a new sell order to be placed on the other
side of the spread. These three steps (switch, buy, sell) were repeated again and again.
The shortest period between sell and buy orders is 6 seconds. This is very fast for a
web-based trading interface and very unlikely to be achieved by accident (besides it is
hard to explain why somebody repeatedly played such a ruinous pattern). In the side
panels, it is shown that the second account was a very important trading partner for this
account. In the table in the lower left, we can see that money and shares of the team
FC Bayern München are the base of the wealth of this account.
For this investigation, only two actions are necessary: one mouse over and one mouse
click.
4.6.2 Explaining Price Peaks
Besides uncommon trading volumes, price peaks may call the user’s attention. The peaks
may be observed in the price index or on a selected share. Figure 4.25 shows a price
peak example. In the lower right, several peaks up to 100 € can be observed. The
time control in the toolbar shows that the graph represents the day of the peaks. In the
graph display, two edges appear to be stronger than any other. With a right click on one
of these edges, the Account Inspector pops up and highlights the transactions between
these two accounts (see Figure 4.26).
In this case, the investigator is lucky because the accountmaniche seems to be responsible
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Figure 4.26: Drilling down the two transactions
Figure 4.27: Switching to maniche
for two peaks. But the crucial role seems to be played by bullrider, who repeated that
pattern again with ramakrishna (c.f. transaction list in Figure 4.26). It is highly suspicious
that someone would be willing to buy a share for 100 € which had a common market
value lower than 3 € and that they would accept this offer within seconds. In total,
this account bought FC Köln for 109,000.00 €. Furthermore, the offer for 100 € was
only seconds old (displayed in the column order Time diff.) when maniche placed the
order. With a double click on maniche the Account Inspector switches to a view of that
account (see Figure 4.27). With this information, now the suspicion turns into certainty.
The account maniche was created on the same day, sold all other shares, and bought
with one order of 1,000 shares at 100 € the rest of the spread and as much as he could
of the offer from bullrider. The hypothesis that he might be just a big supporter of the
share can be checked by opening the Share Inspector via the context menu. The Share
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Inspector shown in the lower right in Figure 4.27 reveals that bullrider opened the spread
as much as he could just before the order from maniche. This way, he gathered enough
shares to sell way over price to maniche.
For this investigation, only three interactions were necessary: one mouse click, a double
click, and one context menu interaction.
In case of a peak in the index chart, the relevant share has to be determined first.
Therefore, the user can reveal the last orders in the moment of the peak using the open
order history option from the context menu. After that, the investigation continues as
described above.
4.7 Summary
In this chapter, the prototype has been presented with its different views and features.
Besides the general views for each market aspect, the interaction and special dialogs have
been described. Finally, a quick implementation overview has been given.
Although one might get the same information with a solid knowledge of SQL, a database
query interface, and paper and pencil, it is much more convenient to get the information
presented in the way in which it is needed. This is illustrated by the two examples at
the end of the chapter, where the user could get the necessary information to make a
decision within a few clicks. Although the examples seem to be constructed, they were
taken from real world data sets. This underlines the relevance and necessity of such a
tool for market operations.
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In this chapter, the proposed algorithms and the prototype will be evaluated. The visual-
ization has already been addressed in chapter 3.3 on page 64, but it is indirectly touched
by the evaluation of the prototype.
Since the main question is how to detect fraud in online auctions, the evaluation of the
algorithms is the primary concern. Classifying accounts into fraudsters and normal users
is difficult and subjective. While there are clear market rules which the system in most
cases does not allow to viloate, there are also possible transactions which are ex post
not an optimal decision. It is now up to the judgement of the market operator to decide
whether this was intentional or accidental. Since the true classification of the accounts
into fraudsters and normal users using just transactional data is such a hard problem, the
best approach is to get a self-classification of the account holders themselves. Therefore,
a post field study online survey was done.
Furthermore, a human-computer-interface (HCI) experiment was used to evaluate the
prototype as well as the algorithms. Certainly, the algorithm evaluation is not the primary
focus of an HCI experiment. To include not only the prototype evaluation but also the
algorithmic verification in the experiment, the participants had to solve tasks that were
designed to objectify the results of the algorithms.
The chapter is organized as follows: The questionnaire and its results are presented and
discussed, followed by the introduction of the experiment and the algorithm evaluation,
and finally the evaluation of the visualization is presented.
5.1 Post-Experiment Questionnaire
The direct approach to verify whether or not somebody has violated the terms and
conditions is to ask him. If he admits to being a fraudster, it is very likely that he tried
to trick the market platform. Note, that the opposite does not necessarily hold true. A
person might not openly admit to be a violator of the rules though being a fraudster.
Since the terms and conditions stated that if fraud was discovered the prizes have to be
returned, all persons who received a prize are less likely to admit anything. Still, several
conclusions can be drawn from the results obtained.
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5.1.1 Design of the Questionnaire
The questionnaire was the second post experiment questionnaire to which the users have
been invited. The first one, with a different topic, was conducted immediately after the
field study finished in July 2006. The second online survey started in May 2007. The
questionaire was implemented as a set of web pages storing the results into a database1.
The url to the questionnaire was included in the invitation text that was sent via email
to the participantes. Each URL included a unique identifier in order to track the different
participating accounts.
According to Cook et al. (2000) the response rate is influenced by several criteria such as
incentivation and university sponsoring. Deutskens et al. (2004) found that the response
rate depends on follow-ups, incentives, length, and presentation of the questionnaire.
According to their results, a short questionnaire incentivised by a lottery of small prices
but with a high chance of winning and having one follow up should have the best response
rate. Therefore, the online questionnaire was shortened to only one page excluding the
“welcome” and “good bye” screen. Since the last contact with the participants was almost
nine months before the invitation, the incentive to participate played an important role.
Three prizes were raﬄed among the participants who completed the online survey form.
The prizes were vouchers from a well known online book and music store with values of
€ 100.00, € 75.00 and € 50.00. The probability of winning a prize was high compared to
the probability of winning in the STOCCER platform itself, since only a few people would
answer a survey nine month after the experiment. However, this was not mentioned in
the invitation nor in the questionnaire itself.
To prevent people from using similar fraud strategies as employed on STOCCER, each
invitation link to the survey contained an identification code. This code was unique for
each invitation. This technique allowed for the detection of users who participated several
times for the same account. On the downside, using the technique could not ensure that
if a person had illegally created more than one account on STOCCER, he or she could
participate one time for each account.
To distract the participants from the real purpose of the inquiry, the questions concerned
the trading strategy employed during the championships. Besides the strategy, partic-
ipants were asked about their username, any possible secondary user names, and the
email address.
The questionnaire appearance and technology were chosen to be as simple as possible.
According to Dillman (2000), different appearance from respondent to respondent may
influence the results or –according to Smith and Leigh (1997)– even prevent participants
from reaching the survey (i.e. technology or accessibility barriers). The full version of
the questionnaire is included in the appendix (c.f. Appendix B). Participants from other
1The questionnaire technology was implemented as an online questionnaire by Jan Schröder from the
STOCCER team.
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countries were in the minority on the STOCCER platform, so only a German version of
the questionnaire was designed and therefore sent only to the German speaking members
(the majority of the registered users).
An email, with an invitation to participate that included a link to the questionnaire, was
sent to 1602 registered accounts of the trading platform. This subset of the participants
was selected from the set of all accounts who had registered for the world championship
markets by the following criteria:
• the email address had one of the following suffixes “.de”, “.ch” or “.at”
• the country of origin, which the participant had selected during his registration,
was either Germany, Austria or Switzerland.
If at least one of the criteria matched, the invitation to the questionnaire was sent to the
corresponding account.
5.1.2 Questionnaire Results
Two hundered and fourteen participants completed the online questionnaire. This is a
response rate of 13.36 percent. The average response rate for online surveys is usually
20-26 percent according to Kaplowitz et al. (2004) .
The questionnaire asked participants to reveal their strategy. In a strict sense of experi-
mental economics, a strategy is a specific action triggered by an external stimulation or
situation, such as ’buy stocks of Italy if the price drops below 15 VCU’. Since the strategy
space in this sense was too large to be compiled into a questionnaire, the participants
were asked about their trading approach or the source of knowledge that they relied on.
However, following the terminology of the questionnaire, these approaches will be called
strategy in the following. The below answers were offered (translated from German to
English):
1. I closely followed the news and tried to use this information to my advantage.
2. I tried to use my knowledge about soccer and my experience in buying and selling
stocks to my advantage
3. I invested all my money into one team from the very beginning.
a) I created multiple accounts in order to bet different teams.
4. I started by betting on the champion(s) from previous year(s).
5. I invested in outsiders.
6. I frequently traded shares of teams already excluded.
7. I created more than one account in order to concentrate shares and/or money on
one account by:
99
100 5 Evaluation
The strategies corresponding to the numbers above can be found in the questionnaire in
Appendix B.
Figure 5.1: Absolute number of answers per question in the online questionnaire
a) trading shares back and forth between the two accounts
b) selling overpriced stocks to other accounts.
c) buying underpriced stocks from the other accounts.
d) opening the spread with a third account to use the widened spread for further
transactions between two of my accounts.
8. I used a script/bot to trade faster and with less effort
9. I used Excel or another program to keep a better overview about my depot.
10. I used a different strategy (please describe below)
The distribution of the answers is depicted in figure 5.1. Multiple answers were allowed.
The most common strategies were number 2 (rely on personal knowledge and experience),
1 (news based trading), 5 (trading outsider teams) and 4 (trading the top teams of the
last championships). These strategies are simple, intuitive, obvious and can probably be
generalized to many fields of trading on stock exchanges. They are simple because they
do not rely on any special technology or market mechanisms and assume price changes
because of news. They are intuitive since they rely on personal knowledge and experience
instead of mathematical models and obvious because outsider teams are likely cheaper
initially but promise the highest returns in case of success.
Less common and more interesting for this evaluation are the people admitting to have
used strategy 3a and 6, 7, 7a -7d, 8, and 9. Strategy 6 (trading teams who lost and were
out of the champion ships) is a strategy particularly relevant for the tournament market
on the STOCCER platform. Since all shares had to add up to a sum of 200 VCU (virtual
currency units) and the overall stock exchange should be a zero-sum game, it is difficult
to remove a share out of the portfolio without imbalancing the market. While this is still
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easy for a share that has a final payoff of zero, the later a team dropped off the higher
its price was. So to remove the teams who dropped off at the quarter finals would have
been quite difficult while keeping the option of portfolio trades.
The high number of results for this strategy is in line with our observation of the methods
used on these markets to make further profits. The shares were cheap in absolute terms
compared to the teams continuing in the tournament and got less attention from the
other traders. Though it is not fraud to trade these shares, buying these shares for a price
> 0 indicates either lack of understanding of the rules or having a malicious intention.
Certainly, there is a valid reason to sell the shares in case their market value is still higher
than their final value. This should drive the market price quickly to the final value. On the
STOCCER market platform, the contrary could be observed. Prices of excluded teams
could raise a few days after their exclusion again. This could be either with the intention
to transfer money to another account by being willing to buy for an unreasonable price
or by making sure to be able to sell them again for a even higher price or later on. Note,
that this strategey could not only be employed on teams with a definite payout of 0,
but any team who had dropped off the competition and therfore had a definitive final
payout value. However, the least attention and thus the highest potential gains could be
achieved in the zearo payout share markets.
Strategy 9 (used a tool such as MS Excel to get a better overview) was surprisingly
high (15.4%). It is an indicator that the design of the trading interface could be further
improved. This strategy was not illegal according to the general terms and conditions.
But it is highly related to strategy number 8 which referred to the use of a script or robot
for trading. Two people admitted having employed scripts or robots. Both accounts had
been found to be fraudsters before the survey started using the prototype for manual
investigations. Finally, 3a and 7a-d (all concerning the creation of multiple accounts)
were mentioned 14 times in total.
5.1.3 Discussion
With 13.36 percent, the response rate is significantly lower than the expected rate of 20-
26 percent. Several reasons come into mind about why the response rate was considerably
lower than the expected average:
1. The participants might have used a secondary or even temporary mail account such
as mailinator, a common technique to prevent spam to one’s main mail account, to
register for STOCCER. Since they would not expect emails from the platform nine
month after the championship finished, they would not be checking this account
on a regular basis.
2. Some participants might not be willing to reveal their trading strategy. Especially
successful traders might want to keep their strategy secret for future applications.
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3. If a person had violated the general terms and conditions by creating several ac-
counts, he might only answer for one of them. Again for reasons similar to the
already mentioned under (1) or because he feared that he might get caught and
prosecuted (e.g. had to return a prize).
4. After nine month the participants did not care anymore about STOCCER. As
described in Chapter 3, many participants only traded once or twice and did not
return afterwards.
5. Even if they still had interest in the topic, they might have thought that they could
not contribute anything since they did not pursue any concrete trading strategy.
These are all only speculations about the low response rate. But why is the response rate
so important? Depending on the explanations above, the real number of participants of
the survey may differ. Consequently, and even more relevant, the number of fraudsters
has to be estimated significantly higher assuming that fraudsters might have used their
multiple identities again with random answers and by this lowering the overall number of
participants furthermore. Unfortunately it is almost impossible to verify these different
possibilities. But the response rate is still important to approximate the number of
fraudsters on STOCCER.
Twelve of the 214 participants voluntarily admitted to being a fraudster (5.6%). Note
that this number is lower than the sum of positive answers to the fraud strategies 3a, 7a-d
and 8, because one person could select multiple strategies. Furthermore, three accounts
that were excluded during the championship because of fraud, did not admit it in the
questionnaire. This increases the number of fraudsters to 15 (7.0%).
One of the accounts, who did not admit any fraud, even tried to increase his possibility
of winning the survey lottery. He took part in the survey with two of his accounts, not
admitting any fraud; for one of the two accounts he even took part twice with different
answers to the questions. The danger of fraud in online surveys is already addressed
in Smith et al. (1997). They suggest to circumvent the problem by using one time
passwords. In the survey presented here, an invitation code has been used as a one time
password. Interestingly this user had three different invitation codes, filed the survey on
three different days, but used the same username twice. Either he had forgotten for which
user he had used the invitation code or he did not care too much to cover his activity.
Thus, he must have had at least three accounts. This again confirms two hypothesis:
1. The number of individuals behind the registered accounts who participated in
STOCCER and the survey is lower than the absolute number of answers on the
questionnaire. So the dark figure of fraudsters is probably even higher than 7%.
2. Online lotteries are an easy target of fraud, since the effort to commit fraud is much
lower than in comparable real world settings. In case of an online questionnaire, it
is easier to reply multiple times than the comparable actions of completing several
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questionnaires, putting them in envelopes, going to the post office, getting stamps
and mailing them back to the origin.
Even more interesting is the fact that twenty other persons answered the question regard-
ing which strategy they would use if STOCCER were repeated by marking at least one of
the fraud strategies. This is almost twice as much as the initial set of persons admitting
fraud. Of the formerly honest market participants, 9.9% would switch to the group of
fraudsters. This confirms the bad influence of fraudsters on honest traders if the honest
traders become aware of fraudsters on the platform. This underlines the importance of
market supervising authorities.
5.2 Human-Computer-Interface Experiment
The accounts classified as fraudsters by the presented detection algorithms are not nec-
essarily all fraudsters, a manual classification was necessary. To objectify this manual
classification at least three different persons should give their opinion about each ac-
count. A lab experiment with the prototype was done. The experiment was structured
as follows:
1. Welcome participant and explain the following steps:
2. Answering one question about the expectations for such a market monitoring and
fraud detection system.
3. Watching fifteen minutes of tutorial videos explaining how to use the prototype.
Afterwards the participant can ask questions.
4. Solving three tasks related to three different scenarios/situations:
a) Check thirteen account pairs and tell whether they belong to the same person
or have committed fraud. Possible classifications were fraudster, innocent,
unsure.
b) Check a single account to tell whether he has committed fraud. Possible
classifications were fraudster, innocent, unsure.
c) Monitor five days of market activity and list all events that appear strange /
not normal.
5. Completing a post-study questionnaire that includes: asking how well the test
person’s expectation were met by the prototype, rating the perceived task difficulty,
and taking a human-computer-interface questionnaire.
The full questionnaire is included In Appendix D. The post-study questionnaire was
adopted from Lewis (1995). The initial question asked after the welcome was to compile
a user requirement list and compare it to the list compiled from related work (see Chapter
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Figure 5.2: Overview of the different account sets
3.2.1). The three tasks were designed to test three different scenarios and started from
the easiest scenario, the investigation of a very specific suspicion involving just two
accounts, raising to the most complex scenario, where all activity in the market has to
be monitored. The amount of information needed for each task was very different. The
more information involved the better the tool has to help support the user to make a
decission.
The experimenter was familiar with all details of the system and wrote a protocol about
all questions, comments, and time the participant needed to complete each task. All
participants were familiar with markets and the underlying trading platform STOCCER.
The majority were PhD students from the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology. Since only
one desktop system was available with a large screen (1920x1200, 24”), all participants
completed the experiment one after another. A secondary monitor (1600x1200, 21”)
expanded the virtual desktop to 2420x1200. Interestingly, it was only used by one par-
ticipant.
5.2.1 Selection of the Test Data Set
To validate the classification quality of the algorithm in tasks one and two, accounts
from four different subsets were selected. Figure 5.2 depicts the subset space. The outer
ellipsoid symbolizes the set of all registered accounts. Based on the observation and
exclusions during the field study as well as the results from the follow up questionnaire,
fraudsters is suspected within this group. Intersecting with the fraudsters and normal
users, the group of accounts reported by our algorithms is located. Some of the fraudsters
were found and excluded during the run-time of the field study ({Manually Excluded}).
All members of this group are supposed to be fraudsters, but the only argument is that
they did not complain about being excluded from the market. To understand why this
might not have been the case, it is important to remember that many people only logged
in once or twice and never came back again. Thus, it is uncertain whether or not the
members of this subset even noticed or cared that their accounts had been blocked.
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Still, members of this subset have a higher probability of beeing fraudsters than the ones
identified by the algorithms. Finally, there is the small group of accounts who admitted
fraud in the online survey described above. This is classified with the highest reliability
and are represented by the small dark ellipsoid within the set of fraudsters intersecting
with the {Questionnaire} and {Manually Excluded} sets.
To make the manual classification a real challenge, accounts from all subsets were se-
lected. This includes accounts that are supposed to be innocent. Ideally, this is the set of
all users excluding the fraudsters. Since the fraudster subset is unknown, the best approx-
imation is the set of all users excluding {Manually Excluded}, {AlgorithmResults}
and {Questionnaire}. Since the {Questionnaire} subset was significantly smaller, a
lower proportion was included in each task.
For the first task, four pairs (eight accounts) were chosen randomly without repetition
from each of of the following sets:
• {Manually Excluded},
• {AlgorithmResults}\{Manually Excluded} (to prevent double checks)
• {InnocentUsers}.
From the {Questionnaire} subset only one pair was included because of the small overall
size of this subset. Three sets times four pairs plus one pair for the {Questionnaire}
subset adds up to 13 account pairs.
For the second task, three accounts were chosen randomly from each set, except for the
{Questionnaire} where only one account was randomly chosen. Thus each experiment
participant checked 11 accounts (four pairs plus three individual accounts) from each of
the first three subsets and three further accounts from the {Questionnaire} subset. The
order of the accounts was shuﬄed randomly for each participant of a group to forestall
learning effects.
Overall four groups participated in the experiment. Since each group verified three
{Questionnaire} accounts and 11 accounts of the other 3 subsets, overall 44 ac-
counts of each subset were tested except for the {Questionnaire} set where only
12 accounts were available. Since not all subsets contained 44 accounts, some of
the accounts had to be repeated. These were not drawn randomly but explicitly cho-
sen. While in the {Manually Excluded}-set some accounts have been repeated, the
{AlgorithmResults} have been extended with some accounts only reported via the Gini
algorithm.
5.2.2 Experimental Results
Since the goal of the experiment was twofold, this section is split into two subsections.
The first one addresses the results regarding the algorithm precision evaluation while the
second part focuses on the prototype usability.
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Figure 5.3: Number of accounts confirmed in each set by the experiment
Algorithm Precision
Does the classification of the experiment participant match with the expected one? To
answer this question, the three options the participants could use (honest, fraudster,
unsure) have to be mapped to the simple classification of fraudster and honest. The rule
employed in this analysis was that an account was only considered to be a fraudster if at
least two participants had marked him as such.
Figure 5.3 shows as a bar-chart how well the participants agreed with the pre-classification.
The first bar of each set indicates the number of accounts used in the experiment of that
specific set. For example, the set of {InnocentUsers} was much larger, but only 44 of
the 1195 accounts were used for the experiement. The second bar with the additional
tag confirmed indicates how many of the accounts have been classified the same way by
the participants (according to the rule given above). The classification was in most cases
unambiguous. The ambiguous case of three different opinions (fraud, honest, unsure)
or high uncertainty (2 or 3 times unsure) appeared twice for the {AlgorithmResults}-
set, twice for the {InnocentUsers}-set and once for {Manually Excluded}-set. They
were classified according to the proverb “in dubio pro reo” as innocent users. The in-
terpretation of the low rate of ambiguous cases cannot be generalized, since the sample
size is rather small. Still, it indicates how difficult it is to differentiate in some cases
between an innocent user and a fraudster even for a human being. One account of the
innocent user set got classified by two persons as fraudster (c.f. 5.3). Though the trans-
action history of the innocent accounts had been previously checked, the registration data
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Table 5.1: Fleiss’ Kappa and its interpretation
Group Kappa∗ Kappa+
1 0.49 0.53
2 0.31 0.47
3 0.50 0.58
4 0.51 0.61
Kappa Interpretation
< 0 poor agreement
0.0− 0.20 slight agreement
0.21− 0.40 fair agreement
0.41− 0.60 moderate agreement
0.61− 0.80 substantial agreement
0.81− 1.00 almost perfect agreement
∗taking only normal into account
+taking unsure as normal as well
had been omitted due to missing automatism. When revising the registration data with
the prototype, the participants found another account with highly similar registration
data and the identified account made at least one suspicious transaction at the end of
the championship to a third account. This convinced two participants to mark him as
fraudster.
The difficulty in revealing a fraudster can also be seen in the poor classification rate of
the questionnaire cases. All cases except the one from the {Manually Excluded}-set
had no common transactions. They were only related by similar registration data. The
participants of the experiment had difficulties finding this link. This indicates room for
future improvements.
Regarding the detection precision, the algorithms detected 60 accounts, of which 53
have been confirmed. Thus, the rate is 88% correctly identified or 12% false positives.
The manually classified accounts of the {Manually Excluded}-set had a similar, but
slightly lower accuracy (31/36=86%). The false negatives cannot be determined ex-
actly. A rough estimation can be done by summing up undetected accounts. In the
{Manually Excluded}-set, 12 approved accounts have not been detected; a further 10
in the questionnaire and one in the honest set. This sums up to 23 accounts which is
about two percent false negatives (23/1224=1.88%). Since not all accounts have been
manually classified this number has to be taken as a lower boundary.
Another aspect is the cosistency between the participants regarding their classifications
which is also known as inter-rater reliability. A standard measurement is the Fleiss’ Kappa
(1971) which is defined in the following way:
K =
p0 − pe
1− pe (5.1)
with p0 − pe being the degree of agreement actually achieved and 1 − pe the degree of
agreement attainable by chance. The standard interpretation of K is shown in Table 5.1.
The values for the groups varied between 0.31 and 0.51 which is between fair and mod-
erate agreement. The value is slightly lower since the users had the option to classify
an account as unsure. If –in dubio pro reo– the unsure classifications are interpreted as
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Table 5.2: Size, number of transactions, and volumes per group
all accounts survey
participants
experiment
accounts
all
discovered
fraudsters
excluded
fraudsters
group size 1260 187 127 62 36
# transactions 80402 23038 25739 15715 1761
volume (m VCU) 225.4 66.6 86.3 56.8 12.2
normal users, then the agreement improves to between moderate and substantial (c.f.
Table 5.1, column unsure as normal).
Market Impact of the Fraudsters
Another interesting aspect are the shares of the different groups addressed in the exper-
iment. Table 5.2 shows the group size as number of accounts, number of transactions
and the volume (shares*price) of the different sets. The whole market is given as a ref-
erence. Almost a third in terms of volume participated in the strategy survey and more
than a third of the transaction volume was covered by the experiment. The second to
last column refers to all discovered fraudsters (by hand and algorithm) while the last col-
umn refers to all fraudsters excluded during market operations. This means that 25% of
the overall transaction volume belonged to fraudsters but only 5.4% have been detected
manually. The algorithms discovered almost five times more transactions (11865) and
almost 4 times more volume (43.9m VCU) than the manual classifications.
5.3 Visualization
The evaluation of a prototype is a difficult task. Usually there exists neither a similar
system to compare to, nor have the testers enough experience to think “out of the box” for
substantial criticism. In the field of visualization it is even harder, since visual disabilities
(e.g. color blindness) of potential users have to be taken into consideration. Furthermore
people have different tastes about colors and appearances in general. So personalization
is important, too.
The main focus of software evaluation is the requirement compliance, usability and num-
ber of bugs. During the experiment only a small number of bugs occurred – most of
them inconsistent labeling. Therefore, the number of bugs will not be further addressed.
The term usability shall be understood in the following way:
Definition. Usability
Usability is defined as the extent to which a product can be used by specified users to
achieve specified goals with effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction in a specified context
of use (ISO 9241, 1996).
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In this chapter, the requirement compliance and usability of the prototype shall be ad-
dressed. To test for compliance, especially focusing on the visualization, different visual-
ization taxonomies will be discussed first.
5.3.1 Information Visualization Taxonomies
Early work on visualization taxonomies date back to 1990. Roth and Mattis (1990)
developed a catalog of objects and tasks together with suitable visualizations. They
developed a data analysis and visualization tool called SAGE, which is an automatic
presentation system. In a followup, Wehrend and Lewis (1990) refined the taxonomy of
Roth and Mattis by changing the operations (c.f. table 5.4). Object classes (c.f. table
5.3) and operation classes are the two axis of the taxonomy.
Table 5.3: Object classes (Roth and Mattis 1990)
scalar
scalar field
nominal
direction
direction field
shape
position
spatially extended region or object
structure
Table 5.4: Operation classes (Wehrend 1990)
identify
locate
distinguish
categorize
cluster
distribution
rank
compare
within and between relations
associate
correlate
Every complex task has to be broken down into simple objects and the related task into
basic operations fitting the taxonomy. Then appropriate visualizations can be derived
from the matrix of Roth and Mattis.
Though a designer can verify whether the chosen visualization fits the operation and data,
user interface design includes more than just the pure visualization. Based on Nielson et
al. (1990) nine basic usability principles should be tested. Though these principals seem
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obvious they are often hard to apply in practice as Nielsen and Molich write (1990).
1. Simple and natural language
2. Speak the user’s language
3. Minimize user memory load
4. Be consistent
5. Provide feedback
6. Provide clearly marked exits
7. Provide shortcuts
8. Good error messages
9. Prevent errors
Though these principles may serve as guidelines for application design in general, small
differences can have a significant influence on user perception and performance. Kobsa
(2001) made an empirical comparison of three commercial information visualization sys-
tems. This comparison showed that even though the systems offered similar views, small
features like the default visualization or ease of use of the possible interactions influenced
the results significantly. The users of one system solved the given tasks faster, while
users of a different system achieved higher accuracy. Interestingly, the difference in ac-
curacy disappeared when all tasks involving the investigation of relationship between two
attributes became removed. This can be seen as an indicator that the quality of decision
support heavily depends on the specific visualization implementation.
Amar and Stasko (2005) concluded that Kobsa’s results indicate room for improvement
of the standard operations but they also address that decision makers need more macro-
level / statistical information about the data sets. They define the terms worldview gap
and rationale gap. The worldview gap describes the discrepancy between the chosen
representation and what is really needed to make a decision. The rationale gap refers to
the black boxes in the reasoning process. Though data mining techniques often consist
of rather less intuitive machine learning and reasoning approaches (e.g. support vector
machines, neural networks) a decision maker needs to understand cause and effects. A
decision based on a black box output is rather hard to explain and is perceived to be
unethical.
Using a five step model they show how bridging the worldview and rationale gaps helps
the user to accomplish his tasks with macro-level analytics.
Traditional visualization merely represents the raw data set and lacks the wider perspec-
tive. Amar and Stasko argue that this is not sufficient and that a representation should
make its own limitations clear to its user. This is difficult and only seldom achieved by
tools nowadays.
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5.3.2 Applying Heuristics and Taxonomies
The goal of the prototype was to develop a new visualization to support users in some
particular tasks. Three different visualizations have been implemented and can be checked
against the taxonomy model of Roth and Mattis (1990). Visualization for other tasks or
data was beyond the scope of this work. The prototype visualizes other data only in text
form.
The stacked bar charts of the trading volume are based on an algebraic dependency among
complex data. The total trading volume =
∑
s∈S trading volumes, meaning that the
trading volume per time slot depends on the volumes of each share. Even these can be
broken down again to the lot sizes of all transactions within the time slot. However, in
the prototype a more general overview with a higher level of aggregation was preferred.
Both aspects can be included in a single visualization by using a tree-map, which sets
the main focus more on the lot size than on the total trading volume per day.
The price chart is a classical plot of scalars. These values have an inherent ordering by
their time stamp. Furthermore, price can also be interpreted as coordinate by its inherent
ordering. This means that the scatter plot is a valid display form, while e.g. a map view
is not.
The most interesting point is the graph visualization. In the taxonomy of Roth and Mattis
this visualization is called node-link-diagram. It is applicable for complex relationships
among complex data types. They point out that a node-link-diagram shows very well
no-values, but are ineffective when non-coverage is due to missing data. This means that
if there is missing data, the absence of a link does not necessarily mean that there is no
link in the real world. It is simply not in the data set. This is partly relevant for the
filtered visualization presented in the previous chapter. Since the prototype is connected
to the trading platform, there is no missing data. But to reduce the visual complexity,
edges are omitted according to the user’s filter settings. This may mislead the user. To
overcome this problem, the user can open the filter for a selected node (see section 4.3).
These early visualization taxonomies are only partially helpful for evaluation purposes.
These taxonomies are mapping data types and operations to visualizations. Newer tax-
onomies try to focus on the knowledge precepts of the tasks, which the user intends to
solve with the visualization. The idea is to support the user in their knowledge deriving
and decision making process. Applied to the use cases of the prototype, it is especially
necessary in the fraud detection process. The support is twofold. First, the algorithms
help to mark suspicious activities and accounts. Later on, the visualization brings the
accounts into the market and social context. Still, one could think of more algorithms
and more visualization. But the prototype is only a first approach towards integrated
visual analysis tools for market operators.
According to the presented taxonomies, the prototype does use the adequat visualization
techniques and supports the user to accomplish their tasks. What support users expect
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from such a tool is presented in the next section.
5.3.3 Fullfillment of Requirements
In the experiment, the users had to write down their key requirements for a market mon-
itoring tool and stack rank them. After completing the tasks with the prototype they
were asked about how well the prototype matched their expectations. Because of the
small subset of observations (n=12) only a qualitative summary will be presented here.
The most often mentioned requirement was the ease of use (seven times), followed by
the clearly structured, holistic overview of the current situation (five times). Each of
the following requirements have been stated at least three times: offering different levels
of detail/drill down/filtering, highlighting outliers & detected fraudsters, automating the
detection and optimizing the accuracy. Only one participant desired to have all cases
presented which are suspicious such that he can filter them manually afterwards. Regard-
ing the importance, most of these tasks have been ranked 2-3 on average with the only
exception of automation ranked four. In the post experiment questions, the users could
give grades between 1 (poorest) and 7 (best) and 0 for no answer/not applicable. It is a
known phenomena that users tend to give better grades to systems that they have used
on their own (compared to systems they have only seen pictures/videos of). Considering
this, it is not surprising that the grades for the prototype are between 5 and 6.6 with an
exception of 4.3 for the highlighting.
Most of the requirements mentioned by the participants are straight forward and are
consistent with the requirements gathered from the literature in section 3.2.1. There is
no way to guarantee that all possible requirements have been discovered. Many are taken
from literature which only describe similar fields of applications such as money laundering
and credit card fraud. But the way the user interacts with the application is very similar.
The full list is given in table 5.5, now extended with the requirements fulfilled by the
presented visualization.
How the prototype matches these requierments: The query interface is realized in various
ways. The account inspector (c.f. 4.1.6), share inspector (c.f. 4.1.5), graph visualization
(c.f. 3) and the account registration data dialog allow the user to narrow his search
by time, share or user-name. Data from other sources are possible to incorporate: e.g.
realized events such as results of a soccer match can be added and used to enrich the
visualizations. Temporal links (i.e. transaction X was executed shortly after the account
Y had been created) in the sense of Sentator et al. (1995) are not incorporated in the
prototype. A first approach of temporal links in market places can be seen in the work
presented by Maranzato (2010).
The algorithms are designed to allow continuous detection in the background while visual-
izing the market activity (see Chapter 2 on page 19). They treat every market participant
equally in the sense that each algorithm does not take previous classifications of another
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Table 5.5: Requirement list for a market visualization for fraud detection
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query interface ‡ 2 2 2 2
incorporate data from other sources† 2 2
“temporal links”‡
integrated and continuous detection† 2 2
periodic evaluations and update of the pattern†¶ 2 2
equal treatment of all market participants† 2 2 2 2
Visualization
weighted node positions 2
drill down$ 2 2
filtering$ 2 2
(near) real-time interaction$ 2 2
automatic layouts$ 2 2
identification of “key” nodes$¶ 2 2 2
similar sub graphs$¶ 2 2
marking outliers¶ 2 2
central spot of information¶ 2 2
adequate visualization for different user groups†
highly flexible, generic view concepts$ 2 2
different visualization forms$ 2 2
adaptable graphical parameters$ 2 2
† Senator et al. $ Chang et al.
‡ Goldberg et al. ¶Chau and Faloutsos
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algorithm or human into consideration. This decision was made on purpose since every
algorithm has a certain false positive probability. If and account is treated by another
algorithm as a fraudster when it has not yet been confirmed, the algorithm may produce
bad results. Human classifications could be taken into consideration. However, the algo-
rithms were designed not to depend on a preclassified (sub-)set. Though the algorithms
detect a certain pattern within the graph, they do not perform a generic, similar subgraph
detection in the sense of Chau et al (2006).
Key nodes can be identified easily since the modified graph layout displays them in the
center of the visualization. Though the layout is completely automatic by the modified
spring embedder algorithm, the user can exclude nodes and fix them to any desired
location of the screen. This way, the visualization works as a central spot of information
including three forms of visualizations (bar chart, line chart and graph visualization).
From this central spot the user can drill down onto any desired data point. Graph
visualization, line and bar charts are generic view concepts. The prototype limits the
user to information which can be visualized by at least one of these views. The user can
adapt the graph visualization by manipulating the layout algorithm parameters and the
sliding window settings. Customizing the tool beyond this would have been out of scope
for this work.
Summarizing the aspects above, it can be stated that most of the requirements have been
met by the presented prototype consisting of the algorithms from chapter 2 on page 19
and visualization of chapter 3 on page 47.
5.3.4 Usability Evaluation by Participatory Observation
Participatory Observation was first applied in sociology. The first successful application
in the field of usability and software engineering is mentioned by Potts (1993). It is an
interdisciplinary study from Summerville et al. (1993) in which sociologists and software
engineers work together in order to improve the usability of a flight database system
for air traffic control. In sociology, this practice of observation in the field has a long
tradition. In this setting, the observer sits next to the participant and tries to observe and
evaluate the user interactions, problems, and time to complete the given tasks. Important
influence factors are the habituation and adaptation during the participatory observation.
Habituation refers to the long-term habits and familiarity with the environment. Adap-
tion, on the other side, refers to the short term when new stimuli from the environment
distract the participant. Depending on the expertise of the participant, this may have a
different influence on the results and has to be taken into consideration by the observer.
In the HCI experiment described above the participants were all familiar with the location
and three of them had previous experience in market surveillance or fraud detection. The
observer measured the time the participants needed to classify each account or account
pair for each task. The average time per task was for task one, 40:12 minutes (maximum:
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Figure 5.4: Histogram of the number of cases decided in less than x seconds
78:06 minutes; minimum 11:06 minutes) and for task two, 25:06 minutes (maximum
37:30 minuntes; minimum 10:36 minutes). Though faster, the participants percieved the
task two as more difficult. The ranking scale was [1,2,3] with 1 for the most difficult
task. They ranked task two with an average of 1.75, which was a little higher than task
one with an average of 2.1.
After completing the difficulty ranking, the participants had to fill out a post experiment
usability questionnaire2 which was adapted from Lewis (1995). The questionnaire con-
sisted of 20 questions regarding three areas: system usability, information quality, and
interface quality. The participant can express how much he aggrees with the listed state-
ment on a seven point Likert scale with an additional point for N/A. With an average of
5.6 (5.5 system usability, 5.5 information quality, and 5.7 interface quality) the partici-
pants were consistent with their qualitative statements in the requirement analysis (c.f.
previous section).
Another interesting metric is the time until decision. It can be seen as the average
time a user needs to gather enough insight to comfortably judge the case. The observer
measured the time between the start of an investigation for a single account / account
pair until the moment when the participant wrote his decision into the questionnaire.
Figure 5.4 shows the histogram of the time. The x-axis is split in slices of 15 seconds,
the left y-axis depicts the number of accounts judged within in this time for the bar
charts, and the right y-axis the overall percentage of judged account for the line chart
overlay. The participants were not aware of any time pressure. For example, there are
2The ranking and post experiment questionnaire were not part of the participatory observation.
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Figure 5.5: Group average times per account for task 1
10 instances in which the participants needed more than 10 minutes to decide. In one
instance, a participant took even 22:30 minutes which causes the spike for question 5
in Figure 5.5. The line chart indicates 50% of the cases have been judged within two
minutes (≤ 120 seconds) and 75% of all cases within 3:30 minutes.
These numbers have to be taken as upper bounds. The fact that only three persons had
former experience in market surveillance and learning effects certainly influenced the time.
The histogram is taken for all participants and all judgments. Because of learning effects,
the evaluation of the first accounts took more time than for the following ones. This can
be seen by comparing Figure 5.5 and Figure 5.6. Both figures have the same co-ordinate
system: the x-axis describes the cases in the order the participants had to solve them,
the y-axis the time in seconds. Though a line graph is not the correct presentation since
each evaluation should be independent from the previous one, it reveals the trend over
the 10 (13) cases. While in Figure 5.5 the average time for classification in each group
descends; the graph of group three in Figure 5.6 is slightly rising. The average linear
regression coefficient for task one is -20.2 while the average slope of the linear regression
of task two is -6.5. This indicates that in the second task a certain amount of learning
still took place, but less than in the first one. The coefficient of task two is also less
robust with ∅R2 of 0.15 compared to 0.40 for task one.
Overall, the participatory observation confirmed the principels of information visualiza-
tion. Humans do perceive the task of identifying previously unknown patterns in a large
amount of transaction data as more difficult than just verifiying the relationship between
two accounts. While this is not surprising, the short time to decision indicates that the
prototype supports the user well during both tasks. The learning curve indicates that
most users were within less than an hour, including the 15 minutes tutorial video, al-
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Figure 5.6: Group average times per account for task 2
ready very efficient in solving the given tasks. Even people without a market surveillance
background achieved good results as the earlier presented interrater reliability shows.
5.3.5 Summary
The post-fieldstudy online survey has revealed that a significant amount of traders are
tempted to try fraudulent strategies if the market were to be repeated again. Still, most
of the people admitting fraud in the questionnaire had been found neither by hand nor by
the algorithms. These were users who abandoned accounts with which they had backed
the wrong horse and now wanted to have a second chance. From a prediction market
perspective, this activity is double-edged. Since this behavior does not necesarrily harm
the prediction quality if it happens purely sequential and always with best effort, it may
even be supported by the trading platform. A functionality such as “close this account
and create a new one” could be incorporated into a trading portal. The down side of such
an approach is that it removes the pressure for participants to really process all available
information and come up with a reasonable price. Instead, they could blindly bet on a
share, simply to maximize their profit without even knowing anything about the market,
the shares or the background information. Solving the problem remains for the market
engineer of the futur prediction market platforms as it is beyond the scope of this work.
Furthermore, the accuracy of the algorithms has been objectified. With 88% accuracy,
the algorithms slightly surpass the manual classification accuracy of 86%. Even better,
the algorithms discover more accounts with higher trading volume than the manual clas-
sification. Besides the accuracy of the algorithms, the usability of the prototype itself
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has been tested and received an average of 5.6 on a 7 point Likert scale, which are very
good results. Regarding the user expectations as well as the requirements gathered from
the literature, the prototype fulfills almost all of them. This is confirmed by the steep
learning curve of the participants. Within a short period of time, the participants were
able to judge 75% of the cases in less than 3.5 minutes.
This shows that the graph based algorithms are a big step forward, since they warrent
higher accuracy than manual spot checks on a real world data set and the visualization
helps users to quicker separate fraudsters from innocent users.
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6 Summary and Outlook
Today’s electronic markets in general and play money prediction markets in particular are
vulnerable to fraud and manipulation. There are many types of manipulations that can
occur, ranging from the manipulation of reputation systems by using fake accounts, to
price manipulation in order to increase profits and manipulation of the outcome on pre-
diction markets. These three examples illustrate the variety of electronic market aspects
which fraudsters target. In physical markets, processes are limited to the speed of action
of the participants, however, electronic markets allow for a much faster pace. In order to
keep track of transactions and ensure legal behavior, computer aided market surveillance
systems are being employed. Scientists tend to use complex, supervised approaches, like
neural networks, to detect fraud. These approaches depend on labeled data sets. In order
to compare different suggested approaches, a common metric is necessary. However, the
problems of missing agreement on a common metric, unpublished data sets, and closely
following fraudsters, hinder further development of the field. Moreover, most industry
solutions are unpublished.
Electronic markets —commercial, as well as academic prediction markets— need the
customer to trust in the platform and fellow participants in order to be successful. Ma-
nipulation, and the resulting loss of reputation, is a serious threat to platform operators.
If participants believe that others are using illegal methods, their willingness to commit
fraud increases. This is shown in the post field study questionnaire of the participants
of STOCCER, taken nine months after the end of the STOCCER main market. The
study revealed that almost 10% of the questionnaire participants would commit fraud if
STOCCER was repeated; this is twice the currently estimated amount of fraudsters.
Missing tools and insufficient staff are primary obstacles to monitoring the high trans-
action volumes of electronic markets. The high-level goal of the monitoring is quality
assurance. One possible monitoring and fraud detection approach has been implemented
as a prototype and is presented in the previous chapters.
6.1 Summary of Main Results
Traders are social entities trying to make a profit on a market. Market rules and platform
restrictions usually prevent a single account from committing fraud or manipulation.
However, many platforms are vulnerable to collusion. Furthermore, fraudsters tend to
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share ideas and techniques among friends or to simply copy what they observe on the
market platform. Since collusion is a social process, the prototype presented in this work
uses the transaction and user data to build the underlying social network. This network
is mined for possible patterns of fraud.
Two graph based approaches to detect collusion in prediction markets have been pre-
sented. The design goals were to find simple and fast heuristics that are easy for market
authorities to control and that achieve a high precision. As the previously mentioned
disagreement on measurements indicates, precision is only one possible criterion. It was
chosen following feedback from two employees of different market surveillance institutions
who stated that a system which returns too many cases with poor precision will cause
the staff to abandon the system or ignore the alerts.
The first approach (Circular Trading Indicator) tries to find repeated transactions between
the same counter-parties, which is beneficial for only one of the two. The sensitivity
analysis shows that the parameters allow for the exclusion of false positives with high
certainty. The result set is shrunk to include only the absolutely obvious cases but
increases the false negatives.
The second approach (Prominent Edge Indicator) is an example of a less accurate pattern
which targets cases where one account is the major trading partner of another account.
This trading concentration is measured by the Gini coefficient. Obviously, this can happen
in absolutely legal and honorable transactions as well, for example, the first transaction
a new account executes on the market. But besides this special case which can be
pre-filtered, it selects accounts deviating from regular trading patterns by developing a
preferred trading partner. Being less accurate, the false positive rate is 50%, much higher
than the first approach. Many cases are just coincidence, for example, people might just
happen to be interested in the same shares and trading at similar times. A sensitivity
analysis of the different parameters showed that for this approach the precision could not
be significantly improved.
Following the idea of finding the most relevant of the suspicious cases, a combination
of the two approaches has been tested. The result is a stronger preselection without
the necessity of calibrating any parameters as both indicators can be used in their least
restrictive settings. Thereby achieving a higher than 90% precision on a real world data
set. The importance of the low false-positve rate and tuning effort is crucial to find
acceptance in the real business world as Symantic already underlined for Spam detection
(Lochmaier 2009).
In terms of speed, the simpler second approach needs just 30 seconds for the complete
replay of 32 graphs with a total of 17432 nodes and 47588 edges. The more complex
indicator takes less than seven minutes.
The findings of Cortes et al. (2001) about fraudsters being closer to other fraudsters
than normal users has been extended from telecommunications to electronic markets.
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The test set includes the accounts tagged during the market run-time, plus the newly
discovered accounts via the combination of the Circular Trading and the Prominent
Edge Indicator. The shortest path from each account to the next fraudulent one has
been measured. The hypothesis, that the length of the shortest path between fraudsters
is longer than the shortest path between legitimate accounts and fraudsters, was tested
using the Mann Whitney U Test. In the manually classified set, only 8 of the 32 markets
had a p-value < 0.05 (see Section 2.2). After applying the indicators, the hypothesis H0
can be rejected for 21 markets. The p-value for 6 of the remaining 11 markets is <= 0.10
and for the others dramatically decreased compared to the first test in the beginning of
chapter 2. The interpretation of these results indicates that fraudsters were the main
drivers in these markets since they had not been detected during the market operation.
The only exception is the market of Switzerland where no fraudsters were detected by
the algorithms and the values stayed the same.
In order to use the human abilities of pattern matching and analytical thinking, a visu-
alization has been presented. The goal was to visualize the dynamics of a market over
time in order to allow real time monitoring without overloading existing solutions with
semantic complexity. Since most market surveillance teams are familiar with reading
price and volume charts, these two displays were combined with a graph visualization of
the transaction network between the different traders. This reveals correlations between
different price or volume artifacts with different trading parties. Several enhancements
to the standard spring embedder algorithm have been presented in order to enrich the
graph visualization with more market related semantics. The run-time analysis shows
that the modifications do not significantly increase the complexity (still in O(n2 log n))
and the empirical test indicates that the visualization accommodates common market
activity very well within the dimensions of a common monitor.
The indicators and the monitoring component have been implemented in a prototype.
This prototype has been successfully used on three other prediction markets so far and
tested on a regular stock market data set. The usability of the prototype has been
evaluated in an HCI experiment. In this experiment, 12 participants used the prototype
to verify individual accounts (reflecting the scenario of a suspected fraud reported by
a customer), verify account pairs (potential output of the indicators), and monitor the
market during a limited time period. The results of the experiment show that the provided
tools and visualizations were quite intuitive since the learning curve was quite steep.
Moderate agreement was achieved regarding the classification quality of the untrained
participants. They classified 50% of the cases in less than 2 minutes, and 75% of the
cases within 3.5 minutes. This shows that the participants could gather the amount of
data they needed to make a decision in a short period of time. In the HCI evaluation,
the overall system quality was rated with 5.6 on a 7 point scale (5.5 system usability, 5.5
information quality, and 5.7 interface quality).
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6.2 Limitations of the Approach
A major limitation during the development and evaluation of fraud detection methods
is the unknown number of false negatives. False positives can be recognized rather
easily. Even labeled data sets usually contain only the cases which have been revealed
during previous investigations. Easy to classify or even pre-classified data sets could be
generated via experiments. The scenario for the experiment would be two groups of
traders, where one is technically and by incentives restricted to honest trading, while the
other group is allowed and motivated to trick the system by all means. This method is still
limited by the creativity of the participants and will most likely generate only small data
sets. Generating data sets algorithmically calculates the false positive and false negative
rates without uncertainty. However, it is questionable whether applying fraud detection
mechanisms to a generated data set is a good approximation of real world scenarios.
The consequence of using real world data sets is the unknown number of fraudsters, and
therefore, the inability to determine precision and recall of a method. In the previous
chapters, it has been assumed that the known set of fraudsters is the complete set of
fraudsters.
Regarding the validation of the approach, it remains uncertain whether the classified
fraudsters are really fraudsters. Some of the accounts have been excluded during mar-
ket operations without complaint and some admitted fraud during the post field study
questionnaire. But for all other accounts, there is only the judgement of the three hu-
man evaluators, where at least two of them were convinced that the accounts in question
were fraudsters. Whether or not they really were fraudsters will probably remain uncertain
forever.
The indicators are designed to analyze edges of the network. Therefore, they scale with
the numberof edges m and nodes n of the graph. So far, the analyzed transaction graphs
have been rather sparse. This is typical for most online markets. However, the graph
might have a higher density on other platforms. For an online analysis the run-time
complexity is O(m
n2
) for the circular trading indicator and O(n) theoretical worst case
for the prominent edge indicator. Because of the low density, the expected run-time
is o(log n). These indicators are still suitable even for large graphs as the main factor
influencing the complexity is the overall graph density. Since the so far observed real
world market graphs are sparse with few dense clusters these indicators can easily be
offered as a service to market operators. Since the fraud detection does not have to
be a validation during transaction execution, it can be performed asynchroneus as a call
to a service returning an alert. In case of higher transaction frequencies the indicators
can easily be parallized in map-reduce fashion as long as no immediate neighboors are
involved in the current set of transactions, such as
−→
ab and
−→
bc. For the prominent edge
indicator such transaction sequences need to be evaluated sequentially. Offering fraud
detection as a service raises the concern whether it can be ensured that the clients are
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only real market operators instead of fraudsters who just want to test various strategies
and whether they would get detected.
Since most of the edges are removed for the visualization, the goal of real-time monitoring
depends on the computational power to calculate the force directed layout for all nodes.
Though the run-time complexity is O(n2 log n), it is too high for really large networks
beyond 10,000 nodes. However, most markets can be split into a separate graph for
each share. These graphs are usually much smaller than the overall registered number
of accounts on the market platform. For example, on eBay, the group of bidders for one
particular item. Though this graph might not yield enough evidence, it can easily be
enriched by including transactions of previous co-occurances for each account pair.
Graph patterns in markets are still a relatively new field of research. New indicators for
different patterns still have to be identified and implemented. Since fraudsters are closely
following the new developments in the field, both auto-adjusting parameters and learning
pattern detectors are desirable features for monitoring software
6.3 Outlook
Visualizations bear endless possibilities for modifications and extensions. An example of
an extension is the encoding of further information into the shape of the nodes. Brandes
et al. (2001) presented a graph visualization where an interval scale is encoded into the
distortion of the node shape. This could be adapted for the market visualization in the
following way: If a node is more of a liquidity provider than a requester, the shape might
be more like a vertical ellipse, while if it is more of a requester, the shape is more like a
horizontal ellipse. A balanced account would be depicted as a circle. Encoding further
information into the graph visualization bears the subliminal danger of overloading the
visualization. The simpler the visualization, the more intuitive is the resulting application
following Eick’s visualization mantra: overview first, details on demand.
Further enhancement of the indicator set can increase the versatility of the prototype.
Examples of further indicators have already been presented in Section 2.7. Looking at the
results of the infestations from the STOCCER market, the de-duplication of registration
data yields a high potential for finding fraudsters on online platforms. Amateurs, who
possess limited creativity in creating different, unlinked registration data, have been found
more frequently than expected. Thus, linking accounts with similar registration data or
the same pattern like “email=aaaaa@xyz.com” and “email=bbbbbb@xyz.com” would be
a valuable extension of the existing set of indicators.
Looking at the requirements, there is one thing missing in all presented fraud detection
tools: the temporal links from Goldberg and Senator (1995). They describe relations like
“shortly after the account x was created, y made a huge sale to z”. Linking all events
with each other leads to exponential growth of the edge set with each occurring event.
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Strong filtering will be necessary to remove edges between unrelated events. It remains an
open question whether a graph is the best internal representation to mine these temporal
relations.
Transaction data between users does not occur only on markets. Exchanged emails, bank
transfers, and text messages from cell phones are a few other types of interactions which
could be visualized using the same approach. Adding further types of transaction data
could enhance the network formation. The visualization design is not limited to markets,
but can be applied to other networks as well. It remains for future research to adapt the
visualization for different types of interactions over time.
Social network analysis for prediction markets recently got more attention. Intrade re-
leased data sets to interested social network researchers in order to improve the accessibil-
ity, transparency, and validation of prediction markets (Intrade 2010). Social networking,
in general, is getting more and more integrated into regular IT infrastructure (Strehlitz
2009; Gengler 2009). This opens the possibility to analyze even more transactions for
audit purposes inside a company by using their social context.
The prototype presented here, has been used successfully to detect fraudsters in further
markets and in a follow up research project (eix-market.de). According to Goldmann,
the combination of our ego-driven, winner-takes-it-all mentality, as well as the pressure
to deliver high growth rates, opportunities to commit fraud, and the culture of short-
term earnings, all come together to foster the increase of fraud in our society (2010).
Until we re-think our incentive systems and ethic values, the race between fraudsters and
prosecutors will continue, making the use and further development of tools such as the
proposed prototype necessary.
124
125
A Data Structures
Node Data Structure
1 class Node {
2 // identifier , e.g. userid of the user -record in the DB
3 long id;
4 // SUM[i](n_i * p_i) => the volume of all transactions
5 double totalVolume;
6 // the timestep (millis since 1970) of the last transaction
7 long lastTransaction;
8 ...
9 }
Edge Data Structure
1 c l a s s Edge {
2 Node sou r c e ; // => the s e l l e r
3 Node d e s t i n a t i o n ; // => the buyer
4 // SUM[ i ] ( n_i ∗ p_i ) => the volume o f a l l t r a n s a c t i o n s
5 doub l e to ta lVo lume ;
6 // the t ime s t ep ( m i l l i s s i n c e 1970) o f the l a s t t r a n s a c t i o n
7 long l a s t T r a n s a c t i o n ;
8 }
By storing on each of the objects the last modification timestamp and aggregates of
each of the attributes of interest, the control logic on top can easily highlight recent
modifications and their impact in the network. The timestamp, for example, allows to
reflect changes in the network in a replay mode. The aggregates can be mapped directly
in the visualization to visual attributes like size, color, shape or speed. Otherwise they
can be kept to be displayed for further investigation (details on demand).
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pavian
visualization network_analysis
Node
id : long
totalVolume : double
lastTransaction : long
Edge
source : Node
destination : Node
totalVolume : double
lastTransaction : long
12
Figure A.1: Class Diagram
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B Online Questionnaire
STOCCER: Umfrage zur Handelsstrategie - Seite 1 von 2 http://psm.em.uni-karlsruhe.de/stoccer/index.php?code=fd1e49678a4...
1 of 1 29.05.2007 15:08
STOCCER:
Um frage zur 
Handelsst rategie
W ilkom m en bei der Stoccer St rategie Survey
Liebes STOCCER- Mitglied,
ein Jahr nach der erstm aligen Ö um l;ffnung unseres W eltm eisterschaftsm arktes unter w w w .stoccer.de m öchten w ir uns noch
einm al für die rege Teilnahm e bedanken.
W ie Sie vielleicht w issen, handelte es sich bei STO CCER um  ein Forschungsprojekt. W ir m öchten Sie zu einer abschließenden
Um frage einladen. M it etw as Glück können Sie attraktive Preise gew innen.
Die Studie beschäftigt sich m it erfolgreichen Handelsstrategien. Hierbei ist unbedeutend, ob diese Strategie m öglicherw eise
gegen die Handelsbedingungen von STO CCER verstößt (STO CCER-AGB). Sie haben keinerlei Konsequenzen zu befürchten.
Unter allen eingesendeten Antw orten verlosen w ir 3 Am azon-Gutscheine im  Gesam tw ert von 225 Euro. Jeder volständig
ausgefüllte Bogen hat eine Chance auf Gew inn; also, m achen Sie m it!
Der Fragebogen besteht nur aus w enigen inhaltlichen Fragen und dauert ca 1 m in. Vielen Dank, dass Sie uns bei der
Evaluation unterstützen.
I hr  STOCCER- Team
Weiter
Im pressum  und Kontakt
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STOCCER: Umfrage zur Handelsstrategie - Seite 2 von 2 http://psm.em.uni-karlsruhe.de/stoccer/seite2.php
1 of 2 29.05.2007 15:10
STOCCER:
Um frage zur 
Handelsst rategie
W elche der folgenden Strategien haben Sie verw endet? ( m ehrfach ankreuzen m öglich)
1
Ich habe die Nachrichten aufm erksam  verfolgt und versucht, aktuelle M eldungen zu m einem  Vorteil
auszunutzen.
?
2
Ich habe versucht, m ein Fußballw issen und m eine Erfahrung beim  Kauf und Verkauf der Aktien geschickt
um zusetzen und dam it von m einem  W issensvorsprung zu profitieren.
?
3 Ich habe von Anfang an alles Geld auf eine Aktie gesetzt. ?
 a) Ich habe m ehrere Accounts angelegt, um  m it diesen jew eils auf verschiedene Aktien setzen zu können. ?
4 Ich habe anfangs auf die Favoriten (aus den Vorjahren) gesetzt. ?
5 Ich habe anfangs bew usst auf unbekannte Team s gesetzt. ?
6 Ich habe häufig die Aktien bereits ausgeschiedener Team s gehandelt. ?
7
Ich habe m ehr als einen Account angelegt, um  Aktien und/oder Geld auf einem  Account zu bündeln. Dabei
habe ich:
?
 a) Aktien im m er zw ischen den beiden hin- und herverkauft ?
 b) Aktien zu einem  überhöhten Preis von m einem  Hauptaccount an w eitere Accounts verkauft. ?
 c) Aktien zu sehr niedrigen Preis von einem  m einer w eiteren Accounts an m einen Hauptaccount verkauft. ?
d) M it einem  w eiteren Account große Teile des O rderbuchs aufgekauft, um  später die große Preisspanne
besser dazu nutzen zu können, w eitere Transaktionen zw ischen zw ei m einer Accounts durchzuführen.
?
8 Ich habe ein Script/Bot verw endet, um  schneller und ohne Aufw and zu handeln. ?
9
Ich habe Excel oder andere Program m e verw endet, um  einen besseren Überblick über m ein Depot zu
behalten.
?
10 Ich habe eine andere Strategie verw endet. (Bitte beschreiben Sie diese in der nächsten Zeile) ?
W elche der oben genannten Strategie w ürden Sie bei einer W iederholung von STO CCER benutzen?
(z.B. 2, 7a, 7c M ehrfachnennung m öglich)
Allgem eine Fragen
 M ein STO CCER Account w ar:
 M eine Zw eitaccounts w aren:
 M ein Nam e:
 M eine E-M ail-Adresse:
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STOCCER: Umfrage zur Handelsstrategie http://psm.em.uni-karlsruhe.de/stoccer/summit.php
1 of 1 29.05.2007 15:11
STOCCER:
Um frage zur 
Handelsst rategie
Vielen Dank!
Liebes STOCCER- Mitglied,
vielen Dank, dass Sie sich die Zeit genom m en haben.
W ir w ürden uns freuen, Sie bald m al w ieder auf der Handelsplattform  STO CCER begrüßen zu können.
Ihr STO CCER Team  aus Karlsruhe
Im pressum  und Kontakt
129
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C STOCCER Terms and Conditions
1. Participation in the forecasting market STOCCER is free of charge but requires a
registration. During the registration process, the following data has to be provided
correctly and completely: First name, last name, e-mail address, gender, year of
birth, country of origin and postal address. By registering the user guarantees for
the correctness of all declarations given in the registration process.
2. Eligibility for registration requires 18 years of age and the approval of the terms
and conditions. No person is allowed to register more than once.
3. The user’s chosen login name will be displayed on the website as part of the rankings
and in other analyses.
4. The operator saves the data which is necessary for the operation and the recon-
struction of the trading activity. The data will not be passed on to third parties.
In this context, third parties are all organisations and persons who are not clearly
named as operators of STOCCER.
5. The operator is not liable for server breakdowns and technical malfunctions.
6. The operator reserves the right to perform changes or supplementations to the ex-
isting offers without prior notice. The operator has the right to abort the exchange
at any time.
7. The use of any kind of automated actions, e.g. scripts for manipulating the sport
exchange, is strictly prohibited.
8. The operator may disqualify participants who violate these terms and conditions. In
such cases prizes can be reclaimed ex post. Participants’ accounts can temporarily
be disabled if they are suspect of having manipulated the market.
9. Non-monetary prizes cannot be paid cash and are not transferable to other persons.
10. There is no legal claim of participation.
11. In case of the existence of winners with equal deposit value, fortune decides which
one will be in the lottery.
12. Employees of the Institute of Information System and Management, University of
Karlsruhe (TH), employees of the Chair for Business Administration, esp. Elec-
tronic Commerce, University of Frankfurt, as well as employees of organizations
and enterprises related to STOCCER are eligible to participate, but not eligible to
win prizes.
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13. The publication of the forecasts created with this exchange for commercial purposes
or in media requires the approval and, if applicable, the agreement of the operators.
14. The exchange is run under the law of the Federal Republic of Germany. Terms and
conditions apply.
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D Experiment Questionnaire
The questionnaire is printed with the same page breaks as the original one.
Introduction
Question 1
What do you expect of an information system for market monitoring and fraud detec-
tion? What requirements do you have? Please Rank them afterwards according their
importance to you.
Expectation/Requirement Rank
Please watch now the following videos in the given order:
1. 1_madevi_graph.wmv
2. 2_madevi_inspector.wmv
3. 3_madevi_fraud.wmv
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List of Tasks:
1.) Checking account pairs
Scenario:
An algorithmic indicator provides a list of suspicious account pairs. The algorithm sug-
gests that these pairs are partners/coalitions. One account is ruined in favour of the
other typically trading large amount of shares back and forth between them in a short
period of time. The algorithm stored the list on the hard disk in “task1.txt”.
Task description:
You have to validate the list, classifying the accounts into normal users and fraudsters.
If you are unsure, please mark the third option and write down a comment. Before you
can start just open the application and select the market with the ID “9”. Then go
to the “analyze” menu and select the option “case manager”. Select the option “Open
fraud list. . . ” from the toolbar and open the file “task1.txt”. If you accidentally close
the window, just open it again like described above. You can use further information
windows from the view menu, if you need them. If you find more accounts just continue
the list.
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Id Account Id Partner Normal Fraud Unsure Comment
102 Luckner 145 didi
1845 tommy 249 benni39
1488 Pia 1195 Maddin
1398 Consti 975 Periastron
567 Lady-W 480 e-union
1308 dgut 780 Degauss
519 vonderwand 791 LePompiste
493 dududei 586 Kabeljau
1019 falke 830 fpschebe
1074 yb1898 1432 Uli
1773 master 1746 king
687 Juster 716 redondo
1180 MB 780 Degauss
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2.) Checking accounts:
Scenario:
The call centre of your company filed several complains where participants were accusing
other accounts to be violating the rules. The compiled list is handed over to you (since
you are representing the market operation centre).
Task description:
Please open the Account Inspector from the “view” menu and investigate the given
accounts. Again try to distinguish normal users from fraudsters. You may list some
irregularities or difficulties you have in the comment field. If you are unsure about the
true state of an account, mark the “unsure” column. If you find further accounts just
continue the list.
Id Partner Normal Fraud Unsure Comment
1874 hiphop
1870 cocacola
161 Spielmacher
1847 Attila
373 Liceu
280 bullrider
990 Studienrat
1763 fruit
728 diemerm
292 fluxrope
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3.) Market Monitoring:
Replay the STOCCER World Championship Market (ID 9) from 2006-07-01 till 2006-07-
05 in the market graph view and look whether you can observer any strange events. You
have 15 minutes time.
Please write down your findings:
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
. . .
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Final Questionnaire
Instructions
This questionnaire, which starts below, gives you an opportunity to tell us your reactions
to the system you used. Your responses will help us understand what aspects of the
system you are particularly concerned about and the aspects that satisfy you.
To as great a degree as possible, think about all the tasks that you have done with the
system while you answer these questions.
Please read each statement and indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with the
statement by circling a number on the scale. If a statement does not apply to you, circle
N/A.
Thank you!
Question 1
How well did the application meet your initially defined requirements?
Expectation/Requirement Very good Very bad N/A
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
Which was the most difficult task for you?
TASK RANK Why?
TASK 1: Checking Account Pairs
TASK 2: Checking Accounts
TASK 3: Monitoring
138
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Question 2 - System Usability
Strongly agree Strongly disagree N/A
1. Overall, I am satisfied with how
easy it is to use this system.
        
2. It was simple to use this system.         
3. I could effectively complete the
tasks and scenarios using this
system.
        
4. I was able to complete the tasks
and scenarios quickly using this
system.
        
4. I was able to complete the tasks
and scenarios quickly using this
system.
        
Strongly agree Strongly disagree N/A
6. I felt comfortable using this
system.
        
7. It was easy to learn to use this
system.
        
8. I believe I could become
productive quickly using this
system.
        
9. The system gave error messages
that clearly told me how to fix
problems.
        
10. Whenever I made a mistake
using the system, I could recover
easily and quickly.
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Question 3 - Information Quality
Strongly agree Strongly disagree N/A
11. The information (such as
on-line help, on-screen messages
and other documentation) provided
with this system was clear.
        
12. It was easy to find the
information I needed.
        
13. The information provided for
the system was easy to understand.
        
14. The information was effective
in helping me complete the tasks
and scenarios.
        
15. The organization of
information on the system screens
was clear.
        
Question 4 - Interface
Note: The interface includes those items that you use to interact with the system. For
example, some components of the interface are the keyboard, the mouse, the screens
(including their use of graphics and language).
Strongly agree Strongly disagree N/A
16. The interface of this system
was pleasant.
        
17. I liked using the interface of
this system.
        
18. This system has all the
functions and capabilities I expect
it to have.
        
19. Overall, I am satisfied with
this system.
        
140
141
E Fraud Detection and Prevention
Software
The following list is compiled from kdnuggets and related pages.
Toolname Hersteller Clients Application Technology
FraudNet 41st
Parameter
(2008)
41st
Parameter
Financial
Institutions,
Merchants
fraud
prevention
and docu-
mentation
EZKeys, TimeDiff
Linking, Data
Spider, Sketch
Match
ACI Retail
Commerce
Server
ACI (2008a)
ACI Retail check
acceptance
authorization system
ACI Proactive
Risk Manager
ACI (2008b)
ACI Wholesale card fraud
detection,
money
laundering
user defined rules,
neural networks
CCM
(Continuous
Control
Monitoring)
ACL (2008)
ACL Austrian
Ministry of
Finance
Accounting
Fraud
continuos audits
SAND
Corporation
(2008a)
Advanced
Software
Design
Corporation
Banks electronic
check
processing
encrypted
authentication code
Fractals Alaric
(2008)
Alaric Credit / Debit
Card Companies
card fraud scoring model
Alcatel Fraud
Management
Systems Lucent
(2008)
Alcatel
Lucent
Telecommuni-
cation
Subscriber
fraud
rule based system
ScorXPress ASA
(2008)
ASA Credit / Debit
Card Companies
Credit card
misuse
neural network
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Toolname Hersteller Clients Application Technology
several
Austinlogistics
(2008)
austinlogistics Seven of the top
10 banks in the
world*
Predictive
analytic
software
solution
rule engines,
prediction models
WatchDog
Solutions
(2008a)
Bassett
Telecom
Solutions
Tele.ring
Austria,
Accenture
Singapore
telecommunica-
tions
fraud
subscriber profiling,
rating
iProtect,
iPrevent,
iComply
Brighterion
(2008)
brighterion Government,
Banks,
Insurance
Intelligent
Anti-Money
Laundering
Solution
Smart-Agents
technology, Neural
Networks, Case
Based Reasoning
payment tech-
nologyCheckfree
(2008)
carreker /
checkfree
Banks full range of
payment
processing
solutions
scaned check image
analysis
several
ChoicePoint
(2008)
ChoicePoint Government,
Banks,
Insurance
customer
profiling,
insurance
fraud, risk
analysis
information
integration
Magnify PAT-
TERN:Detect
Solutions
(2008b)
ChoicePoint
Claims
Solutions
Insurances insurance
fraud
Analytics and
Predictive Modeling,
Accident Reports,
Identity Matching,
Smart Ordering,
Compliance Watch
List Screening,
Carrier
Identification,
Visualization,
Identity Verification,
Case
Management,Claims
Monitoring
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Toolname Hersteller Clients Application Technology
CyberSource
Decision
Manager
CyberSource
(2008)
cyberSource VISA transaction
fraud
Fusion Scoring
technology, Virtual
Intelligence Risk
Technology
LEADMiner
technologies
International
(2008)
datamining-
international
US and partner
governments
structured
and
unstructured
data analysis
expert systems, link
analysis
FraudView Ectel
(2008)
ectel Telecommunica-
tion
subscriber
fraud,
identity
fraud and
many more
scoring model, rule
engine, Link
Visualization
equifax Equifax
(2008)
equifax Credit / Risk
Management
information
solutions
fraud experts do
phone consulting
Falcon® Fraud
Manager
FairIsaac (2008)
FairIsaac Debit, credit, oil
and retail card
issuers
detect and
stop
fraudulent
transactions
rules engine
FinCAIS
FINCEN (2008)
FINCEN US-Goverment money
laundering,
mortage
fraud
link analysis
DebtIn4mer
FML (2008)
FML service provider fraud in bad
debt
discovery
solution
data mining
Fortent Fraud
Management
FORTENT
(2008)
FORTENT Barclays,
JPMorgan, The
Bank of New
York, RBS
check fraud,
money
laundering
case based
reasoning
Validis Route
(2008)
Future
Route
accountants,
financial
directors and
bookkeepers
account
validation
and
anomality
detection
induction logic
programming,
genetic algorithms
and information
theory
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Toolname Hersteller Clients Application Technology
HNC unveiled
Autoadvisor(tm)
INC. (2008)
HNC
SOFTWARE
INC.
Insurance
Companies
insurance
fraud
neutral networks
Analyst’s
Notebook I2inc
(2008)
i2inc over 2,000
organizations
worldwide
visual
investigative
analysis
software
link analysis
NORA IBM
(2008)
IBM US Government homeland
security
identity resolution
infoglide
Infoglide (2008)
infoglide Airlines airline
passenger
screening
fuzzy matching over
multiple databases
RiskShield
inform GmbH
(2008)
inform
GmbH
banking,
insurance and
telecommunica-
tion
transaction
fraud
real-time pattern
recognition
InfoRate
InfoScore (2008)
InfoScore Banks,
Insurance
customer
profiling
scoring, data
cleaning
Secure Science
Corporation
IntelliFound E-Commerce credit card,
identity
fraud, etc.
monitoring
severalInterX
(2008)
InterX several
governement
organisations
distributed
datasource
pattern
search
agent technology
F.A.L.S.T.A.F.F.
Government
(2008)
Italien
Government
Italien Ministery
of Trade and
Finance
counterfeiting,
customes
database and AI
Fraud
Management
Lavastorm
(2008)
Lavastorm Telecommuni-
cation
telephone
fraud
knowledge-based
system
VECTOR Fraud
Solution
Solutions
(2008c)
Metavante
Image
Solutions
Electronic
Payment
Companies
check
processing
rule selection and
filtering
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Toolname Hersteller Clients Application Technology
SONAR (ADS)
NASD (2008)
NASD New York Stock
Exchange
NASDAQ several AI
techniques, such as
data mining, natural
language processing
for text mining,
intelligent software
agents, rule-based
inference, and
knowledge-based
data representation
Minotaur
Technologies
(2008a)
Natural
Technologies
(NT)
Telecommuni-
cation and
Financial Sector
fraud
management
neural predictive
analytical models
PRISM eFraud
Nestor (2008)
Nestor Internet
Gaming, Lottery
and Casino
Customers
detection
and
prevention
neural networks
NetMap
(2008)
Netmap
Analytics
Law
Enforcement
and Intelligence
Agencies
crime
investigation
map data finding
common links
Neural
Technologies
Decider
Technologies
(2008b)
neural
technologies
Credit / Risk
Management
customer
profiling
neural networks
Nt’s Minotaur
Fraud
Management
Solution
Technologies
(2008a)
neural
technologies
Telecommuni-
cation and
Financial Sector
subscription
fraud,
identity
fraud
neural networks
NFC Sentinel
NFC Global
(2008)
NFC Global,
LLC
Banks customer
profiling
data integration
Oscar Kilo’s core
product Kilo
(2008b)
Oscar Kilo Banks,
Insurance
transaction
fraud
pattern matching
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146 E Fraud Detection and Prevention Software
Toolname Hersteller Clients Application Technology
DETECT Kilo
(2008a)
Oscar Kilo All kinds of
businesses
credit card
fraud,
factoring
fraud,
insurance
fraud,
mobile
phone fraud,
etc.
risk engine
Red Shield ReD
(Retail
Decisions)
(2008)
ReD (Retail
Decisions)
Ecommerce
(b2c)
card fraud
prevention
neural networks,
pattern recognition
RootStream
Detect Stream
(2008)
ROOT
Stream
Auditors accounting
fraud
statistical
techniques
FraudOffice
SearchSpace
(2008)
SearchSpace Ericsson telephone
fraud
genetic algorithms,
fuzzy logic, and
neural network
technology
MonITARS
Searchspace
(2008)
Searchspace London Stock
Exchange, Bank
of New York
transaction
fraud
genetic algorithms,
fuzzy logic, and
neural network
technology
SMARTS
Smartsgroup
(2008)
smartsgroup Stock
Exchanges,
Regulator,
Broker
market
surveillance
event processing
system
AdvancedMiner
StatConsulting
(2008)
StatConsulting Telecommuni-
cation
application
fraud, billing
fraud
scoring model
Nikira Subex
(2008)
Subex Telecommuni-
cation
fraud
management
system
rules-based alarms
and pattern
matching
risknet, redflag,
smartauth
Corporation
(2008b)
The ai
Corporation
Credit / Debit
Card Companies
payment
platforms
monitoring
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Toolname Hersteller Clients Application Technology
piCARD
Angency (2008)
The
Modeling
Angency
Auditors credit card,
procurement
pattern matching
LinkExplorer
Tiburion (2008)
Tiburion,
Inc.
Public Safety
and Justice
Organisations
public safety
solutions
link analysis
Centrifuge
Tildenwoods
(2008)
tildenwoods US Government law
enforcement
visual information
analysis
VisuaLinks Inc.
(2008b)
Visual
Analytics
Inc.
US-Goverment homeland
security
visual pattern
discovery
Data Clarity®
Suite Inc.
(2008a)
Visual
Analytics
Inc.
Commercial
Business
information
sharing and
pattern
discovery
solution
data mining,
clustering, timeline
analysis, social
network analysis
WizRule
WizSoft (2008a)
WizSoft Insurance,
Auditors
database
analysis
rule engine,
likelyhood
estimation
WizWhy
WizSoft (2008b)
WizSoft Insurance,
Auditors
database
analysis
rule generator
Xtract
Autoscore
Xtract (2008)
Xtract Telecommuni-
cation
customer
relation
analysis
neural networks
Fraud
Prevention
SmartSystem
Beck (2008)
Beck Telecommuni-
cation
billing fraud finger printing,
learning, rule engine
Data Mining in
Identity Crime
Prevention
Universities
(2008)
Several
Universities
Banks, Credit
Card Companies
white-collar
crime
data mining, graph
mining
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